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Abstract
Stochastic solvency testing methods have existed for more than 20 years, yet there
has been little research conducted in this area, particularly in Australia. This is
for a number of reasons, the most pertinent of which being the lack of computing
capabilities available in the past to implement more sophisticated techniques. How-
ever, recent advances in computing have made stochastic solvency testing possible
in practice and have resulted in a trend towards this being done in advanced studies.
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a realistic solvency testing model in a
form that can be implemented by Australian Life Insurers, in anticipation that the
Australian insurance regulator, APRA, will ultimately follow the world trend and
require stochastic solvency testing to be carried out in Australia. The model is
constructed from three interconnected stochastic sub-models used to describe the
economic environment and the mortality and lapsation experience of the portfolio
of policies under consideration. Australian economic and Life Insurance data is
used to fit a number of possible sub-models, such as generalised linear models, over-
dispersion models and asset models, and the “best” model is selected in each case.
The selected models are a modified CAS/SOA economic sub-model; either a Poisson
or negative binomial (NB1) distribution (depending on the policy type considered)
as the mortality sub-model; and a normal-Poisson lapsation sub-model.
Based on tests carried out using this model, it is demonstrated that, for portfolios
of level and yearly-renewable term insurance business, the current deterministic
solvency capital requirements provide little protection against insolvency. In fact,
for the test portfolios of term insurance policies considered, the deterministic capital
requirements have levels of sufficiency of less than 2% (on a Value at Risk basis) when
compared to the change in capital distribution over a three year time horizon. This
is of concern, as yearly-renewable term insurance comprises a significant volume of
Life Insurance business in Australia, with there being over 426,000 yearly-renewable
v
vi
term insurance policies on the books of Australian Life Insurers in 1999 and more
business expected since then.
A sensitivity analysis shows that the results of the stochastic asset requirement
calculations are sensitive to the choice of sub-model used to forecast economic vari-
ables and to the choice of formulae used to describe the mean mortality and lapsa-
tion rates. The implication of this is that, if APRA were to require Life Insurers
to calculate their solvency capital requirements on a stochastic basis, some guid-
ance would need to be provided regarding the components of the solvency testing
model used. The model is not, however, sensitive to whether an allowance is made
for mortality or lapsation rate over-dispersion, nor to whether dependency relation-
ships between mortality rates, lapsation rates and the economy are allowed for.
Thus, over-dispersion and dependency relationships between the sub-models can be
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The most important goal of any business is to remain solvent, as it can no longer
continue its operations if it becomes insolvent, except in special circumstances where
the government bails out the company by injecting capital. In the case of financial
services institutions, such as banks and insurance companies, continued solvency
is of importance, not just to the institution, but also to account/policyholders who
could potentially face economic hardship if such an institution were to collapse. The
2001 collapse of Australian General Insurer HIH Insurance illustrates the adverse
consequences to the public of such an event. As a result, the financial services in-
dustry is one of the most highly regulated industries, and all advanced economies
have in place legislation designed to minimise the risk of a financial services insti-
tution going bankrupt. The legislation generally requires such institutions to hold
capital greater than a specified minimum amount, often referred to as the solvency
capital requirement, at all points in time. This thesis focuses on the calculation of
this quantity in the context of the Australian Life Insurance industry.
Currently, Australian Life Insurers are required to calculate their solvency cap-
ital requirements on a deterministic basis using formulae set out in Life Insurance
Prudential Standards LPS2.04 and LPS3.041. However, recently there has been a
trend in advanced economies, such as Switzerland, through the Swiss Solvency Test,
and the European Union countries, through Solvency II, towards calculating insurer
1LPS2.04 and LPS3.04 specify methodologies the insurer must follow in order to determine its
solvency and capital adequacy requirements, respectively. The insurer must hold assets greater
than both of these requirements at all times. If the insurer’s assets fall below the solvency require-
ment, the insurer is considered to be insolvent for statutory purposes, while if its assets fall below
the capital adequacy requirement, the Australian insurance regulator, the Australian Prudential




solvency capital requirements using stochastic techniques, thereby requiring insurers
to hold a capital amount that satisfies a probability-based criterion. For example,
insurers might be required to hold an amount of capital sufficiently large so that
there is a 99.5% chance that, in one year’s time, the insurer’s assets will exceed its
liabilities. In order to satisfy such a criterion, the insurer must attempt to determine
the probability distributions of the values of its assets and liabilities, or sometimes
just of its capital holdings, at future points in time. These distributions usually
need to be determined using computer-intensive simulation techniques. It was due
to the unavailability of inexpensive, high-speed computers in the past that determin-
istic solvency testing techniques were used almost exclusively in all countries, and
it is because of the easier access to such computers in recent years that stochastic
solvency testing techniques have suddenly come to prominence.
It is anticipated that the Australian insurance regulator, the Australian Pruden-
tial Regulatory Authority (APRA), will ultimately require Australian Life Insurers
to calculate their solvency capital requirements using stochastic methods. Such be-
ing the case, there is a need to develop a realistic asset-liability model that can be
used for this purpose. In this thesis, such a model is constructed and the model is
then used to assess whether the current Australian deterministic solvency capital
criteria are appropriate, based on four commonly used stochastic solvency criteria:
the 99.5% Value at Risk (VaR) and Tail Value at Risk (TVaR) of the change in
capital distribution over a one year time horizon, and the 95% VaR and TVaR of
the change in capital distribution over a three year time horizon. The developed
model is a simulation model comprising three interconnected stochastic sub-models
used to describe the economic environment and the mortality and lapsation experi-
ence. It is demonstrated, using Australian economic and Life Insurance data, that
the “best” sub-model in each case (out of the range of models under consideration)
is a modified CAS/SOA2 economic sub-model, a Poisson or negative binomial (de-
pending on the policy type considered) mortality sub-model, and a normal-Poisson
lapsation sub-model.
Tests conducted in this thesis demonstrate that, although the current determin-
istic requirements are sufficiently high for portfolios of investment-linked or “tradi-
tional” (endowment insurance) policies, they provide very little protection against
insolvency for portfolios of “traditional” term insurance or for portfolios of “mod-
ern” yearly-renewable term insurance under some of the solvency criteria. Sensitivity
tests conducted in association with these investigations show that the (stochastic)
total asset requirements calculated using the solvency testing model are virtually un-
affected by ignoring the over-dispersion that was found to be present in the mortality
and lapsation data used in this thesis, or dependency relationships that were found
2Casualty Actuarial Society/Society of Actuaries.
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to exist between the economy and mortality rates, and the economy and lapsation
rates. However, for some policy types, the requirements are significantly affected
by changing the sub-model used to forecast the economic variables, or simplifying
the formulae used to determine the mean mortality and lapsation rates in the sub-
models used to forecast future mortality and lapsation experience. The implication
of this latter result is that, if APRA is to require Life Insurers to calculate their
solvency capital requirements using stochastic methods, then, in order to ensure
consistency between insurers, some guidance should be provided with regard to the
nature of the solvency testing model used.
The structure of this thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 provides a review of the
existing stochastic valuation and solvency testing literature, as well as providing
an overview of the current solvency legislation in place in Australia and in several
other countries throughout the world. In Chapter 3, a framework for the stochastic
solvency testing model built in this thesis is developed and a number of research
questions are posed. Chapter 4 gives background details on many of the statistical
models (including generalised linear models and time series models) and tests used
in this thesis. The main data sets used in this thesis are described in Chapter 5, and
in Chapters 6 to 8, a realistic stochastic solvency testing model, intended for use by
Australian Life Insurers, is developed based on this data, and the method of imple-
mentation of the model is set out. Chapter 9 summarises the results of comparing
the solvency capital requirements calculated using the stochastic solvency model de-
veloped in the previous chapters with those calculated under LPS2.04 and LPS3.04,
and provides a sensitivity analysis of these results; and Chapter 10 concludes this
thesis by discussing its limitations and suggesting possibilities for future research.
CHAPTER 2
Life Insurance Solvency Testing: A Review
2.1 Introduction
In the context of accounting, a business is considered to be solvent if it can pay
its debts as they fall due. Thus, a business is generally considered to be solvent
if its assets exceed its liabilities. The difference between assets and liabilities is
referred to as capital. In the context of insurance, however, the values of the assets
and liabilities are uncertain and solvency must be defined in terms of a probability
statement. For example, an insurer is considered to be solvent at a particular point
in time, t, if there is a sufficiently high probability that the insurer’s assets are
greater than its liabilities at that time. That is, for some pre-specified value α,
Pr {A (t) > L (t)} ≥ 1− α; (2.1)
where 0 < α < 1, A (t) denotes the value of the insurer’s assets at time t, and L (t)
denotes the value of the insurer’s liabilities at time t. A major proportion of the
insurer’s liabilities are policy liabilities (defined in Section 2.2).
In spite of the fact that the insurer’s future assets and liabilities are both stochas-
tic quantities, traditionally an insurer’s solvency position has been evaluated using
prescribed formulae that ignore the random nature of these amounts, that is, on a
deterministic basis. This is primarily due to the lack of computational capabilities
required to implement more advanced techniques. However, stochastic asset and
liability valuation techniques have existed for the past 25 years1 and in recent years,
due to advances in computing, there has been a trend towards stochastic solvency
1For example, see Panjer and Bellhouse (1980).
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testing (also referred to as dynamic solvency testing), although this is not, as yet,
required by legislation in Australia2.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the techniques currently
used in Life Insurance policy liability valuation, and of the current valuation and
solvency legislation, as well as a review of the existing stochastic valuation and
solvency testing literature with a view to applying it to the Australian insurance
environment.
2.2 Reserves and Policy Liabilities
A Life Insurance policy reserve, as defined by Booth et al. (2005, p.223), is “the
amount of assets that the Life Office3 needs to hold at a particular point in time
(the valuation date) such that, allowing for future premium income and for the
anticipated returns from investment, the (insurance) liabilities of the Life Office will
be met as they fall due, (where) the (insurance) liabilities of the Life Office can be
defined as:
1. The obligations that the company has under the contracts currently in force
to pay benefits according to the terms of those contracts.
2. The expenses that the Life Office will incur in the future in order to administer
the contracts of insurance it holds.
3. The obligation to provide a return to those with a stake in the company for
the capital that they have provided; that is, to the with-profits policyholders
and/or shareholders, as appropriate.
4. Taxation.”
The terms policy reserve (or reserve) and policy liability are often used inter-
changeably. However, it is important to distinguish between these terms. The
policy liability (also termed policy value) for a Life Insurance contract (or block of
2Note that the trend towards stochastic solvency testing, referred to in this paragraph, has
been observed in the legislative standards issued by insurance regulators and not in accounting
standards. AASB 1038, the Australian Accounting Standard which applies to Life Insurance
contracts and which is the Australian equivalent to International Financial Reporting Standard
IFRS 4, requires a market consistent value to be placed on an insurer’s asset and liabilities at the
current reporting date and the insurer’s solvency is determined subject to the standard accounting
definition of solvency, given previously. Other advanced economies also have similar accounting
standards in place. In this thesis, we focus only on solvency testing from a regulatory point of
view.
3That is, the Life Insurance company.
Life Insurance Solvency Testing: A Review 7
contracts) which is in force4 is the result of the calculation:
Policy Liability = Expected present value of future outgoings
− Expected present value of future income; (2.2)
while the policy reserve is the amount actually held in respect of a contract and
may differ from the theoretical policy value. For example, the reserve may equal
the calculated policy liability plus an additional risk margin added to better ensure
that the insurer will be able to meet all claim payments even if the actual claims
experience turns out to be worse than expected. Policy reserves are calculated
for various purposes, including statutory reporting requirements, and in order to
calculate the insurer’s future financing requirements. This distinction between these
terms is made throughout this thesis.
Equation (2.2) is a prospective formula for calculating policy liabilities (the result
of this calculation is often referred to as a prospective policy liability). An alternative
approach to calculating policy liabilities is to use a retrospective (or accumulation)
approach. Under this approach the (retrospective) policy liability for an in force
insurance contract is calculated as:
Policy Liability = Accumulated value of income to date
− Accumulated value of outgoings to date; (2.3)
where the accumulated values are calculated allowing for both interest and survivor-
ship5. If the retrospective and prospective policy liabilities for a given policy at a
given point in time are calculated using the same set of mortality, lapsation and
economic assumptions, then they will be equal, but otherwise may differ (Faculty
of Actuaries and Institute of Actuaries (2008)).
In practice the prospective method of valuation is most often used, except in the
case of unbundled policies (for example, investment-linked policies). However, for
consistency, in this thesis we shall use the prospective method to value all policy
types. Thus, the term policy liability is taken to refer to the prospective policy
liability. Policy liabilities comprise a major proportion of an insurer’s liabilities (the
residual liabilities typically being those that any business entity, not just an insurer,
would be expected to hold) and thus, estimating the insurer’s policy liabilities is
integral to determining an insurer’s solvency position.
4An insurance contract is said to be in force if it has been written, that is, the policy term has
commenced, and has not yet expired through reaching the end of its term or following a claim, nor
has it been terminated by either the insurer or the policyholder.
5The accumulated value allowing for interest and survivorship of $1, invested for a term of n
years at an interest rate of i p.a by a life currently aged x exact, is (1 + i)n /npx, where npx denotes
the probability a life currently aged x exact survives to age x+ n.
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2.3 An Overview of Policy Valuation Techniques
Prior to the widespread use of computers, actuaries used very simplistic methods for
performing policy valuations. One such method used was the net premium policy
valuation method, described in Carr (2004), which makes no explicit allowance for
future profit distribution or expenses. Traditional valuation methods, such as the net
premium valuation method, were typically implemented using actuarial mathemati-
cal formulae6 that could be evaluated with the assistance of tabulated commutation
functions7, in order to perform the required expected present value calculations.
These formulae required a minimal number of parameters to evaluate (typically
only the mortality table, a fixed interest rate and policy details, such as the age
of the policyholder, term of the contract and sum insured) and made simplifying
assumptions, such as making no allowance for lapsation8. Furthermore, conserva-
tive valuation assumptions (for example, a low future interest rate or high mortality
rates) were typically used to include an implicit margin against the risk of insol-
vency in the policy value. In fact, in Australia, the Life Insurance Act 1945 required
the use of conservative valuation assumptions when calculating policy liabilities for
statutory reporting purposes.
The advancement of fast, inexpensive computers made possible valuation tech-
niques that were previously considered impractical due to the large number of cal-
culations involved, in particular, projection (or discounted cashflow) techniques.
Projection techniques involve calculating the expected cashflows (for example, of
premiums, claims and expenses) for each time period for a policy (or block of poli-
cies) and then discounting these cashflows to get the expected present values required
in Equation (2.2). Projection techniques are usually implemented using either spe-
cialist computer software or spreadsheet models designed to incorporate all of the
necessary variables and assumptions. If spreadsheet models are used, as is the case in
this thesis, it is common to build two models: a policy model and a payment model.
The policy model is used to forecast the number of policies in force at discrete in-
tervals in time (usually monthly, half-yearly, or annually) and once the number of
policies in force at each point in time is known, the policy cashflows are forecast
using the payments model. Some simplifying assumptions are still required in build-
6Actuarial mathematical formulae are discussed in detail in most Life Insurance mathematics
texts, for example Bowers et al. (1997), Gerber (1997) and Promislow (2006).
7Commutation functions are computational devices developed in the 18th century to assist in
the calculation of numerical values for many actuarial quantities, in particular the expected present
values of insurance and annuity benefits. Prior to the widespread availability of computers and
electronic calculators, values of commutation functions were tabulated for specific interest rates
and life tables, for lives of differing ages, thus reducing the time required to calculate premiums
and policy values. For further details see Gerber (1997).
8Lapsation (or withdrawal) is defined as the voluntary termination of an insurance contract by
the policyholder.
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ing such models (for example, assumptions are often made concerning the timing
of cashflows). Nevertheless, these models allow for additional complexities (such as
allowance for withdrawals) not previously feasible with traditional techniques.
With the movement towards projection techniques also came a movement to-
wards calculating policy liabilities on a realistic basis; that is, allowing for all rele-
vant cashflows and using realistic, rather than conservative, valuation assumptions.
Historically, realistic policy liabilities were only used for management information
and not in published accounts. However, in recent years most developed countries
have incorporated the requirement of realistic policy liabilities for statutory report-
ing purposes in their Life Insurance legislation. In Australia, this requirement was
incorporated in the Life Insurance Act 1995. To protect against the risk of insol-
vency, an explicit risk margin can be added to the realistic policy liability, once it
is calculated, to give the amount required for reserving purposes. Such risk margins
are also, typically, required by legislation.
In general, the valuation techniques described above are implemented using de-
terministic valuation assumptions, that is, all valuation model assumptions are as-
sumed to be known (non-random) values, even if this is clearly untrue, as in the
case of future interest rates. The only random variables allowed for in a determin-
istic valuation are time-until-death and time-until-withdrawal. The distributions of
these random variables are summarised in decrement tables of mortality and lap-
sation (or lapse) rates. For use in the valuation model, however, the mortality
and lapse rates in these tables are assumed to be deterministic. A policy value
calculated using deterministic valuation assumptions is referred to as a determin-
istic policy value. Deterministic methods suffice for the calculation of realistic (or
best estimate) policy values. However, they do not allow for the estimation of the
probability distribution of the policy liabilities9. Without such an estimate, it is
impossible to determine the probability of adequacy of the policy reserves. To esti-
mate the probability distribution of the policy liabilities, it is necessary to employ
stochastic valuation techniques.
Stochastic valuation techniques generally involve replacing some of the quantities
used in the deterministic valuation assumptions in the previously mentioned meth-
ods with random variables. Not all of the quantities need be assumed stochastic
(that is, random variables). In some cases, a deterministic assumption is adequate
(for example, expense assumptions). Nevertheless, mortality rates, lapsation rates
and economic processes such as interest and inflation are generally considered to be
stochastic in nature and should be treated accordingly in the valuation. A number
of papers have been written suggesting ways in which this can be done; a review is
9Historically, to account for variability of estimates, some sensitivity analysis is performed of
assumptions such as the decrement table.
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given in Section 2.5.
By replacing the deterministic assumptions with stochastic ones, the policy value
becomes a random variable for which a probability distribution can be estimated.
Using this information, it is then possible to determine a best estimate policy liability
(usually this is set equal to the mean of the distribution) and to set reserves at a
pre-specified level of adequacy (for example, a 75% probability that the reserve is
sufficient to meet all future claim payments and policy expenses as they fall due).
Stochastic liability valuation techniques have existed for the past 25 years, but in
spite of this, stochastic reserves are rarely calculated in the context of Life Insurance.
This is partly due to the lack of computational capabilities required to implement
such techniques and a lack of understanding of these techniques by the actuarial
community in general. However, it is mainly due to the high level of complexity
of this task. To determine the probability distribution of a Life Insurer’s policy
liabilities, it is necessary to “determine the sensitivity of the (policy liabilities) to all
relevant risk factors over the whole run-off period of the liabilities which (is) often
40 to 50 years” (FOPI (2006, p. 9)), and the resulting distribution depends heavily
on the assumptions made in determining it. Nevertheless, it is generally believed
the probability distribution of the change in the best estimate policy liability over a
relatively short time horizon (for example, one year), required for stochastic solvency
testing, can be calculated with reasonable stability, and for this reason, recent ad-
vances in computing have resulted in stochastic solvency testing becoming an area of
increasing interest to insurers and insurance regulators. Stochastic solvency testing
is discussed in the next section.
2.4 Solvency
Estimating the value of policy liabilities is just one step in the process required to
assess an insurer’s solvency position. Traditionally, solvency has been assessed on
a deterministic basis, by using prescribed formulae that ignore the random nature
of the valuation parameters. These formulae are sometimes called “risk-based cap-
ital models”. An insurer is considered to be solvent if, at the valuation date, its
assets are greater in value than its liabilities (both policy liabilities and non-policy10
liabilities), with sufficient buffer for capital. Policy liabilities are valued using one
of the deterministic techniques mentioned in Section 2.3 and conservative valuation
assumptions are enforced so as to include an implicit risk margin in the estimate
(more recently, an explicit deterministic risk margin was added to the best estimate
10Non-policy liabilities refers to any of the insurer’s liabilities that are not classed as policy
liabilities. This definition includes any liabilities a typical company (not necessarily an insurer)
would expect to incur, such as accounts payable, borrowings, etc.
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of the policy liabilities instead of an implicit margin). In many instances, additional
margins are also added to the liabilities to allow for other risks not included in the
policy liability risk margin, such as asset risks (for example, credit risk and liquidity
risk) and catastrophe risk. That is, an insurer is considered to be solvent if:
A (0) > L (0) + Risk margins, (2.4)
where t = 0 is the valuation date.
As in the case of policy reserving, it is also possible to evaluate an insurer’s
solvency position using stochastic techniques. This is referred to in this thesis as
stochastic solvency testing. Stochastic solvency testing involves determining proba-
bility distributions for A (t) and L (t), or sometimes, just for the insurer’s capital at
time t, C (t), where C (t) = A (t)− L (t), and using these to determine the amount
of capital the insurer must hold at the solvency testing date such that a probability-
based solvency criterion (for example11, Pr (C (t) > 0) = 0.995) is satisfied. An
insurer is then considered to be solvent if the amount of capital that it is currently
holding is greater than this amount (additional risk margins may also be added to
this minimum capital amount, as in the deterministic case).
There are many overlaps between stochastic reserving and stochastic solvency
testing and many of the models and techniques used in one can also be applied to the
other. In both cases it is necessary to determine probability distributions for many
of the valuation assumptions (in particular, mortality rates, lapsation rates, asset
returns and inflation). However, in the case of stochastic reserving, it is necessary
to simulate values of the valuation assumptions for each valuation period for the
remaining term of the block of policies in question (often more than 20 years), while
in the case of stochastic solvency testing, it is only necessary to simulate values of
the valuation assumptions for each valuation period for the solvency testing time
horizon, that is, to time t (where t is typically specified in the solvency legislation
and is usually less than 5 years). Simulated values of A (t) and L (t), used to deter-
mine empirical distributions of these quantities, are best estimates of the insurer’s
assets and liabilities that would be calculated at time t, allowing for the simulated
mortality, lapsation, and economic behaviour over the period from the valuation
date to time t. From time t onwards, best estimate valuation assumptions are used.
11This is the Value at Risk (VaR) concept, which is discussed in detail in Section 2.6.
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2.5 Stochastic Claims Reserving and Solvency
Testing
The concepts of stochastic Life Insurance reserving and solvency testing are not new.
They were proposed as far back as the 1970’s (for example, see OECD (1971)), and
most of the papers subsequently written on these topics have put forward very
simplistic valuation models that do not differ greatly from the traditional models
that were criticised in Section 2.3. Most attempts to evaluate policy reserves or
solvency in a stochastic environment have simply involved assuming that there is a
single asset class with the yield on this asset class being a random variable, but still
use deterministic mortality rate assumptions (and ignore lapsation). The papers also
generally take a net premium valuation approach. Some examples of papers which
take this approach are Panjer and Bellhouse (1980), Frees (1990), Parker (1997),
Marceau and Gaillardetz (1999), and Cairns (2000), among others. As was alluded
to previously, the net premium valuation method has been widely criticised for its
lack of realism; ignoring the stochastic nature of mortality and lapse rates will lead
to underestimation of the variance of the policy liabilities.
A range of stochastic asset return and interest rate models exist in the actuarial
and financial literature, most of which are time series models. All of the papers
mentioned above used simple univariate time series models, such as the autoregres-
sive process of order 1 (AR(1)), the moving average process of order 1 (MA(1)) or
the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process (which is the continuous counterpart to the AR(1)
process), to model stochastic interest rates. These models are described in greater
detail in Section 4.4.
Very few investigations have considered stochastic reserving or solvency testing
allowing for more than one stochastic valuation assumption. Three cases where this
has occurred are Daykin et al. (1994), Lee (2000) and Tsai et al. (2001).
Both Lee (2000) and Tsai et al. (2001) took a net premium valuation approach.
Lee (2000) ignored lapsation but assumed that mortality rates, as well as interest
rates and inflation, were random variables. Lee considered three different stochastic
economic models for modelling asset returns: the Wilkie (1995) model, the Smith
Jump Equilibrium model (Smith (1996)), and the Cairns model (Cairns (1999));
and proposed two (original) stochastic mortality models. Tsai et al. (2001) ignored
expenses, but not lapsation, and allowed for stochastic mortality, lapsation and
interest rates in their model. Tsai et al. assumed a binomial distribution for the
number of deaths in each year and used a cointegrated vector autoregressive (VAR)
process to model interest rates and lapsation (taking into account a dependency
relationship observed by Tsai et al. between these variables).
Earlier, Daykin et al. (1994) outlined a stochastic simulation model that could be
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used for policy valuation or solvency testing purposes. They proposed a projection
approach with allowance for all of the commonly expected life insurance cashflows
and decrements. Stochastic sub-models were used to generate the numbers of deaths
and lapses and the interest and inflation rates in each year. Daykin et al. suggested
either a Poisson or binomial distribution be used to model the numbers of deaths
and lapses, and either the Wilkie model (Wilkie (1986)) or a time series model, such
as an autoregressive process, be used to model inflation and interest.
The models proposed by Daykin et al. (1994), Lee (2000) and Tsai et al. (2001)
are all simulation models. In each case, after estimation of the parameters, the values
of the random variables, and hence, the insurer’s asset and liability position at time
t, can be generated using simulation techniques, and based on a large number of
simulation trials, an empirical distribution for the insurer’s capital at time t can be
derived from which the insurer’s capital requirement can be determined.
With some exceptions, dependency relationships between the stochastic random
variables were generally ignored by these authors. Consequently, there is scope for
further research on this topic.
2.6 Risk Measures
The three most commonly mentioned methods of determining risk margins in the
context of stochastic reserving are the Value at Risk (VaR) method, the Tail Value
at Risk (TVaR) method (also referred to as the Expected Shortfall method), and
the Cost of Capital method. As well as being used to calculate policy risk margins,
the VaR and TVaR can be used to calculate the solvency capital requirement of an
insurer. The Cost of Capital method is unsuitable for this purpose.
1. The VaR method is commonly used in banking and referred to in Basel II
(BIS (2006)), the second Basel Accord produced by the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS), which makes recommendations for bank capital regulations.
The VaR of a liability or loss distribution is defined by Sandstro¨m (2006) as
the α-quantile xα, which is the value satisfying
VaRα (X) = inf {x ∈ R : P (X > x) ≤ α} , (2.5)
where X denotes the random variable under consideration (for example, the
loss during year t) and 0 < α < 1.
The 100 (1− α)% VaR Risk Margin is then defined as
RM (α) = VaRα (X)− µ, (2.6)
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where µ denotes the mean of the distribution, and α is specified in advance,
often in the legislation of the country that the insurer operates in. µ here is
generally viewed as the insurer’s policy reserves and RM (α) is interpreted as
the solvency capital requirement.
2. The TVaR (also defined in Sandstro¨m (2006)) is the conditional tail expecta-
tion in the upper α% of the right-hand tail of the (liability or loss) distribution.
That is,
TVaRα (X) = E [X|X > VaRα (X)] ; (2.7)
where 0 < α < 1, and the 100 (1− α)% TVaR risk margin thus satisfies
RM (α) = TVaRα (X)− µ. (2.8)
The TVaR method gives rise to greater risk margins than the VaR method
(for the same confidence level).
3. A third method of calculating risk margins is the Cost of Capital method.
Under the Cost of Capital method, “the risk margin of an insurance portfolio
is defined as the hypothetical cost of regulatory capital necessary to run off
all the insurance liabilities, following financial distress of the company” (Sand-
stro¨m (2006, p. 149)). CEA (2006) and FOPI (2006) give methodologies for
calculating the risk margin under the Cost of Capital method. The basic steps
involved are:
(a) Calculate the solvency capital requirement (SCR) for the portfolio for
each future point of the policy liability projections (that is, t = 1, 2, . . .)
until the portfolio has run off12, assuming no new business.
(b) Calculate the cost of capital (that is, the capital charge) for each year
until run off.
(c) Calculate the present value at time t = 0 of the capital charges calculated
in Step 2.





k=1 (1 + rk)
, (2.9)
where SCRt is the solvency capital requirement at time t, rk is the discrete
12An insurance portfolio is said to have run off when all of the policies in the portfolio have
either expired or been terminated, either due to a claim being made, lapsation, or the actions of
the insurer; and no new policies are being issued by the insurer.
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per period risk discount rate for the period from time k − 1 to time k, and
CoCt is the cost of capital factor for period t.
The SCR may be defined either deterministically or stochastically using ei-
ther the VaR or TVaR method and CoCt is typically specified in reserving
legislation.
There has been a recent trend in Europe towards using the Cost of Capital
method for risk margin calculations. CEA (2006) and FOPI (2006) list a number
of reasons why the Cost of Capital method may be preferable to the Value at Risk
approach to calculating risk margins, the most pertinent of these reasons being:
“policy holders’ interest(s) (are) best served if the portfolio of an insolvent insurer
could be taken over by another insurer (and) this is not necessarily fulfilled by the
(VaR) approach.” (FOPI (2006, p.8)). VaR risk margins provide some degree of
safety that the insurer will have sufficient funds to meet its liabilities, but they do
not necessarily provide adequate risk compensation for a hypothetical insurer who
may take over the portfolio in the future. Cost of Capital risk margins aim to provide
this protection.
2.7 Reserving and Solvency Legislation
In Australia, three actuarial standards exist that set out the statutory requirements
for the valuation of policy liabilities for realistic profit reporting, solvency and capi-
tal adequacy purposes. These standards were made by the Life Insurance Actuarial
Standards Board (LIASB), and reissued by the Australian Prudential Regulatory
Authority (APRA) in 2008, following the transferral of responsibility for actuarial
standards from the LIASB to APRA as a result of the Financial Sector Legislation
Amendment (Simplifying Regulation and Review) Act 2007. All Life Insurers with
operations in Australia are obligated to comply with these standards13. Life Insur-
ance Prudential Standard 1.04: Valuation of Policy Liabilities (LPS1.04) was made
for the purposes of subsection 114(2) of the Life Insurance Act 1995 (the Act)14; Life
Insurance Prudential Standard 2.04: Solvency Standard (LPS2.04) was made for the
purposes of subsection 65(1) of the Act15; and Life Insurance Prudential Standard
3.04: Capital Adequacy Standard (LPS3.04) was made for the purposes of subsection
13Note that the Life Insurance Act 1995 does not apply in relation to the foreign Life Insurance
business of foreign Life Insurers, even if they operate in Australia, under Section 16ZE of the Act.
14“A valuation of the policy liabilities referable to a statutory fund must be made in accordance
with actuarial standards.” Life Insurance Act 1995 (114(2)).
15“The solvency standard consists of provision made by an actuarial standard for the purposes
of this Division.” Life Insurance Act 1995 (65(1)).
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70(1) of the Act16. LPS1.04 requires the realistic valuation of the life policies of the
insurer, providing for the emergence of profit from life policies as it is earned, while
LPS2.04 and LPS3.04 require the determination of policy liabilities using prescribed
assumptions that are more conservative than best estimate assumptions and also
outline the statutory capital requirements for Australian Life Insurers.
The amount calculated under LPS1.04, which is referred to as the policy liability,
is a central estimate of the value of the liabilities payable by the insurer in the future.
It is determined using the formula:
Policy Liability = Best Estimate Liability
+ EPV of future best est. bonuses (for participating business17)
+ EPV of future best est. shareholder profit,
(2.10)
where EPV stands for Expected Present Value, and Best Estimate (or best est.)
refers to an estimate determined using realistic assumptions; while
Best Estimate Liability = EPV of future benefit payments
+ EPV of future expenses
− EPV of future receipts (ie. premiums); (2.11)
Discounting is carried out at either the assumed rate of future investment income or
at “a risk free discount rate18,” and profits can only be recognised once they have
been earned (this is done using the Margin on Services (MoS) approach, which is
described in LPS1.04).






• mortality and morbidity;
16“The capital adequacy standard consists of provision made by an actuarial standard for the
purposes of this Division.” Life Insurance Act 1995 (70(1)).
17Under a participating or with-profits policy, the policyholder is entitled to receive a share of
the profits earned by the insurer (usually as a result of paying higher premiums than if the policy
was a non-profit contract). These profits are distributed to the policyholder as bonuses.
18The risk free discount rate to be used is not specified in the Standard, although is taken to
refer to the yield on Commonwealth Government securities.
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• policy discontinuance; and
• reinsurance.
The amounts calculated under LPS2.04 and LPS3.04, the solvency requirement
and capital adequacy (cap. ad.) requirement, respectively, are the amounts the
insurer must hold so as to be considered, by APRA, to be solvent in the short
term (in the case of the solvency requirement) and likely to remain solvent in the
long term (in the case of the capital adequacy requirement). By definition, the
capital adequacy requirement is always at least as great as the solvency requirement,
and for regulatory purposes an insurer must hold assets greater than its capital
adequacy requirement, although it is not considered to be insolvent for statutory
purposes unless its assets fall below its solvency requirement. If an insurer’s assets
fall below its capital adequacy requirement, this serves as an early warning signal
to APRA, allowing it the opportunity to intervene in order to prevent the insurer
from becoming insolvent, if at all possible.
One component of the solvency requirement is the solvency liability, which is
determined based on the same methodology used to determine the LPS1.04 best
estimate liability but “allowing for current and future bonuses subject to the appro-
priate application of discretions” and adopting prescribed (conservative) valuation
assumption. No allowance is made for future shareholders’ profits, since, if an insurer
is on the verge of insolvency, it is not permitted to release its capital to shareholders.
Similarly, one component of the capital adequacy requirement is the capital adequacy
liability, which is calculated as for the solvency liability, but adopting a different set
of prescribed (conservative) valuation assumptions. The prescribed assumptions un-
der LPS3.04 are more conservative than those prescribed under LPS2.04, but are
subject to the insurer’s discretion. For example, under LPS2.04, the insurer must
add a risk margin of 2.5% to their investment management expenses, while under
LPS3.04 the insurer must add a margin of between 2.5% and 20%, with the size of
the margin determined by the insurer with regard to the particular circumstances
of the company and the level of risk of the product type.
In addition to the solvency and capital adequacy liabilities, the solvency and
capital adequacy requirements also include an allowance for non-policy liabilities
and additional risk margins to protect the insurer against a range of risks, including
credit risk, liquidity risk and the risk of adverse market movements, among others
(the methodologies for calculating the solvency and capital adequacy requirements
are summarised in Appendix B). The difference between the insurer’s solvency re-
quirement and its best estimate liabilities (both policy and non-policy liabilities)
can, consequently, be thought of as its solvency capital requirement, with the in-
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surer’s capital adequacy capital requirement similarly defined:




Cap. Ad. Capital Requirement = Cap. ad. requirement − Best estimate liability
−Other liabilities.
(2.13)
No requirement is made for the actuary to use stochastic assumptions under
any of these three standards, and in practice, most actuaries use deterministic as-
sumptions. Since the solvency and capital adequacy requirements are calculated
deterministically, the probabilities of adequacy of these requirements are unknown,
as is whether these probabilities are consistent among different policy types and be-
tween different insurers, although according to Karp (2002), “the capital adequacy
risk criterion was set at a 2% probability of assets falling below the required solvency
level at the next annual balance date” and “the solvency risk criterion was set at a
5% probability of assets falling below liabilities within any of the next three annual
balance dates” (p. 5). It is uncertain as to how Karp determined these probabil-
ities. Presumably stochastic solvency testing methods must have been used, but
these are not specified, and in order to determine whether Karp’s claims are true,
it is necessary to use stochastic solvency testing methods.
Stochastic reserving methods are currently mandated in Australia for General
Insurers19 under APRA Prudential Standard GPS 310. Under this standard, the
insurer must hold a risk margin above the central estimate of the value of its liabilities
such that the liabilities are valued at the 75% level of sufficiency (or at the central
estimate plus one half of the coefficient of variation, if this amount is greater than
the 75% level of sufficiency).
In addition, the insurer must hold capital greater than its minimum capital
requirement, as specified under APRA Prudential Standard GPS 110. The insurer’s
minimum capital requirement may be calculated using a prescribed (deterministic)
method or the insurer may develop its own internal capital measurement model
and use that to calculate its minimum capital requirement (subject to APRA’s
19General Insurance is defined under the Insurance Act 1973 as any insurance not classified as
Life Insurance (under the Life Insurance Act 1995) or Health Insurance (under the Private Health
Insurance Act 2007). Although both General Insurance and Life Insurance are types of insurance
business, the methods typically used to calculate reserves in the context of General Insurance,
stochastic or otherwise, are not applicable to Life Insurance business and vice versa.
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approval of the model). If the internal model based approach is used, the insurer
must hold sufficient capital such that the insurer’s probability of default over a one
year time horizon is reduced to 0.5% or below. In theory, the internal model based
approach should produce lower risk margins than the prescribed method. However,
Sutherland-Wong and Sherris (2004) demonstrated, through a case study, that the
opposite may, in fact, hold true.
In 2004, the International Actuarial Association (IAA) published a report (IAA
(2004)) making recommendations on insurer solvency assessment. Three recommen-
dations of this report (p. 5) were:
• “A reasonable period for the solvency assessment time horizon, for purposes
of determining an insurer’s current financial position is about one year;”
• “The amount of required capital must be sufficient with a high level of confi-
dence, such as 99%, to meet all obligations for the time horizon as well as the
present value at the end of the time horizon of the remaining future (insur-
ance) obligations (for example, best estimate value with a moderate level of
confidence, such as 75%);” and
• The most appropriate risk measure for solvency assessment is the Tail Value
at Risk as it requires insurers to hold an additional capital amount, above the
Value at Risk capital amount, that is greater for insurers with more positively
skewed loss distributions (that is, insurers who are more likely to experience
catastrophic losses, must hold a greater amount of capital).
Some major countries are already in the process of introducing the requirement
of stochastic solvency testing into their Life Insurance legislation.
The European Commission is currently in the process of reviewing the existing
European Union (EU) solvency regime (Solvency I) with the objective of establishing
“a solvency system that is better matched to the true risks of an insurance company”
(CEA and Mercer Oliver Wyman (2005, p. 1)). This new system is referred to as
Solvency II and it is anticipated that it will come into effect in the EU member
states by the end of 2010.
At the time of writing this, the requirements of Solvency II have yet to be
finalised. However, a recent press release issued by the European Union (EU (2007))
stated that under Solvency II “insurers must have available resources sufficient to
cover a Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR). . . based on a Value at Risk measure
calibrated to a 99.5% confidence level over a 1-year time horizon. . . . The SCR may
be calculated using either a new European Standard Formula or an internal model
validated by the supervisory authorities. . . . The technical provisions under the new
framework should be equivalent to the amount another insurer would be expected to
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pay in order to take over and meet the insurer’s obligations to policyholders.” That
is, the policy liability risk margin is calculated using the Cost of Capital method.
Switzerland, not a member of the European Union, has recently developed the
Swiss Solvency Test. Development of the Swiss Solvency Test started in 2003 and
it will become mandatory for all insurers by the end of 2010.
The Swiss Solvency Test sets out methods for calculating the Minimum Sol-
vency requirement and Target Capital that must be held by an insurer. These can
be viewed as being analogous to the Australian solvency and capital adequacy re-
quirements. Target Capital is used as an early warning sign by the Swiss regulator.
If the insurer’s capital falls below Target Capital, the insurer is not yet considered
insolvent, but the regulator is likely to initiate measures to correct the situation. It is
only if capital falls below the Minimum Solvency level that the insurer is considered
to be insolvent. The Minimum Solvency requirement is calculated deterministically,
while the Target Capital is calculated using “a hybrid stochastic-scenario model”
(FOPI (2004, p. 27)), which we now describe.
Let C (t) denote the insurer’s risk-bearing capital at time t, discounted to time
0, that is:
C (t) =
A (t)− L (t)
1 +R (0, t)
; (2.14)
and
∆C (t) = C (t)− C (t− 1) , (2.15)
where A (t) denotes the market value of the insurer’s assets at time t, L (t) denotes
the best estimate of the insurer’s liabilities at time t, and R (0, t) denotes the risk
discount rate over the period from time 0 to time t.
Target Capital under the Swiss Solvency Test is calculated as the sum of:
• the 99% TVaR of the change of risk-bearing capital over 1 year, that is, the
99% TVaR of ∆C (1);
• the liability risk margin, calculated using the Cost of Capital method; and
• a credit risk margin calculated (deterministically) using the Basel II standard-
ised approach, with operational risk excluded.
The distribution of ∆C (1) is determined by combining a set of standard asset
and liability risk models. These models all involve probability distributions. The
asset model consists of 23 economic variables, and changes in these variables are as-
sumed to be multivariate normally distributed, with mean 0 and variance-covariance
matrix specified by the Swiss Federal Office of Private Insurance (FOPI). Similarly,
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the Life Insurance liability model consists of 7 variables20 and changes in these vari-
ables are also assumed to be multivariate normally distributed with mean 0 and
variance-covariance matrix also specified by FOPI. It should be noted that the asset
and liability random variables are assumed to be independent, and within the Life
Insurance liability model, mortality and lapsation are assumed to be independent.
The distribution of ∆C (1) based on these standard models is combined with the
results of a number of scenario tests that “portray additional losses due to adverse
and rare events” (FOPI (2004, p. 34)), using the methodology outlined in Sand-
stro¨m (2006, Section 6.8.10), and this resulting distribution is used to determined
the required TVaR21.
In light of the trend in developed countries towards stochastic insurer solvency
testing and the fact that stochastic solvency testing is already required in General
Insurance (albeit, only under the internal model based approach), it is likely that
APRA will ultimately require Life Insurers to calculate their solvency capital us-
ing stochastic methods. Based on the current General Insurance legislation and
precedents from other countries, it would be reasonable to assume that APRA will
require insurers to calculate their minimum capital requirement at the 99.5% suffi-
ciency level over a one year time horizon, although according to Karp (2002), the
current Australian Life Insurance solvency requirement is set at a 95% sufficiency
level over a three year time horizon (that is, there is a “5% probability of assets
falling below liabilities within any of the next 3 annual balance dates”). Both of
these confidence levels shall be considered throughout this thesis.
2.8 Conclusion
Very little has been written on the topic of stochastic Life Insurance reserving and
solvency testing and much of what has been written tends to rely on overly sim-
plified and unrealistic assumptions. This is mainly due to the fact that, in the
past, computers capable of implementing more complex methods have not existed
(or been widely available), but it is also because insurers have not been required by
regulation to implement such methods, so have perceived no need to do so.
Until recently, Life Insurance reserving and solvency legislation in all countries
has permitted the use of deterministic valuation methods, and as a result, actuaries
have continued to use these techniques. Nevertheless, recent advances in computing
have made stochastic reserving and solvency testing possible in practice and con-
20Mortality, longevity, disability (for group pension business), disability (for non-group pension
business), recovery (for group pension business), lapse rate and option exercise by policyholder
(Sandstro¨m (2006, p. 154)).
21For more information on the calculation of Target Capital under the Swiss Solvency Test, see
FOPI (2004), Kaufmann and Wyler (2005) and Sandstro¨m (2006).
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sequently it has become an area of increasing importance. There has been a trend
throughout the world towards stochastic reserving and solvency testing, with some
countries already moving towards mandating it in their legislation.
Currently, APRA only requires stochastic reserves and solvency testing for Gen-
eral Insurance business. However, in view of recent trends and the existing General
Insurance requirements, it is likely that APRA will ultimately require that stochas-
tic solvency tests be conducted by Australian Life Insurers. In anticipation of this
requirement, it is desirable to build a realistic stochastic solvency testing model for
use in the context of the Australian Life Insurance industry. This is the purpose of
the present thesis. In the next chapter, we outline a framework for such a model
and develop a set of questions that we intend to address in this thesis.
CHAPTER 3
A Framework for Stochastic Solvency Testing
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, we described a number of Life Insurance valuation and solvency test-
ing models, both deterministic and stochastic. In recent years there has been a
trend towards more realistic policy valuation and stochastic solvency testing. How-
ever, most of the stochastic models described in Chapter 2 have unrealistic and
overly simplistic assumptions. The purpose of this thesis is to build a more realistic
stochastic asset-liability model for solvency testing purposes, and in this chapter we
develop a framework for such a model.
3.2 The Model Framework
A stochastic asset-liability model is “a stochastic model of the main financial factors
of an insurance company (and) a good model should simulate stochastically the
asset elements, the liability elements and also the relationships between both types
of random factors” (Kaufmann et al. (2001, p.214)).
Since the stochastic asset-liability (or stochastic solvency testing) model devel-
oped in this thesis is intended for use in Australia, it is desirable that it be compatible
with the existing Australian valuation philosophy wherever possible. Even though
some elements of the existing valuation philosophy clearly must change, this is not
the case with principles such as the realistic valuation of policy liabilities, which is
one of the main objectives of the current Australian Life Insurance policy valuation
standard, LPS1.04. Consequently, the model we outline in this section is based on
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many of the principles prescribed in LPS1.04, LPS2.04 and LPS3.04. The main
principles that have been retained are as follows:
• Policy liabilities are calculated using Equations (2.10) and (2.11), that is:
Policy Liability = Best Estimate Liability
+ EPV of future best est. bonuses (for participating business)
+ EPV of future best est. shareholder profit;
(3.1)
and
Best Estimate Liability = EPV of future benefit payments
+ EPV of future expenses
− EPV of future receipts (ie. premiums); (3.2)
but making no allowance for future shareholder profits (as is done in LPS2.04
and LPS3.04).
• Realistic valuation assumptions are used in the calculation of the policy lia-
bilities and all significant cash-flows are allowed for in the calculation; and
• Projection techniques are used in calculating the policy liabilities1.
Assets are also assumed to be valued realistically (at market value) in accordance
with standard Australian accounting practices.
Even though it is necessary to consider both policy and non-policy liabilities in
solvency testing, non-policy liabilities (such as borrowings and accounts payable)
are typically considered to be under the insurer’s control and assumed to be de-
terministic in nature, and have generally been ignored in existing solvency testing
models. Non-policy liabilities differ greatly in nature between insurers (so it is dif-
ficult to construct a “typical” non-policy liability portfolio) and usually comprise
a relatively small proportion of an insurer’s total liabilities. Data obtained from
annual returns submitted by Australian Life Insurers to APRA2 show that, at the
end of 2006, non-policy liabilities comprised only 10% of the total liabilities of all
Australian Life Insurers. Consequently, non-policy liabilities are not as important
as policy liabilities, from a solvency perspective, and they shall be ignored in this
thesis. Note that this is the same as assuming that the assets backing the non-policy
liabilities are perfectly matched with these liabilities and so cancel out at all times.
1Note that LPS1.04 does not “prescribe a single methodology for the valuation of policy li-
abilities.” However, it states that “the principles of the Standard will normally be achieved by
adopting a projection methodology” (p.8).
2Supplied by APRA for the purposes of this thesis.
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Recall from Section 2.7 that LPS1.04 specifically lists seven factors that should





• mortality and morbidity;
• policy discontinuance; and
• reinsurance.
These are the main factors to be considered in a Life Insurance policy valuation, and
the parameters associated with these factors are usually assumed to be known and
not subject to variability. In the case of the stochastic asset-liability model, some
or all of these parameters are assumed to be stochastic.
Investment earnings, inflation, policy discontinuance and mortality and morbid-
ity are generally considered to be stochastic processes, so stochastic interest rates
(or investment yields) and inflation rates, and lapse and mortality table parameters
will be used in our stochastic solvency testing model. Note that insurance classes
for which morbidity is a valuation assumption (for example, disability income insur-
ance) are not considered in this thesis, as data relating to these classes of business
could not be obtained. Consequently, morbidity is not considered further.
Tax and real expenses (that is, inflation-adjusted expenses), on the other hand,
will be assumed to be non-random in the stochastic solvency testing model. The
tax rate paid by insurers is usually constant from year to year (it would only change
following changes to the corporate tax system, which could be uncommon, although
during economic hardships, tax incentives may be provided to stimulate the econ-
omy); and real expenses are usually assumed to be under the control of the insurer
and not random. Nominal expenses increase over time due to inflation and the
stochastic nature of these expenses is modelled by allowing inflation to be stochas-
tic. Reinsurance arrangements entered into by insurers are determined at the dis-
cretion of the insurer itself. As is the case with non-policy liablities, reinsurance
arrangements also differ greatly by policy type and by insurer, making it difficult to
construct a “typical” set of reinsurance arrangements. Futhermore, for Australian
Life Insurers, the expected present value (EPV) of future reinsurance benefits is rel-
atively low compared with their gross policy liabilities. Data obtained from annual
returns submitted to APRA shows that, in 2006, the total expected present value
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of reinsurance benefits for all Australian Life Insurers was less that 1% of the total
gross policy liabilities for these insurers. For these reasons, although required under
LPS1.04, reinsurance is not treated in this thesis. This approach is similar to that
taken by Daykin et al. (1994). A major step in the development of our stochas-
tic solvency testing model is, therefore, the construction of (i) stochastic mortality,
(ii) lapsation and (iii) economic sub-models to describe the mortality experience,
lapse experience and the economic environment (that is, the investment yields and
inflation rates), respectively.
As was mentioned in Section 2.5, with the exception of the interrelationship be-
tween interest rates and inflation, dependency relationships between variables have
generally been ignored in previously proposed stochastic valuation models. How-
ever, lapse rates are commonly believed to be influenced by the economy; mortality
rates are often believed to depend on past lapse rates; and a number of studies have
suggested that fluctuations in the economy can cause fluctuation in mortality rates
(these dependency relationships are discussed in detail in Chapter 6). For a desired
realistic solvency testing model, the possibility of interconnected sub-models should
be considered, as we do.
Once the three abovementioned stochastic sub-models and the relevant distribu-
tions have been specified, and the model parameters have been estimated, observa-
tions can be simulated and the insurer’s capital at some future point in time can be
estimated. Repeating this procedure a large number of times produces many esti-
mates of the capital values which can be used to calculate an empirical distribution
of the capital amount. From this distribution, solvency capital requirements can be
found. This simulation-based approach was also used in Daykin et al. (1994), Lee
(2000) and Tsai et al. (2001).
Figure 3.1 shows a simplified view of the solvency testing model framework used
in this thesis. This framework is assumed to be applicable to a specified block of
business whose basic characteristics (such as the number of policies, policy type,
sums insured and the sex and age of each policyholder in the block) and the basic
characteristics of the assets backing this business (that is, the proportion allocated
to each class of assets) are included as model inputs. The arrows in the diagram in-
dicate flows of information. For example, random observations of economic variables
simulated using the economic sub-model are inputs to the mortality sub-model, the
asset model and the payment model.
The economic, mortality and lapsation stochastic sub-models are all potentially
interconnected, but we will assume that the mortality and lapsation experiences of a
relatively small group of lives (that is, the group of policyholders that comprise the
block of business under consideration) do not have a significant effect on the economy
as a whole. The simulated observations act as inputs to the four spreadsheet models,
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that is, the asset model, the policy model, the capital model and the payment model.
In policy liability valuation, projection techniques are usually implemented using
spreadsheet models comprised of a policy model and a payment model, and we
shall follow this practice here. Lapsation and mortality are inputs to our policy
model, while the economic variables, interest and inflation, are inputs to a payment
model. Deterministic tax and expense assumptions are also inputs to the payment
model, though not explicitly shown in Figure 3.1. Two more spreadsheet models
are required for solvency testing: an asset model, for determining the insurer’s asset
position at each point in time, and a capital model, for determining the insurer’s
capital position at each point in time. The economic investment yield variables and
the payment model outputs are inputs to the asset model, while the outputs of the
asset and payment models are inputs to the capital model.
The capital distribution, once estimated, is used to calculate target solvency
capital amounts which will be compared with those calculated deterministically
under the current Australian standards. As discussed in Section 2.6, a number of
different methods can be used to determine solvency capital and there is no general
consensus as to which of these methods is the most suitable. Consequently, we will
consider two versions of the model, in which solvency capital is calculated using
either the VaR or the TVaR method, as described in Section 2.6.
The capital distribution can also be used to calculate the minimum value of
assets that an insurer must hold at a particular point in time so that it satisfies
its solvency capital requirement, holds sufficient funds so that its liabilities can be
met, and could provide adequate risk compensation to a hypothetical insurer who
may take over the portfolio in the future. This amount, which is referred to as the
stochastic minimum asset requirement (SMAR), is calculated as:
SMAR = Best estimate liability
+ Cost of capital risk margin
+ Solvency capital requirement. (3.3)
This quantity is similar to the minimum asset requirement under the Swiss Solvency
Test, although in this case, a credit margin is not included.
Solvency capital in the model is calculated using a 99.5% confidence level over
a one year time horizon, in keeping with the recommendations of the International
Actuarial Association in IAA (2004) and with precedents throughout the world3, and
using a 95% confidence level over a three year time horizon, as this is the level of
sufficiency that the current Australian Solvency standard is calibrated to (according
to Karp (2002)).
3These were discussed in Section 2.7.
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3.3 Research Questions
The framework described in the previous sections gives rise to a number of research
questions. Specifically:
1. Do any significant dependency relationships exist between mortality, lapsation
and the economy and if any such relationships do exist, what are their natures?
2. What is the most suitable model for each of the stochastic sub-models and
how does the choice of model affect the overall solvency testing model output?
3. How do the solvency requirement and capital adequacy requirement calculated
deterministically under LPS2.04 and LPS3.04, respectively, compare with:
• the 99.5% VaR of the change in capital distribution over a one year time
horizon;
• the 99.5% TVaR of the change in capital distribution over a one year
time horizon;
• the 95% VaR of the change in capital distribution over a three year time
horizon; and
• the 95% TVaR of the change in capital distribution over a three year time
horizon?
where the change in capital is defined as in the Swiss Solvency Test (see Equa-
tions (2.14) and (2.15))?
4. How do the solvency requirement and the capital adequacy requirement cal-
culated deterministically under LPS2.04 and LPS3.04, respectively, compare
with the stochastic minimum asset requirement, assuming each of the solvency
capital requirements listed in the previous question?
5. Do the answers to the above questions vary by class of business?
The aim of the remaining portion of this thesis is to answer these questions.
CHAPTER 4
Statistical Models for Mortality and Economic Data
4.1 Introduction
At a number of points throughout this thesis, generalised linear models (GLMs),
possibly including over-dispersion, will be used to test for relationships between
variables, to test for over-dispersion within data sets, and to model mortality and
lapsation. Various time series models will also be used, for the purpose of modelling
economic data. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief introduction to
GLMs in general and as applied to mortality data in particular; over-dispersion
testing; models for over-dispersion; and the time series models we consider.
4.2 Generalised Linear Models
4.2.1 Generalised Linear Models - An Overview
Generalised linear models can be thought of as a generalisation of the multiple linear
regression model. A GLM is made up of three components:
1. Response variables Y1, . . . , Yn which are assumed to share the same distribution
from an exponential family;
2. A p-vector of parameters β = [β1, . . . , βp]
T together with explanatory p-vectors
z1, z2, . . . , zn.
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where µi = E(Yi) is the expected value of Yi.
The data at hand consists of observations of the quantities (Yi, zi), i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
which are assumed independent.
The GLM parameters are estimated by likelihood methods and are usually fitted
efficiently using an iteratively weighted least squares (IWLS) procedure, which is
described in detail in McCullagh and Nelder (1989) and Dobson (1990).
In the context of count data (of which mortality data is an example), it is com-
monly assumed that the response variables Yi follow a binomial or a Poisson distri-
bution. Such models are appropriate, provided the observations are homogeneous.
If this assumption is violated, then over-dispersion can result. It is then necessary
to use an alternative model that allows for this over-dispersion. Such models are
discussed in detail in Section 4.3.
A more in-depth discussion of GLMs can be found in a number of sources includ-
ing Nelder and Wedderburn (1972), where GLMs were first described, McCullagh
and Nelder (1989), Dobson (1990) and de Jong and Heller (2008).
4.2.2 A Review of Existing Generalised Linear Models for
Mortality Data
A number of generalised linear models have been proposed in the past for the purpose
of producing graduated mortality tables. One of the best known mortality rate
graduation models is the Wilkie GLM2. The Wilkie GLM has been used by the
(UK) Continuous Mortality Investigation Bureau in the past to construct initial
mortality rate3 graduations. To set out the model we will use the following notation
(which will remain standard throughout the thesis):
Dx,t denotes the number of deaths observed among a group of lives aged x in year
t; and
Ex,t denotes the initial exposed to risk
4 for lives aged x in year t.
In the Wilkie model, the random variable Dx,t is assumed to follow a binomial
1Throughout, we use “T” to denote a vector or matrix transpose.
2The Wilkie GLM was first used in the context of mortality graduation by the (UK) Continuous
Mortality Investigation Bureau in CMI Committee (1976) at the suggestion of Wilkie. For further
details see Renshaw (1991).
3The initial mortality rate, denoted qx,t, is the probability of a life aged x dying during year t.
4The initial exposed to risk (Ex,t) is defined as the number of lives aged x alive and exposed to
risk at the beginning of observation year t.
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x′ = (x− cx)/wx;
cx = (xmin + xmax)/2;
wx = (xmax − xmin)/2.
Here xmin and xmax are the minimum and maximum observed values of the age
covariate5, x, respectively. The βj are parameters to be fitted. In this model the






, 0 < y < 1. (4.2)
The transformation, x′, of x is used to map the age range onto the interval [−1, 1];
and the degree, p, of the polynomial linear predictor is determined in some optimal
way from the data.
A variation on this model, used to construct central mortality rate6 graduations,
involves replacing Ex,t with E
c
x,t, the central exposed to risk
7, and using a log link
and a Poisson distribution, rather than a binomial distribution with a logit link.
The Wilkie GLM assumes that the only covariate affecting the mortality rate is
age, and does not make allowance for systematic variation in the mortality rate over
time. Renshaw and Hatzopoulos (1996) suggested an extension of the Wilkie GLM
which allows for graduation with respect to time as well as age. In their model, the
linear predictor η in Equation (4.1) is replaced by:










5The age covariate gives the age last birthday of the policyholder or group of policyholders
whom the data point describes.
6The central mortality rate, denoted mx,t, is the number of deaths per person-year lived in year
t by those lives aged x.
7The central exposed to risk (Ecx,t) is defined as the number of person-years lived in year t by
those lives aged x. Usually a uniform distribution of deaths over the year is assumed, so Ecx,t is
taken as Ex,t − 0.5Dx,t.
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where
t′ = (t− ct)/wt;
ct = (tmin + tmax)/2;
wt = (tmax − tmin)/2;
and tmin and tmax are the minimum and maximum observed values of the year
covariate, t, respectively. The α’s, β’s and γ11 in Equation (4.3) are parameters to
be fitted.
Again, this model can be adjusted to construct central mortality rate graduations
in the same way as for the Wilkie GLM. A more thorough review of GLMs for use
in mortality graduations can be found in Haberman and Renshaw (1996).
The GLMs mentioned above were specifically formulated for the purpose of pro-
ducing graduated mortality tables. A graduated mortality table for the mortality
data that is used in this thesis is already in existence8. We make use of this resource
in the thesis by fitting GLMs which take into account the existing graduated mortal-
ity rates. This procedure thus models the observed mortality rate as a function of an
existing graduated mortality rate, and can be thought of as being akin to the process
of “graduation by reference to a standard table”, which is commonly employed by
Life Insurance actuaries. This procedure is described in the next section.
4.2.3 Graduation by Reference to a Standard Table
The process of graduation by reference to a standard mortality table involves relating
the observed mortality experience to a set of graduated mortality rates by way of a
















where f(.) denotes a given mathematical function, qsx,t denotes the initial mortality
rate given by the standard table for lives aged x at time t, and msx,t denotes the
central mortality rate given by the standard table for lives aged x at time t.
Commonly, the mathematical function used to relate the observed mortality rates
8One of the mortality data sets used in this thesis was supplied by the Institute of Actuaries of
Australia Mortality Committee. A subset of this data was used to produce the Australian insured
life mortality tables, IA95-97 M and F. The data is discussed in greater detail in Section 5.2.
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where α > 0 is a model parameter.
Once a possible relationship has been selected, the parameters are fitted using
a method such as maximum likelihood estimation, least squares or weighted least
squares.
This method is used in practice to produce graduated mortality rates for Life
Insurance applications (such as pricing and reserving) when data are sparse but are
believed to come from an experience similar to that for which a graduated table
already exists. Nevertheless, there seem to be very few references to this method in
the actuarial literature. Two references to this method can be found in Benjamin
and Pollard (1980, pp.328–338) and London (1985, pp.24–25).
In Equations (4.4) and (4.5), the standard mortality table rates, qsx,t and m
s
x,t
are denoted in such a way as to allow for different standard mortality tables in each
year, t, but it is rarely the case that tables are compiled in such a way. In practice,
mortality tables are generally produced for a single base year (with the base year
denoted as year 0) and adjusted to allow for durational mortality improvements







where RF qx,t denotes the reduction factor for a life aged x, in year t.






where RFmx,t denotes the reduction factor for a life aged x, in year t.
Methods exist for estimating mortality reduction factors by way of fitting a
model, such as a GLM, to data collected over an extended number of years. For
example, see Renshaw and Haberman (2003). However, due to the limited volume
of mortality data available for use in this thesis, any mortality improvement factors
estimated using these methods are likely to lead to unreliable forecasts, so we will
not follow this practice.
In Australia, organisations such as the Australian Bureau of Statistics and the
Australian Government Actuary estimate mortality reduction factors for the Aus-
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tralian population on a regular basis, but no such factors are publicly available for
Australian insured life data.
In this thesis, mortality reduction factors based on population mortality data
(such as those mentioned in the previous paragraph) will be used as proxies for
insured life mortality reduction factors. The selection of these reduction factors is
discussed in greater detail in Section 4.2.5.
4.2.4 Generalised Linear Models for Mortality Data Using
a Standard Table
Two types of mortality data are used in this thesis: (i) unit record data9, and (ii)
grouped data10. The unit record data gives the number of deaths, central exposures
to risk and covariate information for each policyholder represented by the data set,
while the grouped data gives the number of deaths and the central exposures to risk,
subdivided by covariate information including age and year (this data is described
in detail in Chapter 5). Consequently, and in light of the previous discussion, the
most appropriate generalised linear model to use as the basis for tests involving
either of these data sets is a GLM relating the observed central mortality rates11 to
a set of standard table central mortality rates, assuming a Poisson distribution for
the number of deaths. One possible form for such a model is:












x,t exp (η) ; (4.11)
where η is a linear combination of the covariates, for example η = β0 + β1Age +
β2Y ear + · · ·.
In this model, the log link has been selected as this is the canonical link function






, the logarithm of the expected number
of deaths using the standard table mortality rates, appears as an “offset”12. The
model presented in Equation (4.11) was selected because it is of the form of the
graduation model presented in Equation (4.7).
The (insured life) graduated mortality tables produced by the Institute of Ac-
tuaries of Australia, which are used as the standard table mortality rates in this
9Unit record data is data where information is provided for each individual represented by the
data set.
10Grouped data is data where information is only provided for sub-groups of the individuals
represented by the data set, where the sub-groups are defined according to covariate information.




12An offset is a “quantitative variate whose regression covariate is known to be 1” (McCullagh
and Nelder (1989, p.206).
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thesis, give initial mortality rates but not central mortality rates. To adjust for this,
msx,t is replaced by the approximation:





as was suggested by Haberman and Renshaw (1996). This approximation is based
on the identity:








where µr,t is the instantaneous rate of mortality
13 for a life aged r exact in year t;
and the approximation:




Combining Equations (4.10) and (4.12) gives the model:
ln (E (Dx,t)) = ln
(− ln (1− qsx,t)Ecx,t)+ η. (4.15)
This is the form of the GLM that is used as the basis for a number of tests
involving mortality data throughout our subsequent analysis.
4.2.5 Mortality Reduction Factors
The mortality reduction factors that are used in this thesis are those presented in
Australian Life Tables 1995-97 (which were constructed by the Australian Govern-
ment Actuary). Mortality improvements were incorporated in Australian Life Tables
1995-97 (ALT95-97) using the formula:
qx,t = qx,0 (RFx)
t , (4.16)
where t is the time in years from 1997, RFx = (1 + Ix/100) is the reduction factor
for a life aged x, and Ix is the annual rate of mortality improvement
14 at age x given
in Appendix E of the tables.
Two tables of improvement factors, Ix, are given in the appendix to Australian
Life Tables 1995-97, one based on 100 years of data and the other based on the most
recent 25 years of data. In this thesis, the factors based on the most recent 25 years
of data are used, because it is believed that the more recent data gives the best
indication of future mortality trends and that data from more than 25 years ago is
13The instantaneous rate of mortality is commonly referred to as the force of mortality.
14The annual rate of mortality improvement is the (forecast) rate (per annum) at which mortality
rates will decrease in the future.
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of lesser relevance. Nevertheless, as can be seen from Table 4.1, which compares the
mortality reduction factors, (1+Ix/100), prescribed for males and females at selected
ages, there is little difference between the two sets of factors, although generally we
can observe lower reduction factors for females than males. The 25 year reduction
factors are lower than the 100 year reduction factors at most ages for both males
and females, but in all cases the ratio of the 25 year factor to the corresponding 100
year factor is between 98% and 102%.
Table 4.1: A Comparison of Reduction Factors at Selected Ages
Males Females
Age
25 year 100 year 25 year 100 year
20 0.9802 0.9864 0.9831 0.9779
30 0.9982 0.9834 0.9850 0.9745
40 0.9798 0.9830 0.9727 0.9779
50 0.9677 0.9856 0.9720 0.9838
60 0.9714 0.9892 0.9769 0.9865
70 0.9776 0.9928 0.9784 0.9890
80 0.9842 0.9942 0.9818 0.9909





where qsx,0 is the mortality rate for a life aged x based on IA95-97, RFx is the 25
year reduction factor for a life aged x given in ALT95-97 and t is the time in years
from the designated base year.
4.3 Over-Dispersion Models and Testing
4.3.1 Testing for Over-Dispersion
Once a GLM with Poisson response, Yi, has been fitted to a data set, the model










Statistical Models for Mortality and Economic Data 39
where Yˆi are the fitted values of the Yi and n denotes the number of data points.









D andX2 are both approximately chi-squared distributed with (n− p) degrees of
freedom in large samples (p denotes the number of parameters in the fitted model).
For Poisson models, a widely used statistical rule of thumb is that over-dispersion
is present in the data if D/ (n− p) or X2/ (n− p) is significantly greater than 1.
Lindsey (1999b), however, gives examples of Poisson data that “have models with
deviances that are almost twice the degrees of freedom” for which various models
for over-dispersion do not fit the data better than the standard GLM, and he argues
that a more reasonable criterion for detecting over-dispersion is if either D/ (n− p)
or X2/ (n− p) is greater than 2. Even in these cases, it is not necessarily true that
over-dispersion is present. Lindsey advocates that, if over-dispersion is indicated
(by the D/ (n− p) or X2/ (n− p) statistics), then “more formal methods of model
building should be used to check whether it is actually present and, if so, to account
for it”. The “more formal methods of model building” that Lindsey refers to are
discussed in Section 4.3.2.
The tests for over-dispersion, described above, are based on the assumption
that the limiting distribution of the Poisson deviance is a chi-squared distribution.
This result holds under some reasonable conditions, provided the sample size is
large. However, when the data set is sparse, this result becomes invalid. According
to Boyle et al. (1997), when the data set is sparse, “the deviance values may be
unusually low compared to the degrees of freedom”, thus suggesting that “there is
a problem with under-dispersion when, in fact, the large number of zeros in the
data set make the comparison with the chi-squared distribution unreliable”. Boyle
et al. do not mention at what point the data becomes sufficiently sparse that the
chi-squared distribution is no longer valid. Nevertheless, in their paper they refer
to a data set with 27% of zero observations as “not especially sparse”, while a data
set with 72% of zero observations is considered to be sparse.
The mortality data used in this thesis is subdivided by age, sex, policy type
and policy duration. It would be desirable to conduct over-dispersion tests for
each policy type/sex combination. However, it is inevitable that, for some of these
combinations, the data set will be sparse. In these situations, it is necessary to make
some changes to the previously described methodology.
Farrington (1996) constructed a modified Pearson chi-squared statistic to test
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2 (n− p) ; (4.21)
has an asymptotic standard normal distribution. Over-dispersion is indicated by a
Z value that is significantly greater than 0.
Alternatively, over-dispersion can be tested for by fitting a range of models specif-
ically designed to allow for over-dispersion and then determining whether any of
these models provide a significantly better fit to the data than the Poisson GLM,
using statistics such as the Akaike Information Criterion. If any of these models do
provide a better fit, then it can be concluded that over-dispersion is present.
In this thesis, all three of these methods are used to test for over-dispersion.
Models that allow for over-dispersion are discussed in the next section.
4.3.2 Models for Over-Dispersion
Many models have been proposed over the years to describe various different forms
of over-dispersion. If over-dispersion is truly present in the data, then at least one
such model would be expected to provide a better fit to the data than the base case
GLM. Based on this idea, the approach taken by Lindsey (1999a,b) was, therefore,
to fit several over-dispersion models to his data set. If none of the models provided
a better fit than the base case GLM, he concluded that the GLM had succeeded in
describing all of the systematic variability in the data; that is, that there was no
over-dispersion present. This is the approach that shall be taken in this thesis.
Three models that are commonly used to model over-dispersion in Poisson data
are the negative binomial distribution, the zero-inflated Poisson model and the
normal-Poisson mixture model.
The Negative Binomial Distribution
For Poisson data, the standard over-dispersion model is the negative binomial dis-
tribution. The negative binomial model allows for over-dispersion in the Poisson
data by assuming that the Poisson parameter, denoted ui here, is a random variable
that follows a gamma distribution with variance, αµ2i , that is, a quadratic function
of the mean, µi, where α is a positive parameter. Thus, conditional on ui,
Yi ∼ Pois (ui) ; (4.22)











Under this model, it can be shown that Yi has a negative binomial distribution with
mean µi, variance µi (1 + αµi), and probability mass function:


















, y = 0, 1, . . . . (4.24)
The Poisson and negative binomial models have the same mean structure, but the
additional parameter in the negative binomial model, α, allows for over-dispersion
due to heterogeneity among the observations. The greater the value of α, the greater
the spread of the data. On the other hand, if α = 0, there is no over-dispersion
present and the negative binomial model reduces to the Poisson model. Based on
this, Long and Freese (2005) tested for over-dispersion by testing the hypothesis
H0 : α = 0, using a likelihood ratio test that compared the likelihood for a GLM
with a negative binomial error structure to that of an equivalent GLM with a Poisson
error structure . Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the negative binomial
model is preferable to the Poisson model and, hence, indicates the presence of over-
dispersion.
The Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT) statistic is defined as:
LRT = −2 (ln (L1)− ln (L2)) ; (4.25)
where L1 is the likelihood from the smaller model (in this case, the Poisson model)
and L2 is the likelihood from the larger model (in this case, the negative binomial
model). Usually, the likelihood ratio test statistic is approximately chi-square dis-
tributed with degrees of freedom equal to the number of additional parameters in the
more complex model. However, in the case described above, a boundary hypothesis
is being tested (as α = 0 is on the boundary of the range of possible values for α).
In this case, the limiting normal distribution of the maximum likelihood estimate
of the parameter of interest, α, is truncated at the boundary, 0, so is only half of a
normal distribution, and as a result, the limiting distribution of the likelihood ratio
test statistic is a 50:50 mixture of a chi-square distribution with 1 degree of freedom
and a point mass at zero. This must be taken into account when performing signif-
icance tests. Following the methodology set out by Gutierrez et al. (2001) (which
is also used by the Stata computer package), p-values for this mixture distribution
are set equal to half the p-value for the standard (non-boundary) likelihood ratio
test, unless the likelihood ratio test statistic is “so small as to be indistinguishable
from zero” (for the purposes of this thesis, this was taken to mean LRT < 0.0005),
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in which case the p-value is set equal to 1. For more information on boundary value
hypothesis tests see Cox and Hinkley (1974) and Gutierrez et al. (2001).
The negative binomial model specified in Equation (4.24) is the form most of-
ten used in applied research. Cameron and Trivedi (1986) refer to this as the NB2
model. However, by changing the parameters of the gamma distribution, it is pos-
sible to derive an alternative version of the negative binomial model. If the Poisson
parameter is assumed to follow a gamma distribution with mean µi, and variance
δµi, where δ is a parameter, that is, if conditional on ui,











then Yi has a negative binomial distribution with mean µi, variance µi (1 + δ), and
probability mass function:


















, y = 0, 1, . . . . (4.28)
This model has been described by a number of sources including Cameron and
Trivedi (1986), McCullagh and Nelder (1989) and Lindsey (1999a), among others.
Cameron and Trivedi (1986) refer to this negative binomial model as the NB1 model.
Over-dispersion can be tested for in the NB1 model by testing the hypothesis H0 :
δ = 0, using a (boundary-value) likelihood ratio test, with a significant test result
indicating over-dispersion.
The Zero-Inflated Poisson Model
Under certain circumstances, over-dispersion in a data set is consistent with excess
zero observations in the data set compared with the number expected under an
ordinary Poisson model. Many of the data sets used in this thesis contain a large
number of zero observations. In such situations, the zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP)
model (also known as the Poisson With-Zeros (WZ) model) can be used to model the
data. The ZIP model, first proposed by Mullahy (1986)15, is based on the hypothesis
that the zeros in the data set are generated by two distinct but unobserved processes.
It attempts to model the said data using a mixture of two distributions, one being a
point mass at 0, and the other having a Poisson distribution with a mean, µi, that
depends on covariates. The model can be written as:
15In Mullahy (1986), the ZIP model is referred to as the Poisson With-Zeros or WZ model. The
name “zero-inflated Poisson” model was first applied to a generalisation of this model in Lambert
(1992). This generalisation is discussed further in the next paragraph.
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Pr (Yi = y) =
pi + (1− pi) e−µi , if y = 0;(1− pi) e−µiµyi
y!
, if y > 0;
(4.29)
where µi = exp (ηi), ηi is the linear predictor, and pi is the probability that an
observation is an “excess zero”, that is, that it belongs to the process that has a
point mass at 0. If pi = 0, then the ZIP model reduces to the ordinary Poisson
model. Thus, over-dispersion can be tested for by testing the hypothesis H0 : pi = 0
using a (boundary-value) likelihood ratio test.
Lambert (1992) and Greene (1994) generalised the ZIP model by modelling pi as








Φ (pii) = ηpi,i; (4.31)
where Φ (.) is the standard normal CDF, the ηpi,i is a second linear predictor which
may involve the same covariates as the linear predictor, ηi, in Equation (4.29) or
may include different covariates.
In these generalised cases, the ordinary Poisson model and the ZIP model are
not nested (the reason why this is the case is explained by Greene (1994, p.15)), so
the likelihood ratio test described above cannot be used to test for over-dispersion.
Instead, Greene (1994) used a test for comparing non-nested models proposed by
Vuong (1989) (this will subsequently be referred to as the Vuong test). The Vuong













Pr1 (yi) and Pr2 (yi) are the probabilities of observing yi in the first and second
models (for example, the ordinary model and the ZIP model), respectively, m¯ and
sm are the mean and standard deviation of mi, n is the number of observations,
and V has an asymptotic normal distribution. If V > 1.96, then the first model is
favoured, while if V < −1.96, then the second model is favoured. This test can also
be used to test for over-dispersion in the basic ZIP model, described previously.
Normal-Poisson Mixture Model
If, in the negative binomial model, instead of assuming that the Poisson parameter
ui is gamma distributed, it is assumed that ui = µiλi and that ln (λi) has a normal
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distribution with zero mean and variance σ2,











then the model becomes a normal-Poisson mixture model (also known as a Poisson
random effects model and as a Poisson log-normal mixture model). Under this
model, the unconditional mean and variance of Yi are:
E (Yi) = µie
0.5σ2 ; (4.36)
and










Setting mi = µie
0.5σ2 gives:
E (Yi) = mi; (4.38)
and








The mean-variance relationship for Yi is, therefore, of the same form as for the NB2
model.
The above described mixture model reduces to the basic Poisson model under
the hypothesis H0 : σ
2 = 0, so over-dispersion can be tested using, for example, a
(boundary-value) likelihood ratio test that compares the likelihood for the Poisson
GLM with that of the above described mixture model. This approach was taken by
Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2005).
Normal-Poisson mixture models are computationally more demanding than neg-
ative binomial models. Whereas for the negative binomial model it is possible to
express the likelihood in a closed form, this is not possible for normal-Poisson mod-
els and, thus, it is necessary to employ numerical integration techniques in order
to fit such models (for example, penalised quasi-likelihood, Laplace approximation,
Gauss-Hermite quadrature or adaptive quadrature, all of which are summarised in
Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh (2004)). Nevertheless, unlike with the negative bino-
mial models, the above described normal-Poisson model can be generalised to the
case of several random effects, which allows for greater modelling flexibility.
A more complex form of the normal-Poisson model involves the inclusion of
random coefficients. In the previous description of the normal-Poisson model, sup-
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pose that µi = e
ηi and λi = e
ζi , where ηi is a linear predictor of the form ηi =
β0 + β1Z1,i + β2Z2,i + . . .. Thus,
ln ui = β0 + β1Z1,i + β2Z2,i + . . .+ ζi
= (β0 + ζi) + β1Z1,i + β2Z2,i + . . . ; (4.40)
where ζi ∼ N (0, σ2). (β0 + ζi) is the intercept term in this model, and since ζi is a
random variable, it can be viewed as being a random intercept.
An obvious extension of the above model is to allow for random coefficients as




and Cov (ψj,i, ψk,i) = σj,k, then
ln ui = (β0 + ψ0,i) + (β1 + ψ1,i)Z1,i + β2Z2,i + . . . . (4.41)
In this case, β1 + ψ0,i is a random coefficient. That is, the random intercept varies
depending on the value of Z1,i.
Random effects models that are even more complicated than those described are
also possible, although none are used in this thesis. For further details, see Bryk
and Raudenbush (1992) or Rabe-Hesketh et al. (2004).
The selection of the “best model” of the various models described in this section
will necessarily involve non-nested comparisons. This can be done using the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC), which is calculated, for a particular fitted model, as:
AIC = 2k − 2 ln (L) ; (4.42)
where k is the number of model parameters and L is the model likelihood. Among a
set of different models, the “best” model is selected to be the one with the smallest
value of this criterion.
4.4 Time Series Statistical Models
A time series is a time-ordered sequence of random variables, which we will denote by
{Xt : t = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n} or {Xt}, and is alternatively called a discrete time stochastic
process. A time series, {Xt}, is said to be stationary, or more properly, weakly
stationary, if E (Xt) is constant for all t and Cov (Xs, Xt) depends only on |s − t|
(the more general concept of strict stationarity of a time series will not be needed
in this thesis). Non-stationarity can often be dealt with by transforming the time
series to stationarity. Many models have been developed for modelling time series
processes. The main linear models used for modelling stationary univariate time
series are the Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA) processes (first outlined by
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Box and Jenkins (1970)) including the “trivial” cases of the Autoregressive (AR)
process, and the Moving Average (MA) process.
An Autoregressive Moving Average process with autoregressive order p and mov-
ing average order q (ARMA(p, q)) can be expressed as:
Xt − µ = φ1 (Xt−1 − µ) + φ2 (Xt−2 − µ) + . . .+ φp (Xt−p − µ)
+ εt + θ1εt−1 + θ2εt−2 + . . .+ θqεt−q, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ; (4.43)
where p and q are positive integers, µ is the mean of the X (t), the φ’s and the
θ’s are parameters, and {εt} is a Gaussian white noise process with mean 0 and
constant variance, σ2. That is, the εt are assumed to be independent and identically
normally distributed, written as εt ∼ N (0, σ2), for t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. Alternatively,
setting c = µ (1− φ1 − φ2 − . . .− φp),
Xt = c+ φ1Xt−1 + φ2Xt−2 + . . .+ φpXt−p
+ εt + θ1εt−1 + θ2εt−2 + . . .+ θqεt−q, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . (4.44)
The AR and MA processes are special cases of the ARMA process. An autore-
gressive process of order p (AR(p)) is equivalent to an ARMA(p, 0) process, that
is:
Xt − µ = φ1 (Xt−1 − µ) + φ2 (Xt−2 − µ) + . . .+ φp (Xt−p − µ) + εt, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ;
(4.45)
or
Xt = c+ φ1Xt−1 + φ2Xt−2 + . . .+ φpXt−p + εt, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ; (4.46)
and a moving average process of order q (MA(q)) is equivalent to an ARMA(0, q)
process, that is:
Xt = µ+ εt + θ1εt−1 + θ2εt−2 + . . .+ θqεt−q, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . (4.47)
Models of these forms can be fitted to time series data using maximum likelihood
estimation techniques, as outlined in Hamilton (1994, Chap. 5).
More complex time series models have also been developed for modelling multi-
variate time series and for modelling time series that do not satisfy the assumptions
underlying the ARMA model (for example, models for data where the assumption
of constant variance is believed to be unreasonable). One such model is the Gen-
eralised Autoregressive Conditionally Heteroskedastic (GARCH) model (originally
proposed by Bollerslev (1986)). A GARCH model is an extension of the ARMA
process that allows for non-constant variance of the εt. In the case of a GARCH(p,
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q) model, the εt are calculated from
εt = σtωt, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ; (4.48)
where the ωt follow a standard normal distribution and σ
2
t denotes the variance of
εt. σ
2
t is then modelled as:
σ2t = α0 + α1ε
2




t−1 + . . .+ βqσ
2
t−q, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ; (4.49)
where the α’s are parameters, α0 > 0, αi ≥ 0, and βi ≥ 0 for all i > 0 (this is to
ensure that σ2t is positive).
A more in-depth discussion of ARMA, GARCH and other time series models is
given in many time series analysis and econometrics texts and papers, for example,
Bollerslev (1986), Box et al. (1994), Hamilton (1994), and Greene (2008).
4.5 Software
All statistical models described in this thesis, except for the over-dispersion models,
were fitted using either the S-Plus16 or R17 statistical computer packages. As most
functions written for use in S-Plus can also be run in R and vice-versa, in most
cases, either of these packages can be used. For time series models, R is preferred
to S-Plus (with one exception, given in Section 7.2.3), as the R time series functions
are easier to use than the equivalent functions in S-Plus. Further, the S-Plus time
series functions are slightly different from those available in R, and most of them
are only available through S-Plus FinMetrics, an add-on module for S-Plus.
All over-dispersion models were fitted using the Stata18 computer package. Al-
though functions do exist in S-Plus or R that can fit these models, most of these
programs exist only as add-on packages/modules which produced few model sum-
mary statistics and in some cases, produced fitted parameter values that seemed
unreasonable. On the other hand, most of the Stata over-dispersion model fitting
functions are part of the base computer package, and consequently, are of a much
higher quality than their S-Plus/R counterparts.
The spreadsheet models mentioned in Chapter 2 (described in greater detail in
Chapter 8) were built using Microsoft Excel19 and simulations were performed using
@Risk20, a simulation add-on for Microsoft Excel.
16S-Plus 6.0 Professional Edition for Windows. Copyright c©1988–2001 Insightful Corp.
17R version 2.2.1. Copyright c©2005 the R Foundation for Statistical Computing.
18Stata version 8.2. Copyright c©1984–2003 StataCorp.
19Microsoft Office Excel 2003. Copyright c©1985–2003 Microsoft Corporation




Two sets of insurance data were available for use in this thesis. One was supplied
by the Institute of Actuaries of Australia Mortality Committee (this is referred to
as the IAAust Data Set and is a grouped data set). A second smaller (although unit
record) data set was supplied by a major Australian Life Insurer, the Single Insurer
Data Set. These data sets are described in detail in this chapter. In addition to
this, the economic data used at various points in this thesis is also described.
5.2 The IAAust Data Set
The IAAust Data Set comprises data collected from a large number of Australian
Life Insurers over the period 1995 to 1999. The 1995 to 1997 portion of this data
set was used by the Institute Mortality Committee to develop the latest Australian
insured life mortality tables, IA95-97 M and F. The data set gives central exposures
to risk, Ecx,t, and numbers of deaths, Dx,t, subdivided by year, age last birthday, sex,
smoker status (Smoker, Non-Smoker and Aggregate1), policy type and duration2
bands3. The data relates to “standard” lives only (that is, lives that were not
considered to be impaired during the initial underwriting process) and the policy
1The “Aggregate” category for smoker status applies to policies where smoker status was un-
differentiated.
2Duration is defined as the length of time since policy inception.
3The duration bands used in the raw data set are: < 3 months; 3–6 months; 6–12 months; 1–2
years; 2–3 years; 3–4 years; 4–5 years; 5–10 years; and 10+ years.
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types represented in the data set are as follows4:
Type 1: Whole of life/endowment insurance, both with and without term insur-
ance riders;
Type 2: Unbundled policies, both capital guaranteed and investment-linked, car-
rying significant death risk;
Type 3: Temporary insurances where premiums are fully guaranteed, and the
sums insured may be level or reducing; and
Type 4: Temporary insurances where the premium rate may be reviewed.
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 give details of the exposures and deaths for this data set by
sex, policy type and year (for ages5 15–99 and all durations combined), while Tables
5.3 to 5.6 give details of the exposures for this data set by age band, sex, policy type
and duration band (for duration bands 0–2 years, 2–5 years, 5–10 years, and 10+
years), for all years combined. In each case, here, the data set has been condensed
purely for summary purposes, but the whole, uncondensed, data set was used in the
subsequent analyses.
Table 5.1: Exposures by Sex, Policy Type and Year
Policy Males
Type 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
1 157,381 958,874 888,280 810,915 758,922 3,574,371
2 101,884 122,349 222,944 160,582 134,984 742,742
3 15,294 17,697 15,353 10,323 9,081 67,747
4 132,073 248,512 266,780 308,003 263,559 1,218,926
Total 406,631 1,347,432 1,393,355 1,289,823 1,166,545 5,603,785
Policy Females
Type 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
1 47,794 318,301 294,108 263,403 247,730 1,171,334
2 41,777 51,544 103,978 78,406 66,427 342,131
3 12,860 14,089 12,335 8,825 7,673 55,782
4 83,056 152,031 168,690 185,767 162,726 752,269
Total 185,487 535,965 579,110 536,400 484,555 2,321,516
Note: the values in the above table are given in years, rounded to the nearest integer.
Any discrepancies between the sums of the row or column values and the “Totals”
are due to this rounding.
4IAAust Mortality Committee (2001, p. 4).
5Ages 0–14 and 100+ are ignored throughout this thesis. The insured life mortality tables,
IA95-97 M and F, only provide mortality rates for lives aged 15–99. We expect this to have little
impact on the results, as the majority of insurance policyholders are in the 15–99 age range, and,
in fact, many insurers do not sell insurance products to lives outside this age range.
The Data 51
Table 5.2: Deaths by Sex, Policy Type and Year
Policy Males
Type 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
1 1,224 7,541 7,068 6,354 6,355 28,542
2 115 164 288 175 176 918
3 42 51 40 17 22 172
4 158 323 357 459 393 1,690
Total 1,539 8,079 7,753 7,005 6,946 31,322
Policy Females
Type 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
1 242 879 918 992 1,028 4,059
2 28 34 98 53 47 260
3 16 8 16 11 9 60
4 39 117 148 160 119 583
Total 325 1,038 1,180 1,216 1,203 4,962
Table 5.3: Exposures by Age Band, Sex and Duration Band for Type 1 Policies
Males Females
Age
< 2yr 2–5yr 5–10yr 10+yr < 2yr 2–5yr 5–10yr 10+yr
15–19 2,730 4,166 7,024 32,686 1,635 3,047 5,608 26,994
20–24 4,656 11,401 19,375 56,930 2,779 5,722 10,160 38,972
25–29 4,356 12,236 63,214 92,541 3,345 8,778 28,120 47,855
30–34 4,187 10,979 66,390 168,243 3,274 9,269 36,872 62,376
35–39 3,997 9,827 58,320 282,515 3,177 8,348 36,641 98,166
40–44 3,392 8,063 43,778 380,914 2,679 6,528 31,045 133,808
45–49 2,314 5,814 35,206 487,345 1,741 4,343 25,272 145,145
50–54 1,567 3,859 23,137 510,420 936 2,333 15,596 123,773
55–59 837 2,630 12,036 405,449 504 1,698 7,058 78,655
60–64 451 1,775 5,561 265,390 254 1,248 3,101 42,663
65–69 206 1,504 2,590 133,124 182 1,367 2,161 27,551
70–74 67 1,179 1,963 113,980 69 1,246 1,996 23,908
75–79 14 516 1,171 88,670 18 713 1,415 19,040
80–84 0 9 230 66,928 0 22 417 12,809
85–89 0 0 1 35,022 0 0 2 6,592
90–94 0 0 0 11,313 0 0 0 2,277
95–99 0 0 0 190 0 0 0 45
Total 28,771 73,953 339,992 3,131,655 20,592 54,658 205,460 890,625
Note: the values in the above table, and in the next three tables, Tables 5.4 to 5.6,
are given in years, rounded to the nearest integer.
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Table 5.4: Exposures by Age Band, Sex and Duration Band for Type 2 Policies
Males Females
Age
< 2yr 2–5yr 5–10yr 10+yr < 2yr 2–5yr 5–10yr 10+yr
15–19 1,455 833 3,230 2,031 512 532 2,854 1,798
20–24 4,562 6,587 9,043 3,312 2,143 2,602 4,369 2,298
25–29 6,872 13,023 43,508 6,768 3,508 6,119 19,698 2,571
30–34 8,693 16,658 64,333 24,176 4,647 8,543 32,037 7,612
35–39 9,868 17,514 71,086 44,512 5,144 10,076 37,322 14,618
40–44 8,999 14,706 60,330 52,911 4,450 9,112 36,017 18,134
45–49 7,431 11,751 47,390 51,565 3,258 6,450 29,489 18,449
50–54 4,802 7,222 29,204 38,785 1,694 3,007 15,659 13,549
55–59 1,781 2,771 12,435 20,393 437 860 4,474 5,632
60–64 408 626 3,559 6,991 53 130 845 1,238
65–69 34 63 218 249 5 9 81 66
70–74 2 5 26 28 1 1 15 16
75–79 0 0 4 4 0 0 1 5
80–84 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1
85–89 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
90–94 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
95–99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 54,904 91,755 344,362 251,721 25,849 47,440 182,859 85,984
Table 5.5: Exposures by Age Band, Sex and Duration Band for Type 3 Policies
Males Females
Age
< 2yr 2–5yr 5–10yr 10+yr < 2yr 2–5yr 5–10yr 10+yr
15–19 42 45 74 2 19 22 36 0
20–24 172 353 282 20 141 238 129 13
25–29 287 1,215 1,468 116 278 1,129 1,365 98
30–34 357 1,873 3,266 746 301 1,629 3,595 1,741
35–39 298 1,656 4,048 3,268 287 1,366 4,000 6,607
40–44 303 1,365 3,710 7,270 237 892 2,939 9,670
45–49 305 1,015 3,062 10,263 189 582 1,803 8,166
50–54 211 720 2,088 8,356 87 263 879 4,392
55–59 130 400 1,111 4,751 46 127 322 1,574
60–64 66 181 366 1,743 15 24 64 343
65–69 16 49 114 461 2 9 23 105
70–74 0 2 24 76 0 3 6 29
75–79 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 8
80–84 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 2
85–89 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
90–94 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
95–99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 2,184 8,872 19,611 37,081 1,600 6,281 15,158 32,744
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Table 5.6: Exposures by Age Band, Sex and Duration Band for Type 4 Policies
Males Females
Age
< 2yr 2–5yr 5–10yr 10+yr < 2yr 2–5yr 5–10yr 10+yr
15–19 1,198 441 272 373 691 315 185 285
20–24 8,803 4,311 904 788 7,697 3,491 527 588
25–29 32,174 24,471 6,396 1,075 27,113 22,470 5,855 556
30–34 58,164 54,495 22,697 3,964 44,691 48,186 24,008 3,152
35–39 72,883 79,717 45,623 14,297 49,266 62,293 44,908 12,659
40–44 71,385 83,468 58,034 27,702 41,319 54,301 45,754 22,301
45–49 65,262 78,995 59,203 37,170 30,912 40,238 33,981 21,744
50–54 45,823 57,344 43,595 32,577 16,408 21,966 17,659 13,549
55–59 20,702 27,699 21,030 16,991 5,349 7,974 6,270 4,451
60–64 6,499 9,537 8,195 6,662 1,457 2,134 1,906 1,212
65–69 1,438 2,077 1,862 1,540 444 675 466 255
70–74 169 336 358 156 64 187 223 65
75–79 6 8 41 28 3 6 48 17
80–84 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 4
85–89 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
90–94 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
95–99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 384,502 422,895 268,207 143,323 225,412 264,233 181,789 80,835
From the information presented in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, it can be seen that the ex-
posures to risk are concentrated in Policy Types 1, 2 and 4, while most of the deaths
are observed among Type 1 policyholders. The large number of deaths among Type
1 policyholders is consistent with the fact that there is a greater proportion of older
lives among Type 1 policyholders than among the holders of the other policy types.
The very small numbers of deaths observed among Type 3 policyholders (particu-
larly among females) means that there are many age/year/duration combinations
for which the observed mortality rate is zero.
It is not uncommon for insurers to sell their products only to lives in a particular
age range. For Type 2, 3 and 4 policies, it is common (in Australia) for Life Insurers
to sell policies only to lives with a minimum age of around 16–18 and a maximum age
of around 55–70 (with the minimum and maximum ages varying between insurers).
This can be seen from Tables 5.3 to 5.6. Tables 5.3 to 5.6 also illustrate that for
Type 1 and 3 policies, the majority of policy exposures are at the longer durations
(10 years and greater), while for Type 2 and 4 policies, the exposures are mainly
at the shorter durations (less than 10 years). Type 1 and 3 policies are commonly
known as “traditional” policies. These policies were popular in Australia in the
past, but have largely been superseded by Type 2 and 4 policies over the last two
decades. This phenomenon is clearly exemplified by this data set.
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5.3 The Single Insurer Data Set
The Single Insurer Data Set was supplied by a major Australian Life Insurer. It
comprises two data sets: the first set (which is referred to as the Single Insurer
Mortality Data) gives unit record exposure and claims data for the years 1998 to
2004, while the second data set (which is referred to as the Single Insurer Lapsation
Data) gives central exposures to risk and numbers of withdrawals, subdivided by
year, curtate duration and policy type, for the years 1997 to 2004. The Single Insurer
Mortality Data was also supplied to the Institute of Actuaries of Australia Mortality
Committee for use in their investigations. Although both of these data sets were
provided by the same insurer, the two data sets are not directly comparable, and it
is not possible to combine them into a single larger data set.
These two data sets are described in detail in the following sections.
5.3.1 The Single Insurer Mortality Data
The Single Insurer Mortality Data set, of unit record exposure and claims data for
the years 1998 to 2004, comprises only Type 1 and 4 policies and is considerably
smaller than the IAAust Data Set, but it has the advantage that exact durations can
be calculated for each policy and the number of non-death policy discontinuances
each year can be indirectly inferred. This data set also gives the sum insured6 for
each unit record, which is used to set the model assumptions in Section 8.5. Sum
insured information is not provided in any of the other data sets.
Tables 5.7 to 5.9 give the central exposures to risk, deaths and non-death dis-
continuances for this data set by sex, policy type and year (for ages 15–99 and all
durations combined). The central exposures to risk and non-death discontinuances
were estimated using the approximations
Ecx,t ≈ 0.5 (Ex,t + Ex+1,t+1) ; (5.1)
and
Wx,t ≈ Ex,t −Dx,t − Ex+1,t+1; (5.2)
where Wx,t denotes the number of non-death discontinuances among lives aged x in
year t. These approximations are based on the assumption of a uniform distribution
of deaths and non-death policy discontinuances over the year.
Estimation of the central exposures to risk and non-death discontinuances in
a particular year requires knowledge of the initial exposures to risk at both the
6The sum insured of an insurance policy is the amount that the insurer will pay in the event
of the policyholder’s death, or, in some cases, the policyholder’s survival to a particular point in
time.
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beginning and the end of that year. So, although data files were provided for each
of seven years, it was only possible to estimate these quantities in six of these years
(five years, in the case of Type 4 policies, due to the nature of the 1998 data). The
Single Insurer Mortality Data set gives unit record exposures at the end of each of
the years it covers. Thus, the exposures at the end of year t can be taken to be the
initial exposures to risk at the beginning of year t+ 1.
Table 5.7: Exposures by Sex, Policy Type and Year
Policy Males
Type 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total
1 188,363 177,904 167,512 153,241 135,784 121,600 944,403
4 - 122,510 121,528 125,749 135,623 144,207 649,617
Total 188,363 300,414 289,040 278,989 271,407 265,807 1,594,019
Policy Females
Type 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total
1 68,296 64,787 61,367 56,480 50,057 44,754 345,741
4 - 74,706 75,305 78,808 85,334 91,031 405,184
Total 68,296 139,493 136,672 135,288 135,391 135,785 750,924
Note: the values in the above table are given in years, rounded to the nearest integer.
Table 5.8: Deaths by Sex, Policy Type and Year
Policy Males
Type 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total
1 1,256 1,157 982 1,248 1,377 1,159 7,179
4 - 273 196 262 375 302 1,408
Total 1,256 1,430 1,178 1,510 1,752 1,461 8,587
Policy Females
Type 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total
1 243 231 169 240 270 223 1,376
4 - 98 86 104 164 127 579
Total 243 329 255 344 434 350 1,955
Tables 5.10 and 5.11 show the central exposures to risk for this data set by age
band, sex, policy type and duration band (again, as in the case of the IAAust Data
Set, this data set has been condensed for summary purposes).
The Single Insurer Mortality Data has many characteristics in common with the
IAAust Data Set. In both data sets, a disproportionately large number of observed
deaths arise from Type 1 policies, and for both policy types, exposures are greatest
at the middle age groups, that is ages 35 to 64. For Type 1 policies, exposures
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Table 5.9: Non-Death Terminations by Sex, Policy Type and Year
Policy Males
Type 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total
1 11,131 9,343 10,600 16,635 16,434 10,057 74,200
4 - 11,237 14,784 10,157 11,541 12,058 59,777
Total 11,131 20,580 25,384 26,792 27,975 22,115 133,977
Policy Females
Type 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total
1 4,662 3,549 4,049 6,172 6,830 3,855 29,117
4 - 6,646 7,693 6,204 6,706 7,243 34,492
Total 4,662 10,192 11,742 12,376 13,536 11,098 63,609
Table 5.10: Exposures by Age Band, Sex and Duration Band for Type 1 Policies
Males Females
Duration
15–34 35–49 50–64 65+ 15–34 35–49 50–64 65+
0–4 630 355 289 92 442 211 196 45
5–9 10,963 7,762 3,034 372 7,109 7,090 2,213 254
10–14 22,765 23,037 10,766 933 13,738 16,356 7,042 913
15–19 39,937 64,003 34,151 2,256 30,133 30,784 16,966 2,799
20–24 35,962 73,804 69,788 5,539 25,385 28,155 23,565 4,082
25–29 31,200 53,759 95,323 16,596 17,636 16,630 24,943 7,866
30–34 17,433 21,786 86,496 25,031 7,448 6,632 12,742 9,453
35–39 0 19,718 46,591 25,301 0 5,184 3,275 6,912
40–44 0 8,219 14,363 20,416 0 1,231 851 3,651
45–49 0 3,766 4,899 13,961 0 283 386 1,359
50–54 0 0 5,854 9,335 0 0 372 427
55–59 0 0 2,605 4,623 0 0 176 234
60–64 0 0 1,277 5,002 0 0 65 243
65–69 0 0 0 3,015 0 0 0 163
70–74 0 0 0 951 0 0 0 81
75–79 0 0 0 329 0 0 0 22
80+ 0 0 0 130 0 0 0 11
Total 158,888 276,206 375,433 133,876 101,888 112,553 92,788 38,512
Note: the values in the above table, and in Table 5.11, are given in years, rounded
to the nearest integer.
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Table 5.11: Exposures by Age Band, Sex and Duration Band for Type 4 Policies
Males Females
Duration
15–34 35–49 50–64 65+ 15–34 35–49 50–64 65+
0–4 73,018 185,031 64,230 1,093 59,516 118,791 26,347 388
5–9 19,273 122,992 64,087 2,075 16,283 80,586 26,549 807
10–14 4,785 40,713 25,947 1,089 2,945 31,653 12,214 490
15–19 1,162 16,665 15,079 781 694 13,732 7,908 289
20–24 350 3,206 6,087 264 253 2,295 2,730 87
25–29 32 316 1,217 131 2 86 491 53
30+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 98,619 368,922 176,645 5,432 79,692 247,141 76,238 2,113
are greatest at the higher durations, while for Type 4 policies, the exposures are
concentrated at durations under 10 years.
The similarities between the two data sets are further highlighted by Tables 5.12
and 5.13. From these tables it can be seen that the distributions of the exposures
within each policy type/sex combination are very similar in the two data sets for
the different age bands and duration bands, although the Single Insurer Mortality
Data Set is more skewed towards exposures at older ages and greater durations.
Nevertheless, for both data sets, for all policy types, the majority of the exposures
are in the 35–64 age group; for Type 1 policies, the majority of the exposures are in
the 10+ duration band; and for Type 4 policies, the majority of the exposures are
in the bands with durations of under 10 years.
Table 5.12: Exposures as a % of the Total for each Policy Type/Sex/Data Set
Combination by Age Band
IAAust Data Single Insurer Mort. Data
Age Band
1M 1F 4M 4F 1M 1F 4M 4F
15–34 15.7% 25.2% 18.1% 25.2% 16.8% 29.5% 15.2% 19.7%
35–49 37.0% 42.4% 56.9% 61.1% 29.2% 32.6% 56.8% 61.0%
50–64 34.5% 23.7% 24.3% 13.3% 39.8% 26.8% 27.2% 18.8%
65+ 12.8% 8.7% 0.7% 0.3% 14.2% 11.1% 0.8% 0.5%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
The feature of the Single Insurer Mortality Data that is not observable in the
IAAust Data Set is the distribution of the non-death discontinuances. Unlike deaths,
most of which were observed among Type 1 policyholders, the ratio of non-death
discontinuances to exposures does not vary so greatly by sex and policy type. When
setting withdrawal assumptions, it is common for insurers to assume that lapsation
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Table 5.13: Exposures as a % of the Total for each Policy Type/Sex/Data Set
Combination by Duration Band
IAAust Data Single Insurer Mort. Data
Duration Band
1M 1F 4M 4F 1M 1F 4M 4F
0–1 0.8% 1.8% 31.5% 30.0% 0.0% 0.1% 21.8% 22.5%
2–4 2.1% 4.7% 34.7% 35.1% 0.1% 0.2% 28.0% 28.1%
5–9 9.5% 17.5% 22.0% 24.2% 2.3% 4.8% 32.1% 30.7%
10+ 87.6% 76.0% 11.8% 10.7% 97.5% 94.9% 18.1% 18.7%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
rates do not vary by age or sex of the policyholder. The data appears consistent
with this belief but this is investigated in greater detail in Section 7.4.
5.3.2 The Single Insurer Lapsation Data
The Single Insurer Lapsation Data set is less detailed than either of the other two
data sets, but is specifically designed for the calculation and analysis of withdrawal
rates. It is a grouped data set which gives the numbers of withdrawals and the
central exposures to risk, subdivided by year, policy type and curtate duration
(curtate durations are given in one-year bands for durations of 0 to 20 years and are
grouped into a single band for durations of 21 years and over).
As this data set was not created for the purposes of the Institute of Actuaries of
Australia (IAAust) Mortality Committee investigations, the data is not specifically
grouped into the policy type groups defined in IAAust Mortality Committee (2001).
However, the data set gives details of traditional savings products (whole of life
insurance, endowment insurance and pure endowments), traditional term insurance
and yearly renewable term insurance. These three categories roughly correspond
with the IAAust Mortality Committee Type 1, 3 and 4 policies, and are treated as
such for the purposes of this analysis.
For the Type 1 policies, data is given for each of the years from 1997 to 2004,
while for the Type 3 and 4 policies, data is only given for the years 2000 to 2004.
Table 5.14 gives the central exposures to risk and numbers of withdrawals for
this data set by policy type and year, while Tables 5.15 gives the exposures by policy
type and duration band (the data set has been condensed for summary purposes).
As in the case of the IAAust Data Set, the majority of the exposures for this data
set are concentrated in Policy Types 1 and 4, with very few exposures for Policy







Table 5.14: Exposures and Withdrawals by Policy Type and Year
Policy Central Exposures to Risk
Type 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total
1 713,158 412,114 401,932 401,514 402,380 399,297 372,446 337,293 3,440,133
3 - - - 1,394 1,073 940 755 592 4,754
4 - - - 204,415 210,712 216,230 235,055 249,742 1,116,152
Total 713,158 412,114 401,932 607,323 614,165 616,466 608,256 587,627 4,561,039
Policy Withdrawals
Type 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total
1 60,975 32,558 20,643 16,612 18,130 27,373 43,372 20,208 239,871
3 - - - 114 62 46 46 32 300
4 - - - 16,875 22,283 16,961 17,875 19,062 93,056
Total 60,975 32,558 20,643 33,601 40,475 44,380 61,293 39,302 333,227
Note: the exposure values in the above table are given in years, rounded to the nearest integer.
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Table 5.15: Exposures by Duration Band and Policy Type
Duration Type 1 Type 3 Type 4
0–4 25,202 3 544,365
5–9 261,341 97 398,400
10–14 479,713 277 114,770
15–19 643,889 2,312 44,275
20+ 2,029,988 2,065 14,342
Note: the values in the above table are given in years, rounded to the nearest integer.
Type 3 policies are in run off 7.
Comparing Tables 5.14 and 5.7, it is clear that the Single Insurer Lapsation
Data set does not reconcile with the Single Insurer Mortality Data set, even though
both data sets were supplied by the same insurer. The Single Insurer Lapsation
Data contains greater exposures for each policy type in each year. Nevertheless, the
distribution of the exposures between the different duration bands is typical of the
other data sets, that is, the majority of the exposures for Type 1 and 3 policies are
at the longer durations and the majority of the exposures for Type 4 policies are at
the shorter durations. This fact is further highlighted by Table 5.16, which gives the
percentage distribution of the exposures for each policy type between the duration
bands used in Table 5.13.
Table 5.16: Exposures as a % of the Total for each Policy Type by Duration Band
Duration Type 1 Type 3 Type 4
0–1 0.1% 0.0% 21.3%
2–4 0.6% 0.1% 27.5%
5–9 7.6% 2.0% 35.7%
10+ 91.7% 97.9% 15.5%
Total 100% 100% 100%
5.4 The Economic Data
At several points throughout this thesis, it is necessary to use economic data. To
satisfy this need, a number of economic time series data sets were obtained from the
Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) website8 and the Property Council of Australia
7A block of insurance business is said to be in run off if the insurer is no longer selling new
policies of this type but is allowing existing policyholders to continue with their policies until either
the policy term expires or the policyholder chooses to terminate the policy.
8www.rba.gov.au (downloaded on 24th September, 2007).
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website9. Only property yield data was obtained from the Property Council of
Australia; similar data was unavailable from the Reserve Bank of Australia. Table
5.17 lists the economic time series obtained and the economic variable that each of
these time series is taken to represent. This table also gives the time period for which
each of these data sets was available, the data frequency and the symbol (used from
Chapter 7 onwards) to denote this time series. Note that several of these time series
are index time series, and to calculate rates of growth of the variable represented
by these indices, it is necessary to take the ratio of the index at consecutive points
in time, then to subtract 1. For example, the rate of price inflation over the period
from time t− 1 to t is calculated as (Q (t) /Q (t− 1))− 1.
For consistency with the mortality data, it is often necessary to calculate “an-
nual” values of the economic variables. In the case of the variables represented by
index time series (that is, price inflation, the share price index and the property
yield), this is simple to do, since the annual return on these variables can be calcu-
lated by taking the ratio of index values at one year intervals and then subtracting
1. For time series that comprise per annum rates reported more frequently than
annually (that is, the long-term and short-term interest rates, the share dividend
yield and the unemployment rate), the “annual” observation of the time series is
calculated as the arithmetic average of the twelve monthly observations of that rate
for the period from January to December of the year in question.
Table 5.18 gives summary statistics for the “annual” return time series, while
Figures 5.1 to 5.6 give plots of this data. The statistics were calculated for the
period from December 1984 to December 2006, the longest time period for which
(annual) data was available for all of the economic variables, and the plots were
constructed for the same time period. Note that in most cases the logarithms of the
rate of return are used, not the untransformed rates. This is because most of the
models fitted to the economic data are fitted to log transformations of the data.
It is evident from the data plots that some of the economic variables are highly
correlated. Table 5.19 gives the correlations between the different (annual) economic
variables for the period from December 1984 to December 2006, with p-values shown
in brackets. Not surprisingly, the long-term and short-term interest rates are almost
perfectly positively correlated. The inflation rate and the interest rates are also very
highly correlated, which is consistent with economic theory.








Table 5.17: A Summary of the Economic Data
Variable Time Series Period Available Frequency
Price Inflation (Q (t)) Consumer price index - all groups Sep 1969 – Jun 2007 Quarterly
Share Price Index (P (t)) S&P/ASX 200 Dec 1979 – Aug 2007 Monthly
Share Dividend Yield (Y (t)) Share market dividend yield Dec 1982 – Aug 2007 Monthly
Long-Term Interest Rate (R (t)) 10-year Commonwealth Government bond yield Jan 1972 – Aug 2007 Monthly
Short-Term Interest Rate (F (t)) 90-day bank accepted bill yield Jun 1969 – Aug 2007 Monthly
Property Yield (Z (t)) Commercial property performance index - composite Dec 1984 – Mar 2007 Half-Yearly*
Unemployment Rate (U (t)) All persons unemployment rate Feb 1978 – Aug 2007 Monthly







Table 5.18: Summary Statistics for the Economic Data
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Ex. Kurtosis Min. Max.
CPI Inflation (∆ lnQ (t)) 0.0392 0.0285 0.5935 -0.8453 -0.0025 0.0977
Share Price Index Growth (∆ lnP (t)) 0.1114 0.1764 0.1792 -0.1024 -0.2243 0.4676
Share Dividend Yield (lnY (t)) 0.0399 0.0072 1.6597 2.6210 0.0327 0.0610
Long-Term Interest Rate (ln (1 +R (t)) ) 0.0868 0.0321 0.5307 -1.3712 0.0532 0.1395
Short-Term Interest Rate (ln (1 + F (t))) 0.0849 0.0445 1.0248 -0.5987 0.0475 0.1761
Property Yield (∆ lnZ (t)) 0.1106 0.0896 -0.0117 1.4347 -0.0858 0.3247
Unemployment Rate (U (t)) 0.0743 0.0162 0.3326 -0.4491 0.0478 0.1060
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Table 5.19: Correlations Between the Economic Variables with p-values Shown in
Brackets
Unemp. Rate Property Yield ST Int. Rate
Inflation Rate -0.2229 (0.331) 0.5856* (0.011) 0.8464* (0.000)
SPI Growth Rate 0.1008 (0.661) 0.0120 (0.958) 0.1720 (0.453)
Dividend Yield -0.0986 (0.667) -0.0873 (0.704) 0.6410* (0.005)
LT Int. Rate 0.2993 (0.192) 0.2165 (0.345) 0.9450* (0.000)
ST Int. Rate 0.0260 (0.910) 0.3363 (0.143)
Property Yield -0.4829* (0.035)
LT Int. Rate Div. Yield SPI Growth Rate
Inflation Rate 0.7404* (0.001) 0.3835 (0.095) 0.1545 (0.501)
SPI Growth Rate 0.0745 (0.746) -0.1033 (0.653)
Dividend Yield 0.6004* (0.009)




The aim of this thesis is to develop a stochastic asset-liability model for Life Insur-
ance solvency testing purposes. As was discussed in Chapter 3, this model will be
constructed from a number of stochastic sub-models, in which stochastic mortality,
lapsation and economic processes are considered. These sub-models may in princi-
ple be interconnected, in view of possible associations which may exist between the
different variables.
Insurance lapse rates are commonly believed to be influenced by the economy
and it is often assumed that a dependency structure exists between lapsation rates
and mortality rates for a given block of insurance business (references are given
in Section 6.2). The theory of selective lapsation suggests that there is a direct
relationship between mortality rates and lapse rates due to healthy lives being more
likely to withdraw from a Life Insurance policy than those who believe themselves to
be in poor health; while there are several theories which imply that lapse rates are
affected by economic factors such as interest rates or unemployment rates (references
are given in Section 6.4).
Regarding a possible association between mortality and economic factors, it is
common among Life Insurance actuaries to assume that the mortality rates for a
single block of Life Insurance business are not influenced by economic factors (such
as interest rates and inflation) and conversely. While it seems reasonable to assume
that the mortality rates among a relatively small proportion of the population do not
affect the economy as a whole, it does not necessarily follow that the opposite is true.
A number of investigations (references are given in Section 6.3) have been conducted
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into the relationship between the economy and mortality in industrialised countries
and the majority have concluded that a statistically significant relationship does
exist between economic variables, such as the gross domestic product (GDP) and
unemployment rates, and mortality (although the exact nature of this relationship
is the subject of much contention). Although these results are based on population
mortality data (mostly from the US or countries in Western Europe), they do raise
the possibility that there is a relationship between Australian insured life mortality
data and fluctuations in the Australian economy.
These theories are tested in this chapter with a view to including such relation-
ships in the solvency testing model if significant relationships are found.
6.2 Withdrawal Rates and Mortality
6.2.1 Selective Lapsation
Among Life Insurance actuaries, there is a generally held belief that unhealthy lives
see a greater need for Life Insurance than healthy lives and so policyholders who
believe their health to have deteriorated substantially since policy inception will be
less likely to lapse their policies than those who believe that they have remained
healthy. This phenomenon is known as selective lapsation or mortality selection
and has been described in a number of papers, including those of Albert and Bragg
(1996), Jones (1998) and Valdez (2001). One consequence of selective lapsation
would be that higher than expected lapse rates in one year will result in higher than
expected mortality rates in future years (that is, in a deterioration of the mortality
experience). Another consequence is that “the insured group at duration k after
issue does not comprise a random sample of the insured group at issue” (Jones
(1998), p.79).
On the other hand, as was pointed out by Jones (1998), for a group of policy-
holders that spans a wide range of socioeconomic classes, those with greater wealth,
income and education will typically experience less mortality due to lifestyle choices,
while being less likely to lapse their policies, due to greater premium affordability
and a greater understanding of the value of Life Insurance. In such a situation, it is
possible that selective lapsation will not be observed.
In spite of the wide recognition of the possible existence of the phenomenon
of selective lapsation, very few empirical studies have been carried out to confirm
whether it is actually observable in practice. One recent study that did so was
that of Albert and Bragg (1996), using two years of data collected from 13 United
States Life Insurance companies. Their data was differentiated only by insurer and
duration, and not by other typical factors such as policy type, age, sex, etc. Albert
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and Bragg concluded that, for the companies under investigation, there was “little
evidence of a direct relationship between lapses and the changes in mortality results
by duration. . . so the premise that high lapse rates result in deterioration of mortality
as duration increases is not supported” (p.9).
A second study, carried out by Dukes and Dziedzic (2007) for the (US) Society
of Actuaries, examined the lapse and mortality experience in the years following
the level premium period for individual level premium term products1. For such
products, selective lapsation is expected immediately following the level premium
period as healthy lives can often obtain the same insurance cover at a lower price by
lapsing their policies and commencing a new policy, for which they re-undergo the
underwriting process (this is known as lapse and reentry). Lives that believe them-
selves to be in poor health are not confident that they could pass the underwriting
process if they were to re-undergo it and so continue with their existing policies.
Dukes and Dziedzic obtained data from 18 US Life Insurance companies and
found that almost all of the companies surveyed assumed an increase in mortality
rates after the level premium period. However, they did not conduct any tests to
determine whether a relationship existed between lapse and mortality experience for
these companies.
A number of other models for analysing the relationship between mortality and
lapsation have been proposed2, but in none of these cases has real insurance data
been used to test them. As far as was ascertainable, there have been no published
investigations into the relationship between withdrawal rates and mortality rates
conducted using Australian data.
6.2.2 Existing Tests for Selective Lapsation
Over the past 30 years, a number of models have been proposed for analysing the
relationship between mortality and lapsation. These models incorporated a wide
range of statistical concepts, ranging from ordinary least-squares regression models
(Albert and Bragg (1996)) to frailty models (Jones (1998)) and copulas (Valdez
(2001)), among other methods. Section 2 of Valdez (2001) provides a brief overview
of such models. Although these proposed models are many and varied, most have
one characteristic in common. With the exception of Albert and Bragg (1996), in
none of these cases did the authors apply their models to actual insurance data.
Both Valdez (2001) and Dukes (2005) explain this as being due to the difficulties
involved in obtaining the mortality and lapsation experience data necessary to fit
1Level premium term products are term life insurance products for which the premium is con-
stant (or level) for a specified term (the level premium period) and then increases if the policyholder
wishes to continue with the policy after the level premium period has elapsed. Level premium term
products are common in the US, but are not commonly sold in Australia.
2A summary of these models is given in Section 2 of Valdez (2001).
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these models. For example, in the case of Valdez (2001), the implementation of
his proposed test requires access to unit record mortality, withdrawal and exposure
data for the block of insured lives under investigation, for each of a reasonably large
number of consecutive years. Such data requirements are greatly prohibitive.
Albert and Bragg (1996) managed to carry out an empirical study and test for se-
lective lapsation in the US insurance environment. They tested the hypothesis that
high lapse rates result in the deterioration of mortality experience on the remaining
unlapsed block of business, using data supplied by a number of US insurance compa-
nies. They first calculated, for each of the companies under investigation, the lapse
rates and the actual to expected mortality ratios for each of the duration bands:













= β0 + β1Lapse Rate(d), for d = 1. (6.2)
Here d is an indicator for the duration band:
d =

1 for duration band 1–5 years;
2 for duration band 6–10 years;






while Actual Deaths(d) denotes the total deaths observed during duration band d,
and Expected Deaths(d) denotes the expected deaths during duration band d based





where Withdrawals(d) denotes the withdrawals observed during duration band d
and Exposure(d) denotes the central exposure to risk3 during duration band d. β0
and β1 are regression parameters to be estimated.
Thus, Albert and Bragg (1996) regressed the ratios of later to earlier mortality
3As mentioned in Section 4.2.2, if it is assumed that deaths are distributed uniformly over the
policy year and that all withdrawals occur at the end of the policy year, then the central exposure
to risk during duration band d is taken as the initial exposure to risk at the beginning of duration
band d minus half the number of deaths during duration band d.
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ratios against lapse rates, separately for each of the durations 6–10 versus 1–5 years;
11–15 versus 1–5 years; and 11–15 versus 6–10 years, and tested the hypothesis
H0 : β1 = 0 versus H1 : β1 > 0 in each regression using standard least-squares
methodology. This analysis did not reject the null hypothesis for any of the duration
bands, and found no evidence to support the hypothesis that higher lapse rates led
to deteriorating mortality experience at future durations.
The implementation of such a test for selective lapsation requires the availability
of mortality and lapsation data from a large number of Life Insurers. Data of this
form was not available for the purposes of this thesis. Consequently, it is necessary
to develop an alternative approach to testing for selective lapsation which suits the
data available.
6.2.3 A GLM-Based Test for Selective Lapsation
If selective lapsation is truly present, then higher than expected lapses among a
group of lives in a given year will result in higher than expected deaths among the
remaining members of that group in future years. Thus, there should be a positive
relationship between the mortality ratio and the ratio of actual to expected lapses
at lag l, for l greater than 0 (this shall subsequently be referred to as the lapse ratio
at lag l and denoted lapse ratio (l)), all other things being equal.
An indication of the existence of selective lapsation can, therefore, be gained
by calculating the correlation coefficients between the mortality ratios and the lapse
ratios at lag l (for each possible value of l > 0) and testing whether these correlations
are significantly greater than 0. A significant result would suggest selective lapsation.
A more complex, GLM-based test for selective lapsation involves fitting two
GLMs to the data, both of the form proposed in Section 4.2.4. That is:










x,t is the expected
number of deaths, based on the IA95-97 mortality rates with (25 year) mortality
improvement factors taken from Appendix E of ALT95-97. Ecx,tm
s
x,t is fitted as an
offset in this model, and as usual, η is a linear combination of the covariates age,
policy type, sex, duration and lapse ratio(l) (for l = 1, 2, . . .). Note that, throughout
this chapter, year is not included as a covariate in any of the GLMs, as it caused
multicollinearity problems in some of the models as could be expected. Two different
linear predictors were considered:
Model 1:
η = α + βZ; (6.5)
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Model 2:
η = α + βZ + γ1Lapse+ γ2Lapse× Type+ γ3Lapse× Sex
+ γ4Lapse×Age+ γ5Lapse×Duration; (6.6)
where Z is a vector of the covariates age, sex, duration and policy type (denoted
type), as well as all two-way interactions. Sex and type were treated as categorical
variates in the model. The notation Lapse in (6.6) denotes a vector of the Lapse
Ratio(l) variables contained in the data set. Finally, α, β and the γ’s in (6.6)
are model parameters. The interactions between the lapse ratios and the other
covariates, as indicated in (6.6), were included to allow for the possibility that
selective lapsation might differ among different subsets of the insured life population.
As the two models represented by (6.5) and (6.6) are nested, it is possible to com-
pare them based on their residual deviances. A decrease in the (residual) deviance
between Model 1 and Model 2 greater than the 95th percentile of a chi-squared dis-
tribution with degrees of freedom equal to the change in degrees of freedom between
the two models, suggests a significant relationship between mortality and lapsation,
which should be allowed for in the stochastic reserving model; otherwise we con-
clude that mortality and lapsation can be assumed to be independent for modelling
purposes.
6.2.4 Inferring Policy Discontinuances from the Single In-
surer Data
The Single Insurer Mortality Data, previously described in Section 5.3.1, was used
to test for selective lapsation. Although this data does not contain explicit records
of lapses in each year, by comparing the policy unit records from year to year, it
is possible to infer the number of policy discontinuances due to either lapsation
or policy termination4. Most policy terminations occur at older ages, usually at
ages 65 and above, so it can be assumed that for ages under 65, most non-death
policy discontinuances are policy lapses. Based on this assumption, it is possible to
estimate policy lapses by year, age, sex, policy type and duration for this data.





which is analogous to the mortality ratio at time t, defined in Equation (6.3). When
calculating the mortality ratio at time t, the denominator of the ratio, Expected
4In this thesis, policy termination is taken to refer to a policy discontinuance due either to the
expiry of the policy term or to the insurer disallowing the policyholder to renew their policy.
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Deaths(t), can be calculated by reference to a standard mortality table. No such
standard tables exist for lapsation rates, so we proceed as follows.
To calculate the expected lapses for this data, expected lapse rates were deter-
mined based on the Single Insurer Lapsation Data (described in Section 5.3.2)5.
The “traditional” policy lapse data were used to determine the expected lapse rates
for Type 1 policies, while the Yearly Renewable Term Insurance lapse data were
used to determine the expected lapse rates for Type 4 policies. In each case, the
expected lapse rates were assumed to vary only by duration (not by age or sex) and
the expected lapse rate at duration d was set equal to the average lapse rate at that
duration for all of the years for which data were available. The expected lapse rates
resulting from this calculation are given in Table A.4 of Appendix A. The expected









where wsd is the expected lapse rate at duration d; and E
c
d,t is the central exposure
to risk among policies at duration d at time t.
The Single Insurer Mortality Data set comprises seven years of data, making
it possible to estimate the policy lapses in each of six years and to calculate lapse
ratios up to a lag of five years, although it is only possible to calculate lag 5 lapse
ratios for the most recent year’s observations. The earlier the year of observation,
the fewer the lags at which lapse ratios can be calculated. Thus, for the purpose
of running the tests described in the previous section, five data sets were created.
Each data set contained observations listing exposures, deaths and lapse ratios by
age, sex, duration, year and policy type, but with the maximum lag of the lapse
ratios differing between data sets. The data set with a maximum lapse ratio lag of
1 year contained the most data points, while the data set with a maximum lapse
ratio lag of 5 years contained the least data points. The correlation-based test for
selective lapsation was run at each possible lag, using the data set with the greatest
number of observations at that lag, while the GLM-based test was run once using
each data set. The results of these tests can be found in the next section.
5The Single Insurer Lapsation Data was used to determine the expected lapse rates because the
data set contains actual numbers of lapses rather than inferred lapses (as in the case of the Single
Insurer Mortality Data). The “expected” lapse rates derived from this data set are assumed to be
typical lapse rates for the insurer in question.
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6.2.5 Results
Correlation Tests for Selective Lapsation
Mortality ratios and lapse ratios were calculated for each age, sex, duration, policy
type and year combination, and correlations were subsequently calculated at each
possible lag from 1 year to 5 years. These were calculated for all ages combined
and for ages 15 – 64 only (since, as has been previously mentioned, many policy
discontinuances after age 65 are due to the insurer disallowing the policyholder
to renew their policy rather than to a decision on the part of the insured). The
correlation coefficients by lag, sex and policy type are presented in Tables 6.1 and 6.2.
The p-values associated with these correlation coefficients are shown in brackets6.
The number of data points, n, used to calculate the correlations varies between cells,
but in all cases, n is greater than 900.
Table 6.1: Correlations Between Mortality Ratios and Lapse Ratios by Lag, Sex and
Policy Type (All Ages) with p-values Shown in Brackets
Lag Type 1 Males Type 1 Females Type 4 Males Type 4 Females
1 0.0120 (0.110) 0.0122 (0.146) -0.0145 (0.287) -0.0135 (0.347)
2 0.0014 (0.867) 0.0096 (0.308) -0.0104 (0.515) 0.0016 (0.924)
3 -0.0087 (0.374) 0.0035 (0.751) -0.0120 (0.546) 0.0025 (0.906)
4 -0.0073 (0.545) 0.0095 (0.483) -0.0255 (0.372) 0.0040 (0.894)
5 -0.0163 (0.346) 0.0027 (0.887) - -
Table 6.2: Correlations Between Mortality Ratios and Lapse Ratios by Lag, Sex and
Policy Type (Ages 15–64 Only) with p-values Shown in Brackets
Lag Type 1 Males Type 1 Females Type 4 Males Type 4 Females
1 0.0300* (0.004) 0.0135 (0.216) -0.0121 (0.420) -0.0086 (0.581)
2 0.0022 (0.852) 0.0087 (0.481) -0.0086 (0.626) -0.0090 (0.623)
3 -0.0034 (0.803) -0.0017 (0.905) -0.0098 (0.659) -0.0070 (0.761)
4 -0.0098 (0.567) 0.0124 (0.487) -0.0220 (0.490) 0.0078 (0.813)
5 -0.0415 (0.090) 0.0001 (0.998) - -
Note: * indicates significance at the 5% significance level.
Only one of the correlations presented in either of these tables is significantly
different from zero at the 5% level, that one being the correlation between the
6The p-values are calculated based on the Fisher z-transformation of the correlation coefficient,





. Fisher’s z is approximately normally distributed with
standard error 1√
n−3 , where n is the number of observations used to calculate r.
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mortality ratio and the lag 1 lapse ratio for Type 1 Males in the 15–64 age band.
This provides only very weak evidence of the presence of selective lapsation (it
should be noted that at the 5% significance level it is expected that one in twenty
hypothesis tests will result in the rejection of the null hypothesis, even if the null
hypothesis is true). Overall, the results of these correlation tests tend to contradict
the selective lapsation hypothesis.
GLM Tests for Selective Lapsation
As a more rigorous test for selective lapsation, the two GLMs described in Section
6.2.3 were fitted to the data. As in the case of the correlation tests, this was done
for the “all age” data and for ages 15–64 only. The decrease in deviance between
Models 1 and 2, along with the associated change in degrees of freedom and p-value
for each pair of models fitted, are presented in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3: Drop in Deviance Between the Two Selective Lapsation GLMs by Maxi-
mum Lag
All Ages Ages 15–64 Only
Lag
∆ Dev. df p-value ∆ Dev. df p-value
1 16.99 5 0.005* 21.42 5 0.001*
2 32.65 10 0.000* 36.05 10 0.000*
3 22.15 15 0.104 19.01 15 0.213
4 31.41 20 0.050 18.52 20 0.553
5 21.50 20 0.368 26.64 20 0.146
Note: * indicates significance at the 5% significance level.
For the data sets with maximum lags of 1 and 2 years, there were significant
drops in deviance at the 5% significance level, but not for any of the other data sets.
In the case of the data sets with a maximum lag of 2 years, two more models were
fitted to the data. For both of these models, the linear predictors were identical to
those for Model 2, except that in the first case, Lapse was replaced by Lapse Ratio(1)
(this model is referred to as Model 3) and in the second case, Lapse was replaced
by Lapse Ratio(2) (this model is referred to as Model 4). Comparing the deviances
of Models 2 and 3, it is possible to determine whether the lapse ratio at lag 2 is
significant in the model, given that the lapse ratio at lag 1 (and the other, usual
covariates) has already been included in the model. For the all age data, the change
in deviance between Models 2 and 3 is 10.15 with 5 degrees of freedom (and a p-value
of 0.071), while for the age 15–64 only data, the change in deviance is 7.077 with
5 degrees of freedom (p-value = 0.215). Thus, in both cases, Lapse Ratio(2) is not
significant in the model, given that Lapse Ratio(1) has already been included.
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By comparing Models 1 and 4, it is possible to determine whether the lapse ratio
at lag 2 is significant in the model, given that the usual covariates have already
been included in the model, but not the lapse ratio at lag 1. For the all ages data,
the change in deviance between Models 1 and 4 is 3.71 with 5 degrees of freedom
(p-value = 0.592), while for the age 15–64 only data, the change in deviance is 6.52
with 5 degrees of freedom (p-value = 0.259). Thus, again, Lapse Ratio(2) is not
significant in the model. Therefore, it can be seen that, of all of the Lapse Ratio(l)
variates, only Lapse Ratio(1) is significant in any of the models. Nevertheless,
although a relationship between lapsation and mortality rates one year into the
future was suggested by some of the models, it does not necessarily follow that
selective lapsation is present.
If policyholders truly were, en masse, choosing whether to lapse their policies
based on their perceived health status, then it would be expected that a change in
lapsation rates would impact mortality rates for several years into the future (with
these effects diminishing over time), since, once a healthy or unhealthy life has left
a particular cohort, it cannot return to that cohort. Our analysis suggests that a
change in lapsation rates significantly impacts mortality rates for at most one year
into the future, after which the data reflects no significant change in lapse rates.
Thus, either selective lapsation has not occurred or the effects of selective lapsation
after one year are so small as to be of little concern.
Even supposing these results were due to selective actions of policyholders, it
seems clear that policyholders are not selectively lapsing their policies consistently
in all years, since otherwise a significant relationship between lapsation and mortality
would be expected to occur in all of the data sets we have used; however, we observed
no such relationship.
On the whole, it seems that if selective lapsation occurs, it is a small effect that
does not consistently occur in all years.
6.2.6 Conclusion
Based on the results of both the correlation tests and the GLM tests, there is some
evidence to indicate the presence of selective lapsation. However, this evidence is
not conclusive, and for modelling purposes, mortality and lapsation will be assumed
to be independent in the remainder of this thesis.
Dependency Relationships 79
6.3 Mortality and the Economy
6.3.1 Population Mortality and the Economy
It is common among Life Insurance actuaries to assume that economic fluctuations
have no impact on the mortality experience of insured lives. Nevertheless, a great
number of studies have been conducted which demonstrate that statistically signifi-
cant relationships do exist between economic variables (particularly unemployment
rates) and mortality rates for the population as a whole. The nature of these rela-
tionships, however, has been the cause of much controversy7.
In his seminal paper on the topic, Brenner (1979) hypothesised that recessions
and other sources of economic instability are associated with higher mortality rates.
A number of researchers have criticised these results on statistical grounds (a sum-
mary of these criticisms can be found in Laporte (2004)) and the majority of subse-
quent studies have, in fact, found evidence that economic downturns lead to reduced
mortality.
Ruhm (2000), Laporte (2004) and Tapia Granados (2005) all found, using US
aggregated mortality data (and differing methodologies), that mortality rates fall
when the economy deteriorates (as characterised by increased unemployment rates).
Gerdtham and Ruhm (2002) and Neumayer (2004) reached the same conclusion,
but using aggregated mortality data for 23 OECD countries (including Australia)
and Germany, respectively. Ruhm (2003) also reached the same conclusion using
US unit record data (referred to as microdata), while Gerdtham and Johannesson
(2005) used Swedish microdata and found that “recessions increase the mortality
risk of men, but have no effect on the mortality of women” (p.206). This is not an
exhaustive list of papers that have dealt with the relationship between the economy
and mortality. For a more detailed summary of papers that have been written on
this topic, see Ruhm (2004).
There are two main schools of thought as to why the economy has an impact
on mortality. One focusses on the psychological reasons, while the other focusses
on the economic reasons. From a psychological point of view, downturns in the
economy can place additional stress on people, particularly those in lower socioeco-
nomic groups, which can result in a negative impact on physical and mental health.
Brenner and Mooney (1983, p.1128) list three ways in which recessions (and the as-
sociated unemployment) can have a detrimental effect on health (and subsequently
on mortality rates):
7Throughout this thesis and in the papers cited in this section, we are referring to the relation-
ship between economic variables and mortality for industrialised nations. It is generally accepted
that sustained economic growth leads to reduced mortality for developing countries and this has
been demonstrated by a number of studies, for example Pritchett and Summers (1996) and Noumba
(2004).
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1. Poverty or lack of material resources to meet the ordinary requirements and
extraordinary problems of life affect many of the unemployed and others who
lose financially.
2. Psychosocial stress associated with (the) loss (of employment or money) is
potentially damaging in itself, especially if it leads to withdrawal and loss of
potentially beneficially social relationships.
3. Attempts to alleviate psychological distress by medication with alcohol or legal
and illegal drugs, by overeating or undereating, or by smoking tobacco will tend
to exacerbate existing morbidity and produce additional health problems.
On the other hand, Ruhm (2000, pp.620–622) offers four reasons why economic
upturns can have a negative effect (and recessions can have a positive effect) on
health and mortality, based on an economic model of utility maximisation:
1. The Opportunity Cost of Time: Leisure time declines during economic up-
turns, making it more costly to undertake health-producing activities (such as
exercise) that are time intensive. Similarly, the time price of medical care
will rise if individuals working more hours find it harder to schedule medical
appointments for themselves or their dependents. . .
2. Health as an Input into Production:. . . hazardous working conditions, job-related
stress, and the physical exertion of employment may have negative effects on
health, particularly when job hours are extended during short-lasting economic
expansions. . .
3. External Sources of Death:. . . work-related accidents are likely to become more
common during temporary (economic) expansions. Other types of accidents
will probably increase as well. Of particular importance, drinking and driving
rise in good times, leading to higher motor vehicle fatality rates. . .
4. Migration Flows: (Migration flows have) the potential to raise death rates (in
destination locations). . . through increasing crowding, because the new migrants
import disease, or if they are unfamiliar with roads or medical infrastructure. . .
These two points of view seem to contradict one another. However, as was
pointed out by Neumayer (2004, p.1039), these “two perspectives and the theories
associated with them need not be inconsistent with each other. Instead, they could
capture two different aspects of a complex impact of economic fluctuations on health
and mortality.” So, if economic fluctuations are found to have no statistically signif-
icant effect on mortality rates, this could be because the two above described effects
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are of approximately equal strength and cancel each other out. Furthermore, a sta-
tistically significant positive or negative effect does not necessarily imply that one
effect is non-existent, “instead, it merely means that one effect is so much stronger
than the other that the overall effect goes into one direction.”
6.3.2 Existing Tests for a Relationship Between Economic
Fluctuations and Mortality
Each of the papers mentioned in the previous section put forward an econometric
model (mostly linear regression models) to determine whether a statistically signif-
icant relationship exists between economic fluctuations and mortality. In most of
the cases, the age-adjusted mortality rate (or some function of it) was used as the
dependent variable, while the unemployment rate was used as the primary proxy
for economic conditions. The age-adjusted mortality rate, Mt, (also referred to as








where sEcx,t is the central exposed to risk for lives aged x in year t for a specified




Ruhm (2000), Gerdtham and Ruhm (2002) and Ruhm (2003) all used essentially
the same linear regression model to test for a relationship between the economy and
mortality, and all used panel data for multiple geographic locations (states in the US
or countries in the OECD) at several points in time. The basic form of the models
fitted is:
ln (Mj,t) = αt + λj + βXj,t + γUj,t + εj,t; (6.10)
when aggregate data is used, where Mj,t is the age-adjusted mortality rate for lo-
cation j at time t, Uj,t is the unemployment rate for location j at time t, and Xj,t
is a vector of covariates. The regression error term, εj,t, was assumed to have a
normal distribution with a mean of 0 and constant variance, and αt, λj, β and λ
are regression parameters to be fitted. αt is a year-specific time effect and λj is a
location specific fixed effect. Mj,t is logged in order to transform it from a positively
skewed, non-negative random variable to an approximately normally-distributed
random variable.
In the case of microdata, this equation becomes:
ln (Mi,j,t) = αt + λj + βXi,j,t + γUj,t + εi,j,t; (6.11)
where i indexes the individual.
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When aggregate data was used, observations were weighted by the square root
of the location population size, to account for heteroskedasticity, while in the case
of microdata, observations were weighted to account for unequal probabilities of
inclusion in the sample (although, no details were provided as to how this was
done).
The explanatory variables used differed slightly from paper to paper, depending
on the nature of the data used, but Ruhm, and Gerdtham and Ruhm allowed for
differences between location in per capita income; age, sex and race distribution
of the population; and educational attainments of the adult population. If after
allowing for a wide variety of determinants of mortality, such as lifestyle differences in
different location and racial differences, γ was found to be significantly different from
zero, then Ruhm, or Gerdtham and Ruhm concluded that a significant relationship
did exist between economic fluctuations and mortality. Specifically, they found that
physical health improves and mortality rates decline during economic downturns
and that economic improvements are associated with higher mortality rates.
Neumayer (2004) extended Ruhm’s, and Gerdtham and Ruhm’s models. Neu-
mayer proposed both a static model, identical to the models previously described,
and a dynamic model, which allows for lagged effects of unemployment on mortality.
Neumayer’s dynamic model is of the form:
ln (Mj,t) = αt + λj + δ ln (Mj,t−1) + βXj,t + γUj,t + εj,t; (6.12)
where δ is another parameter to be estimated.
This is an infinite distributed lag (IDL) model assuming a geometric lag struc-
ture, which Neumayer fitted using Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) tech-
niques.
Neumayer used mostly the same explanatory variables as in the previous mod-
els, although he did not include a variable for educational attainment, since such
data was not available to him, and also found that higher unemployment rates are
associated with reduced mortality rates and conversely.
Laporte (2004), Tapia Granados (2005) and Gerdtham and Johannesson (2005)
all investigated the relationship between mortality and more than one economic
variable. Laporte and Tapia Granados both fitted models containing more than one
economic explanatory variable, while Gerdham and Johannesson fitted six models
of the same form, each containing a single economic explanatory variable but with
that variable changing between models.
Laporte (2004) put forward an error correction mechanism (ECM) model to test
for a significant relationship between the aggregate age-adjusted mortality rate and
three economic variables: unemployment rate, real GDP per capita and real per
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capita total health expenditure. This model is of the form:
∆Mt = α+β1∆Gt+β2∆Ut+β3∆Ht+γ1Mt−1+γ2Gt−1+γ3Ut−1+γ4Ht−1+εt; (6.13)
where ∆ is the difference operator, for example ∆Mt = Mt −Mt−1, Gt is the real
GDP per capita in year t, Ut is the unemployment rate in year t, Ht is the real per
capita total health expenditure in year t and εt is the normally distributed error
term. α, the β’s and the γ’s are parameters to be estimated.
Tapia Granados (2005) proposed a regression model to test for a significant
relationship between the age-adjusted mortality rate and unemployment rate and
real GDP per capita. His model is of the form:
∆Mt = α + β1∆Gt + β2∆Ut + εt. (6.14)
Laporte (2004) and Tapia Granados (2005) both drew similar conclusions to the
previously mentioned papers.
Gerdtham and Johannesson (2005), on the other hand, used microdata, rather
than aggregate data and suggested a probit model of the form:
Pi,t = α + β1Agei,t + β2BCt + β3t+ εi,t; (6.15)
where Pi,t is the probability of dying for individual i in year t, Agei,t is the age of
subject i in year t, and BCt is the measure of the business cycle in year t.
Gerdtham and Johannesson used six different measures of the business cycle
in fitting this model (that is, they fitted the above model six times for each data
set, using a different measure of the business cycle in each fitting): unemployment
rate, job loss notification rate, deviation from the GDP trend, GDP change, industry
capacity utilisation (for the manufacturing, mining and quarrying industries) and an
industry confidence indicator (for the manufacturing industry). They also considered
the possibility that there was a time lag between changes in economic activity and
the mortality rates and tested for this using the model:
Pi,t = α+β1Agei,t+ β2BCt+ β3BCt−1 +β4BCt−2 + β5BCt−3 +β6BCt−4 + β7t+ εi,t.
(6.16)
Gerdtham and Johannesson (2005) found that increases in the job loss noti-
fication rate, GDP change, industry capacity utilisation and industry confidence
indicator were all associated with a decrease in the male mortality rates. However,
they did not find a significant relationship between unemployment rate or deviation
from the GDP trend and the male mortality rates, nor between any of the business
cycle measures and the female mortality rate.
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Unlike Ruhm (2000, 2003), Gerdtham and Ruhm (2002) and Neumayer (2004),
neither Laporte (2004), Tapia Granados (2005), nor Gerdtham and Johannesson
(2005) allowed for differences in the population composition (that is, differences
in age, sex, race etc) from year to year (or differences from person to person, when
microdata was used) explicitly in their models (with the exception of age differences,
in the case of Gerdtham and Johannesson’s model). Tapia Granados allowed for
these differences implicitly, however, by fitting his model to different subsets of his
data determined by age, sex and race (for example, white females or males aged 35
to 44 years) and Gerdtham and Johannesson fitted their model separately to the
male and female subsets of their data.
6.3.3 A GLM-Based Test for a Relationship Between
Economic Fluctuations and Mortality
All of the tests for a relationship between economic fluctuations and mortality de-
scribed in the previous section are clearly similar in nature.
• They all test for a significant relationship between an economic variable (in
most cases the unemployment rate) and a standardised measure of mortality,
• after allowing, either directly or indirectly, for other, non-economic variables
that are likely to have an impact on the mortality rate (for example, age and
sex), and
• this is generally done through the use of linear regression models.
The model developed in this section is based on these same principles, but now
we use a GLM framework.
In Section 4.2.4 a Poisson GLM of the form given in Equation (4.10) was pro-













is the mortality ratio for lives aged x in year t and η is a linear
combination of the covariates. This same model structure is used again in this
section.
This model is similar in form to those given in Equations (6.10) and (6.12) except
that the mortality ratio is used in place of the age-adjusted mortality rate and a
Poisson error structure is assumed instead of a normal error distribution. The mor-
tality ratio and the age-adjusted mortality rate are two different but similar methods
of standardising mortality data so that the mortality among different populations
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can be compared. Throughout the previous sections of this thesis, the mortality
ratio has been used as the standardised measure of mortality and it is used here,
again, for consistency. Furthermore, it is more appropriate to assume the number
of deaths follows a Poisson distribution than a normal distribution, as the observed
number of deaths is a discrete, non-negative random variable, whereas the normal
distribution would imply that it was a continuous random variable with range over
the entire number line (nevertheless, in a large sample, we expect there to be little
difference between the Poisson and normal models, by the Central Limit Theorem).
Based on the literature review provided in Section 6.3.2, the possibility of a
relationship between mortality and the unemployment rate should be investigated.
Furthermore, in later parts of this thesis, a number of other economic variables
are considered (the price inflation rate, the share price index growth rate, the share
dividend yield rate, the long-term interest rate, the short-term interest rate, and the
property yield), and it is desirable to see if a significant relationship exists between
mortality and any of these variables. In theory, this could be done by including all
of the economic and non-economic variates in the linear predictor of the GLM given
in Equation (6.17) and then testing to determine whether the economic variates are
significant, given the presence of the non-economic variates in the model. However,
from Table 5.19 it is clear that some of the economic variates are highly correlated
with each other, and including all of them together in the one model is likely to
give rise to multicollinearity problems. Thus, it is necessary to reduce the set of
economic variates to be included in the model.
Another point that should be considered is that the existence of a statistically sig-
nificant relationship between two variables does not necessarily imply that a causal
relationship exists between them. It is easy to see how a causal relationship could
exist between unemployment rates, interest rates, or price inflation and mortality,
since the main source of income for the majority of the adult population is wages and
salaries (see ABS (2007) for further details); most adults are exposed to movements
in interest rates through either debts or investments; and all adults are directly
exposed to movements in prices. However, it is more difficult to see how a causal re-
lationship could exist between commercial property yields, share price growth rates
or dividend yields and mortality.
According to Parlett and Rossiter (2004), in 2002, only 10.3% of Australian
households owned investment property, and it seems likely that the majority of
these properties were residential, rather than commercial properties (statistics were
not available to confirm this), since residential property is typically cheaper than
commercial property. Furthermore, according to ASX (2007), in 2006, 46% of Aus-
tralian adults owned shares (down from 55% in 2004), either directly or indirectly,
with people from households with a greater combined income more likely to in-
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vest than those from households with a lower combined income. However, in spite
of this, shares make up a relatively small proportion of the total assets of most
Australian households. According to ABS (2006), in 2003–04, among “high wealth
households8”, shares only made up 5.1% of total household assets, on average, with
the percentage falling to 0.9% for “medium wealth households9” and 0.8% for “low
wealth households10” For all households, on average, shares made up 3.4% of total
household assets. With such low exposures to these assets by the population in gen-
eral, it is difficult to see how a causal link could exist between the mortality ratio
and fluctuations in the property yield, share price index growth rate or dividend
yield.
Based on the above argument, it was decided to test only for relationships be-
tween the mortality ratio and the unemployment rate, price inflation rate or interest
rates. As was mentioned previously, however, in order to avoid multicollinearity
problems, these four variables should not all be included in a single model. To de-
termine which economic variates should be included in the model, a principal com-
ponents analysis of the economic variates was conducted11 (using the correlation
matrix, rather than the covariance matrix and implemented using S-Plus). Figure
6.1 presents the scree plot12 for the economic data described in Section 5.4. From
this graph, it can be seen that over 95% of the variance of the data is explained by
the first two principal components. The variates with the greatest absolute weight-
ings in each of these components were, respectively, the short-term interest rate and
the unemployment rate. Consequently, it was decided to include only the short-term
interest rate and the unemployment rate in the linear predictor when testing for a
significant relationship between mortality and economic fluctuations.
To test for a relationship between the mortality rate and any of these variables,
two different linear predictors were considered in fitting the GLM in Equation (6.17)
to this data:
Model 1:
η = α + βZ; (6.18)
8High wealth households are defined as those in the highest household net worth quintile.
9Median wealth households are defined as those in the third household net worth quintile.
10Low wealth households are defined as those in the lowest household net worth quintile.
11For more information on principal components analysis, see Rencher (1998) or Lattin et al.
(2003).
12A scree plot is a diagnostic tool used in principal components analysis. It plots “the variance
accounted for by each principal component in order from largest to smallest” (Lattin et al. (2003,
p.113)).
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η = α + βZ + γ1V + γ2V × Type+ γ3V × Sex
+ γ4V × Age+ γ5V ×Duration; (6.19)
where Z is a vector of the covariates: age, sex, duration and policy type, including all
two-way interactions, and V is a vector of the economic covariates: unemployment
rate and the short-term interest rate. The sex and policy type variables were both
treated as categorical covariates, and as usual, α, β and the γ’s are model parameters
to be estimated. Duration was fitted as a continuous variate for durations of less
than 10 years, and as an indicator variable for durations of 10 years or greater. The
reasoning behind this is given in Section 6.3.4.
Non-economic variables were allowed for explicitly in the model, rather than by
fitting the model to subsets of the data, as this makes better use of the available data.
Only age, sex, duration and policy type were used as (non-economic) explanatory
variables and not race, educational attainment, income per capita or year, as were
used in Ruhm (2000, 2003), Gerdtham and Ruhm (2002) and Neumayer (2004). We
omitted the latter variables because they are not commonly collected by insurers
and so are unlikely to be included in a pricing or reserving model.
Each of these models was fitted to the data and then, because the two models
are nested, the residual deviances of the models were used to compare them, as was
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done in Section 6.2. The results are presented in Section 6.3.5.
6.3.4 The Data
The IAAust Data Set, previously described in Section 5.2, and the economic data
described in Section 5.4 were used to test for a possible relationship between insured
life mortality and economic fluctuations. For the economic data, the “annual” rates
of return (the construction of these “annual” rates was described in Section 5.4) were
used for ease of comparability with the mortality data. Figure 6.2 plots the (logged)
all-age, all-duration mortality ratios for the IAAust data (plots of the economic data
were given in Section 5.4).


































As a preliminary investigation, correlations were calculated between the (all-age,
all-duration) mortality ratios and each of the economic variables considered (for the
period 1995–99) for each policy type/sex combination. These correlations (with p-
values shown in brackets) are presented in Table 6.4. Only one of the correlations
presented in this table is significantly different from zero.
Ideally, in testing for a relationship between economic fluctuations and mortality,
it is desirable to use a data set that covers the longest time period possible. Both the
IAAust Data Set and the Single Insurer Mortality Data cover relatively short periods
of time (5 years and 6 years, respectively). However, Australian population mortality
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Table 6.4: Correlations Between Insured Life Mortality Ratios and Economic Vari-
ables (1995–1999) with p-values Shown in Brackets
ST Int. Rate Unemp. Rate
Type 1 M 0.896* (0.040) 0.600 (0.327)
Type 1 F 0.684 (0.237) 0.434 (0.511)
Type 2 M -0.242 (0.727) -0.376 (0.576)
Type 2 F -0.442 (0.503) 0.185 (0.792)
Type 3 M 0.852 (0.074) 0.571 (0.358)
Type 3 F -0.134 (0.849) -0.047 (0.947)
Type 4 M -0.856 (0.071) -0.690 (0.231)
Type 4 F -0.591 (0.337) 0.083 (0.906)
Note: n = 5 and * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
data13 was available for the period 1901-2003. This data set (which shall be referred
to as the Australian Population Data Set) gives deaths and central exposures to
risk by age, sex and year. Although this is population mortality data rather than
insured life mortality data, if mortality rates are influenced by the economy, then
this should be true for the whole of the population, not just for insured lives (in
fact, it is likely that the general population would be more greatly influenced by
economic factors than the insured life subset, as the general population contains a
greater proportion of people from low economic backgrounds and in poor health).
Thus, the relationship between mortality and the economy for the general Australian
population is likely to give an indication of the relationship between mortality and
the economy for the insured life subset. Consequently, the GLMs given in Section
6.3.3 were fitted to both the IAAust Data Set and the Australian Population Data
Set.
As described in Section 5.4, all of the economic data sets are only available
(simultaneously) for the period from December 1984 onwards. Because of this,
the GLMs previously described were only fitted to the Australian Population Data
Set for the period 1985–2003. The duration and policy type covariates were not
included when fitting the models to the population data, as these are meaningless
in this context.
When fitting the model to the Australian Population Data Set, the expected
numbers of deaths, Ecx,tm
s
x,t, for each age/sex/year combination, were calculated
based on ALT95-97 mortality rates with (25 year) mortality improvement factors
taken from Appendix E of ALT95-97. ALT95-97 mortality was used rather than
IA95-97 mortality (which has been used when calculating mortality ratios for the
insured life data), because ALT95-97 was constructed based on (Australian) popu-
13Australian Demographic Databank, Version 3.2b, February 2005.
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lation data, rather than insured life data, and, consequently, is believed to better
reflect the shape of the mortality curve for the Australian Population Data Set than
IA95-97. Furthermore, only data relating to ages 15–99 were used. This is for con-
sistency with the IAAust Data Set and because very few lives aged under 15 or over
99 hold insurance policies. Figure 6.3 shows the (logged) all-age mortality ratios for
each year for males and females.


















From Figure 6.3 it is clear that the male and female (population) mortality ratios
are highly correlated with each other. Tapia Granados (2005, p.1195), citing John
Stuart Mill’s fifth canon, pointed out that “if two phenomena vary up and down
simultaneously, one is causing the other or there is a third factor causing both of
them”. It is unlikely that the male mortality ratio is causing the variation in the
female ratio or vice versa, which suggests that there is a third factor causing both of
these factors to vary. This could be an environmental factor, for example weather
conditions or the prevalence of certain viruses from year to year, but it could also
be an economic factor. By contrast, there is not such a clear pattern between the
(all-age) insured life mortality ratios, as can be seen in Figure 6.2.
Table 6.5 shows the correlations between the (all-age) population mortality ratios
and the economic variables (with p-values). These were calculated for the period
1985–2003 and for the period 1995–99, to facilitate comparison with the IAAust
data.
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Table 6.5: Correlations Between Population Mortality Ratios and Economic Vari-
ables with p-values Shown in Brackets
ST Int. Rate Unemp. Rate
1985–2003
Females 0.581* (0.008) 0.296 (0.222)
Males 0.752* (0.000) 0.364 (0.127)
1995–1999
Females 0.497 (0.441) 0.858 (0.069)
Males 0.756 (0.163) 0.901* (0.036)
Note: n = 19 for the 1985–2003 values and n = 5 for the 1995–1999 values. *
indicates significance at the 5% level.
For the period 1985–2003, the mortality ratios are significantly correlated with
the short-term interest rates for both males and females. However, for the period
1995–99, the male (but not female) mortality ratio is significantly correlated with the
unemployment rate, but none of the other correlations are significantly different from
zero. Figures 6.4 and 6.5 plot the (logged) mortality ratios against the short-term
interest rates and the unemployment rates, respectively, for the period 1985–2003,
thus illustrating the above-noted facts.
Figure 6.4: All-Age Mortality Ratios versus Short-Term Interest Rate (%) for the
Australian Population Data Set



















Figure 6.5: All-Age Mortality Ratios versus Unemployment Rate (%) for the Aus-



















As was mentioned in Section 6.3.3, duration was treated, in the GLM, as a
continuous variate for durations of less than 10 years and as an indicator variate
for durations of 10 years or greater. In the IAAust Data set, policy duration was
grouped into 9 bands. Rather than treat this variate as a categorical covariate,
it was decided to assume a uniform distribution of policy durations within each
duration band and, consequently, to assume the duration of each policy within a
specific policy band to be equal to the “average” duration for all policies in that
band. For example, it was assumed that all policies in the 2–3 year duration band
have a duration of 2.5 years. By doing this, it is possible to treat duration as a
continuous covariate. For the 10+ years duration band, it is difficult to determine
an appropriate “average” duration without additional information, which was not
available. Consequently, it was decided to use an indicator variable for policies with
durations of 10 years or greater.
6.3.5 GLM Modelling Results
The two models described in Section 6.3.3 were fitted to each of the data sets
previously mentioned and to the Australian Population Data Set for each of the
time periods, 1985–2003 and 1995–99. The decrease in deviance between Models 1
and 2, along with the associated change in degrees of freedom and p-value for each
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pair of models fitted, are presented in Table 6.6.
Table 6.6: Drop in Deviance between the Two Economic Fluctuation versus Mor-
tality GLMs
Data Set ∆ Dev. df p value
IAAust Data (1995–1999) 92.83 16 0.000*
Aust. Pop. Data (1985–2003) 2241.78 6 0.000*
Aust. Pop. Data (1995–1999) 201.19 6 0.000*
Note: * indicates significance at the 5% level.
In each case, Model 2 provides a significantly better fit than Model 1, suggesting
that a significant relationship exists between economic fluctuations and the mortality
ratio.
Based on the analysis of deviance table for Model 2 fitted to the IAAust data,
with V ×Type and V ×Duration fitted last (see Table 6.7), it is clear that the inter-
actions between the economic variables and policy type, and the economic variables
and duration, are not significant. These terms were dropped from the model and the
model refitted. In the refitted model, the three terms involving the unemployment
rate were also found to be insignificant and were removed from the model. The final
refitted model is termed Model 3, and the linear predictor of this model is presented
below.
Table 6.7: Analysis of Deviance Table for Model 2 for the IAAust Data









V × Age 2 24.78
V × Sex 2 6.20
V × Type 6 5.51
V ×Duration 4 3.57
Model 3:
η = α + βZ + γ1STI + γ2STI × Sex+ γ3STI ×Age. (6.20)
Table 6.8 presents the estimates of the coefficients of the economic variables
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(and interactions involving the economic variables) for the final fitted models, with
standard errors. In this table, U denotes the unemployment rate, STI denotes
the short-term interest rate, and I (F ) is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the
policyholder is female and 0 otherwise. Note, in interpreting the coefficient values,
that the unemployment rate and short-term interest rate were given in decimal
(rather than percentage) form in the data sets.
Table 6.8: Fitted Coefficients for the Economic Fluctuation versus Mortality GLMs
with Standard Errors Shown in Brackets
IAAust Data Australian Population Data
Covariate
1995–1999 1985–2003 1995–1999
U - -0.298 (0.223) -1.364 (1.483)
STI -6.979* (2.441) 0.292* (0.067) -1.376* (0.659)
U × I (F ) - -1.190* (0.099) 0.075 (0.659)
STI × I (F ) -3.645* (1.586) -0.561* (0.030) -0.813* (0.291)
U ×Age - 0.027* (0.003) 0.055* (0.020)
STI × Age 0.161* (0.034) 0.007* (0.001) 0.026* (0.009)
Note: * indicates significance at the 5% significance level.
From Table 6.8, it can be seen that, for the population data, in some cases,
the coefficients of covariates involving the unemployment rate are not significantly
different from zero. However, the three covariates involving the unemployment rate
are, together, significant in each of the models with p-values of 0.000 for both cases
of the Australian Population Data. This is of interest, since these results suggest
that there is a significant relationship between fluctuations in the unemployment
rate and the mortality ratio for the Australian population in general, but not for
the subset of the population who take out insurance. This seems reasonable, since
it would be expected that the people who take out insurance policies would come
from higher socioeconomic backgrounds and thus, have greater job security, and be
less likely to be affected by fluctuations in the unemployment rate.
Table 6.9 gives the percentage change in the mortality ratio associated with a
1% change in the short-term interest rate, for each sex and for each of a number of
ages, as suggested by each model.
In the case of the short-term interest rates, for most of the data sets an increase
in this variable is associated with a decrease in the mortality ratio at lower ages
and an increase at higher ages. This result is unexpected, since younger people
are more likely to be in debt, and thus, adversely affected by increases in interest
rates, while older people are more likely to be receiving an income from assets, and
thus be positively affected by such an increase. The relationship between economic
fluctuations and mortality is investigated further in Chapter 7.
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Table 6.9: % Change in the Mortality Ratio Associated with a 1% Change in the
Short-Term Interest Rate
IAAust Data Aust. Pop. (1985–2003) Aust. Pop. (1995–99)
Age
Males Females Males Females Males Females
20 -3.69% -7.14% 0.43% -0.13% -0.85% -1.66%
40 -0.54% -4.10% 0.57% 0.01% -0.34% -1.14%
60 2.72% -0.96% 0.71% 0.15% 0.18% -0.63%
80 6.08% 2.28% 0.86% 0.29% 0.71% -0.11%
6.3.6 Conclusion
Based on the GLM tests conducted in the previous section using both insured life
data and Australian population data, there is evidence to indicate significant rela-
tionships between the short-term interest rate and the mortality ratio, but there is
evidence to suggest a significant relationship between the unemployment rate and
the mortality rate only in the case of the Australian Population data. Consequently,
a relationship between the short-term interest rate and mortality should be allowed
for in the stochastic solvency testing model.
6.4 Withdrawal Rates and the Economy
6.4.1 The Interest Rate and Emergency Fund Hypotheses
Insurance lapse rates are commonly believed to be influenced by the economy. Over
the past century a number of papers have been written on the subject of lapse
rates (although very few have been written in more recent years) and from these
papers two hypotheses have emerged to explain lapse behaviour: the emergency
fund hypothesis and the interest rate hypothesis.
The interest rate hypothesis holds that lapse rates rise when interest rates in-
crease “because the latter acts as the opportunity cost for owning insurance con-
tracts. . . . Policyholders thus tend to surrender their policies to exploit higher
yields. . . available in the markets” (Kuo et al. (2003, pp.490–491)). The emergency
fund hypothesis, on the other hand, conjectures that “lapses should increase during
recessions (that is, during times of high unemployment) because some policyhold-
ers are unable to maintain premium payments for insurance contracts” (Outreville
(1990, p.249)). As was pointed out by Kuo et al. (2003, p.491), these two hypotheses
are not mutually exclusive, so it is possible that both may be acting on lapse rates
simultaneously.
In recent years, three papers have investigated the relationship between lapse
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rates and the economy. Outreville (1990) used US and Canadian “early lapse”14
data for all ordinary Life Insurance product types combined, and annual average
lapse rate data for whole of life insurance policies. He found, in all cases, that
lapse rates tended to be higher during periods of higher unemployment but only
in the case of the US annual average lapse rate data did he find any significant
relationship between lapsation rates and interest rates. In that case, the relationship
between lapse rates and interest rates was positive. That is, Outreville found strong
evidence to support the emergency fund hypothesis, but support for the interest rate
hypothesis was weak. Kuo et al. (2003) used US annual average lapse rate data for all
ordinary Life Insurance product types combined and found evidence to substantiate
the emergency fund hypothesis in both the long run and the short run, but found
“that the interest rate hypothesis (was) valid in the long run but obscure in the short
run” (p.501). They also found, through the use of impulse-response analysis, that
the lapse rate responded “insignificantly to. . . shocks from the unemployment rate
but significantly to. . . shocks from the interest rate” and consequently concluded
that “the interest rate hypothesis (was) more consistent with the evidence than
the emergency fund hypothesis” (p.492). Similarly, Kim (2005) used Korean Life
Insurance data for four product groups, including traditional insurance products15,
and found evidence to support both hypotheses for the traditional products. He
also found that interest rates were more important in modelling lapse rates than
unemployment rates.
Although the conclusions of the three abovementioned papers are not strictly
in agreement, they do provide strong evidence that lapse rates are influenced by
economic factors in some way.
6.4.2 Existing Tests for a Relationship Between Economic
Fluctuations and Lapse Rates
As in the case of testing for a possible relationship between economic fluctuations
and mortality, the main method used for testing for a possible relationship between
economic fluctuations and lapsation has been through the use of ordinary least-
squares regression models. Both Outreville (1990) and Kim (2005) used regression
models to test for such relationships. Outreville fitted models of the following form
to his data:
E (wt) = α + βX; (6.21)
14Early lapsation is defined as being lapsation within the first 13 months of policy issue.
15The other product groups considered by Kim (2005) are not considered in this thesis, so are
not mentioned here.
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where wt is the observed lapse rate during year t, X is a vector of covariates and α
and β are regression parameters; while Kim fitted models of the form:
g (E (wt)) = α + βX; (6.22)
where g(.) is a link function. Kim used the logit and complementary log-log links.
The complementary log-log link is the function: g(y) = ln (− ln (1− y)).
Outreville used the real transitory income per capita, the real rate of return on
alternative assets, the price of insurance, the unemployment rate, and the antici-
pated inflation rate as explanatory variables; while Kim used the difference between
the market interest rate and the policy crediting rate, policy duration, the unem-
ployment rate, the economic growth rate, the month and a financial crises indicator
variable16.
An alternative approach was taken by Kuo et al. (2003), who used cointegration
techniques and fitted an error-correction model of the following form to their data:
∆Yt = α + γYt−1 + β1∆Yt−1 + . . .+ βp∆Yt−p+1 + εt; (6.23)
where Yt is a vector that consists of the lapse rate, interest rate and unemployment
rate at time t, α and the β’s are 3 × 1 parameter vectors, γ is a 3 × 3 parameter
matrix, and εt is a 3 × 1 error term vector. εt is assumed to follow a multivariate
normal distribution with a mean of zero and constant variance.
These models are all very similar in form to those models described in Section
6.3.2 for identifying a possible relationship between economic fluctuations and mor-
tality. This is not surprising, considering that deaths and withdrawals are simply
two alternative types of decrement from a population of insured lives. The key
differences between the lapsation models and the mortality models are that, for
the mortality models, a standardised version of the mortality rate was used as the
dependent variable, whereas in the above lapsation models, the crude (or unstan-
dardised) lapse rates are used; and in the mortality models, non-economic variables,
such as age and race, were included as explanatory variables, while this is not the
case for the lapse models. These differences appear to be primarily due to the na-
ture of the data used in the different investigations. The data used in the lapsation
investigations does not appear to have been subdivided by the usual covariates (age,
sex, etc.), making it impossible for the lapse rates to be standardised or for non-
economic explanatory variables to be included. Nevertheless, it is desirable to do
these things, if possible, in order to allow for factors other than economic variables,
which may also be causing the lapse rates to fluctuate. The model developed in the
16The data used by Kim (2005) was for a period that included the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.
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next section allows for this.
6.4.3 A GLM-Based Test for a Relationship Between
Economic Fluctuations and Lapsation
In keeping with the model proposed in Section 6.3.3 to test for a possible relation-
ship between economic fluctuations and mortality, a similar model is proposed in
this section to test for a possible relationship between economic fluctuations and









whereWd,t denotes the observed number of withdrawals among lives at duration d in






is the lapse ratio for lives at duration d in year t, and η is a linear combination of
the covariates.
This model is identical to that given in Equation (6.17) except that the mortality
ratio has been replaced by the lapse ratio. It is also similar in form to the models
proposed by Outreville (1990) and Kim (2005), except that the lapse ratio is used
as the dependent variable in place of the crude lapse rate, and a Poisson error
structure (with log link) has been used in place of the normal error structure. It is
more appropriate to use the lapse ratio than the crude lapse rate, as the lapse ratio
adjusts the lapse rate to allow for changes in the population under investigation
between data points, and it is more appropriate to use the Poisson error structure
than the normal error structure, as lapse data is count data.
The same linear predictors as were used in the GLMs to test for a relationship
between economic and mortality fluctuations were again used here (that is, the linear
predictors given by Equations (6.18) and (6.19)). Note that the unemployment rate
and (short-term) interest rate were used as measures of the business cycle, both in
keeping with the models described in Section 6.3.3, and because the emergency fund
and interest rate hypotheses suggest that there is a relationship between lapsation
and the unemployment and interest rates, respectively.
As in the case of the GLM-based tests for a relationship between economic fluc-
tuations and mortality, the change in the residual deviance was used to determine
the best model out of those listed above, and, consequently, whether a significant
relationship exists between lapsation and any of the economic variables. The results
of these tests are presented in Section 6.4.5.
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6.4.4 The Data
The Single Insurer Mortality Data (described in Section 5.3.1) and the Single Insurer
Lapse Data (described in Section 5.3.2) were both used to test for a relationship
between economic fluctuations and lapsation. Each of these data sets has its own
advantages and disadvantages. As was outlined in Section 6.2.4, the Single Insurer
Mortality Data set does not contain explicit records of lapses, but it is possible
to infer the number of policy discontinuances by age, sex, year, policy type and
duration. By contrast, the Single Insurer Lapse Data set does explicitly give the
number of lapses, but only by year, policy type and duration band, and not by age
or sex. Because many policy discontinuances after age 65 are due to the actions of
the insurer, rather than those of the policyholder, the models fitted to the Single
Insurer Mortality Data set were fitted to both the entire data set and to the ages
15–64 subset of this data; and because the Single Insurer Lapse Data set is not
subdivided by age or sex, neither age nor sex was used as a covariate when fitting
the models to this data set.
Figure 6.6 displays the all-age lapse ratio for each year for each policy type/sex
combination for the Single Insurer Mortality Data, while Figure 6.7 shows the same
for the Single Insurer Lapse Data. From Figure 6.6 it is clear that for each policy
type there is a high correlation between the male and female lapse ratios, suggesting
that a third factor could be driving the changes in the lapse ratios. The lapse ratios
in both of these figures also exhibit similar shapes by policy type (that is, the lapse
ratios for Type 1 policies in Figure 6.6 exhibit a similar shape to those in Figure
6.7). This is not surprising, since both of these data sets were supplied by the same
insurer and many insurance policies would be common to both data sets.
As was done in Section 6.2.4, the expected lapse rates given in Table A.4 were
used to calculate the expected lapses for both data sets for Policy Types 1 and 4.
The expected lapses given in Table A.4 were set equal to the average lapse rate for
the Single Insurer Lapse Data set for each policy type/duration combination for all
of the years for which data was available. In the case of Type 3 policies, the average
lapse rates exhibited high variability due to the low exposures for this policy type
(for example, at duration 4 years, the average withdrawal rate was 66.7%, while at
durations 5 and 6 years, the average withdrawal rate was 0%). These lapse rates
were not considered to be typical for this product type and, instead, the Type 1
expected lapse rates were used as proxies. The Type 1 rates were selected because
Type 1 and 3 policies are both classed as traditional policies and, as a result, Type
3 policies are considered to be closer in nature to Type 1 policies than to Type 4
policies.
The same economic data as were described in Section 6.3.4 were used to fit the
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economic fluctuation versus lapsation models.
Tables 6.10 and 6.11 show the correlations between the (all-age, all-duration)
lapse ratios and the economic variables (with p-values) for the two data sets. None of
the correlations presented in either of these tables is significantly different from zero.
However, these correlations are only indicative of the directions of the relationships,
being based on very few (5 to 8) pairs of observations. In the next section, it is
shown that when GLMs are fitted to the full, uncondensed data sets, significant
relationships between the economic variables and lapsation ratios are found.
Table 6.10: Correlations Between (All-Duration) Lapse Ratios and Economic Vari-
ables (Single Insurer Mortality Data) with p-values Shown in Brackets
ST Int. Rate Unemp. Rate
All Ages
Type 1 M -0.527 (0.310) 0.192 (0.736)
Type 1 F -0.519 (0.320) 0.238 (0.675)
Type 4 M -0.166 (0.812) -0.311 (0.650)
Type 4 F 0.010 (0.989) -0.335 (0.622)
Ages 15–64 Only
Type 1 M -0.523 (0.314) 0.190 (0.739)
Type 1 F -0.513 (0.326) 0.247 (0.662)
Type 4 M -0.167 (0.811) -0.315 (0.645)
Type 4 F 0.011 (0.988) -0.337 (0.620)
Note that n = 6 for the correlations with the Type 1 mortality ratios, and n = 5 for
all other correlations.
Table 6.11: Correlations Between (All-Duration) Lapse Ratios and Economic Vari-
ables (Single Insurer Lapsation Data) with p-values Shown in Brackets
ST Int. Rate Unemp. Rate
Type 1 -0.394 (0.351) 0.242 (0.581)
Type 3 0.860 (0.067) 0.552 (0.379)
Type 4 -0.245 (0.724) -0.464 (0.477)
Note that n = 8 for the correlations with the Type 1 mortality ratios, and n = 5 for
all other correlations.
6.4.5 Results
The models described in Section 6.4.3 were fitted to the Single Insurer Mortality
Data and to the Single Insurer Lapse Data, and the change in deviance between
Models 1 and 2 for each of the data sets are presented in Table 6.12. In each case,
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the economic variables are highly significant. Note that, unlike in the case of models
fitted in Section 6.3 to test for a relationship between fluctuations in the economic
variables and mortality rates, duration was treated as a continuous variable when
fitting the models to the Single Insurer Mortality Data; and as a continuous variable
for durations 0 to 20 years, and as a categorical variable for durations greater than
20 years, when fitting the models to the Single Insurer Lapse Data.
Table 6.12: Decrease in Deviance between the Two Economic Fluctuation versus
Mortality GLMs
Data Set ∆ Dev. df p value
Mortality Data (All Ages) 13,889.20 10 0.000*
Mortality Data (15–64 Only) 13,163.62 10 0.000*
Lapsation Data (All Ages) 7,852.01 10 0.000*
Note: * indicates significance at the 5% significance level.
Table 6.13 presents the estimates of the coefficients of the economic variables (and
interactions involving the economic variables) for Model 2, with standard errors. In
this table, I (d ≥ 21) denotes an indicator variable that equals 1 if the policy duration
is 21 years or greater and 0 otherwise, I (d < 21) = 1− I (d ≥ 21), I (Type 3) denotes
an indicator variable that equals 1 for Type 3 policies and 0 otherwise, and I (Type 4)
denotes an indicator variable that equals 1 for Type 4 policies and 0 otherwise.
Again note that the unemployment rates and short-term interest rates were given
in decimal form, not as percentages.
The direction and magnitude of a change in the lapse ratio suggested by an
increase in either of the economic variables depends on the values taken on by the
covariates. Table 6.14 shows the suggested impact of a 1% increase in each of the
economic variables on the lapse ratio for some selected combinations of covariates for
the models fitted to the Single Insurer Mortality Data. Note that the Type 1 policies
were considered at a duration of 31 years and the Type 4 policies at a duration of
12 years, as these are the average durations for each of these policy types.
For each of the cases considered, for Type 4 policies, an increase in either of
the economic variables is associated with an increase in the lapse ratio, which is
consistent with both the interest rate and emergency fund hypotheses. For Type 1
policies, an increase in either of the economic variables is associated with a decrease
in the lapse ratio. This result is not consistent with either of the hypotheses dis-
cussed, but is also not inexplicable. One possible explanation is that, because Type
1 policies are primarily savings products, lapses may increase during good economic
times (characterised by low unemployment rates) as, during such times, policyhold-
ers might feel more confident in investing in alternative, higher risk, investments,
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Table 6.13: Fitted Coefficients for the Economic Fluctuation versus Mortality GLMs
(Model 2) with Standard Errors Shown in Brackets
Mortality Data Lapsation Data
Covariate
All Ages 15–64 Only All Ages
U -87.406* (2.113) -92.693* (2.387) 31.170* (0.936)
STI -86.540* (2.237) -86.083* (2.459) -8.993* (1.716)
U × I (Type 3) - - -1.839 (15.601)
STI × I (Type 3) - - 56.671* (9.706)
U × I (Type 4) 127.150* (1.575) 132.791* (1.641) -2.299* (0.970)
STI × I (Type 4) 87.514* (1.585) 88.286* (1.636) 14.785* (1.389)
U × I (F ) -0.253 (1.075) -1.490 (1.099) -
STI × I (F ) 3.180* (1.052) 2.516* (1.068) -
U × Age -0.809* (0.043) -0.834* (0.050) -
STI ×Age -0.193* (0.046) -0.221* (0.052) -
U ×Duration 2.786* (0.069) 3.141* (0.075) -
STI ×Duration 1.408* (0.073) 1.471* (0.078) -
U ×Duration× I (d < 21) - - -1.505* (0.064)
STI ×Duration× I (d < 21) - - -1.385* (0.115)
U × I (d ≥ 21) - - -44.081* (1.006)
STI × I (d ≥ 21) - - -29.504* (1.878)
Note: * indicates significance at the 5% significance level.
Table 6.14: % Change in the Lapsation Ratio Associated with a 1% Change in Each
of the Economic Variables for the Single Insurer Mortality Data
Type 1 (duration = 31 years) Type 4 (duration = 12 years)
All Ages Ages 15–64 All Ages Ages 15–64Age
Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females
% Change Associated with a 1% Increase in the Unemployment Rate
20 -15.82% -16.03% -11.31% -12.62% 76.82% 76.37% 84.25% 81.52%
40 -28.39% -28.58% -24.94% -26.05% 50.40% 50.02% 55.94% 53.63%
60 -39.09% -39.25% -36.47% -37.41% 27.94% 27.61% 31.98% 30.03%
80 -48.19% -48.32% -46.23% -47.02% 8.82% 8.55% 11.71% 10.05%
% Change Associated with a 1% Increase in the ST Interest Rate
20 -37.34% -35.32% -36.17% -34.55% 15.04% 18.76% 16.69% 19.66%
40 -39.72% -37.77% -38.93% -37.38% 10.68% 14.26% 11.64% 14.49%
60 -42.00% -40.13% -41.57% -40.09% 6.49% 9.93% 6.82% 9.54%
80 -44.20% -42.39% -44.10% -42.68% 2.46% 5.77% 2.20% 4.80%
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such as shares or property, and lapse their policies in order to obtain funds in or-
der to invest. Similarly, low interest rates might facilitate a shift in investments by
giving the policyholder greater access to additional funds, through lower borrowing
costs, which could be supplemented by policy surrender payments.
In the case of the models fitted to the Single Insurer Lapse data, a 1% increase
in the unemployment rate is associated with a 12.11% decrease in the lapse ratio for
Type 1 policies (at duration 31 years), a 13.71% decrease in the lapse ratio for Type
3 policies (at duration 31 years) and a 11.42% increase in the lapse ratio for Type
4 policies (at duration 12 years). A 1% increase in the short-term interest rate is
associated with a 31.95% decrease in the lapse ratio for Type 1 policies (at duration
31 years), a 19.93% increase for Type 3 policies (at duration 31 years) and a 10.26%
decrease for Type 4 policies (at duration 12 years).
The relationship between economic fluctuations and lapsation is investigated in
greater detail in Chapter 7 as part of the lapsation sub-model fitting process.
6.4.6 Conclusion
The GLM tests conducted in the previous section provide evidence that a relation-
ship exists between lapsation and the economy, with the nature of this relationship
varying by policy type, age, sex and duration. Based on these results, allowance for
the relationships between economic fluctuations and lapsation should be included in




In Chapter 3, we outlined a framework for a stochastic Life Insurance asset-liability
model which comprised of three, possibly interconnected, stochastic sub-models: a
mortality model, a lapsation model and an economic model. In Chapter 6, we tested
the significance of possible dependency relationships between withdrawal rates, mor-
tality and the economy, and found that significant relationships existed between the
short-term interest rate and insured-life mortality, between the short-term interest
rate and lapsation and between the unemployment rate and lapsation (although
not between mortality and lapsation), suggesting that the stochastic economic sub-
model should be connected with both the stochastic mortality sub-model and the
stochastic lapsation sub-model. In this chapter, we determine the “best” model to
use as each of the three sub-models, taking into account the dependency relation-
ships observed in Chapter 6 in the selection process, and estimate the parameters
of these models.
7.2 Stochastic Economic Models
7.2.1 Introduction
The first of the three stochastic sub-models we shall consider is the stochastic eco-
nomic model. The earliest attempts to allow for stochastic assumptions in Life
Insurance reserving involved replacing the deterministic interest rate assumption
with a stochastic interest rate model. These models were frequently simple univari-
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ate time series models. Over the past 30 years, however, a large number of more
complex stochastic economic models (also referred to as stochastic asset models)
have been proposed in the actuarial literature (for example, see Wilkie (1986)). In
this section, we review a number of these models in an effort to determine the most
appropriate economic model for reserving purposes.
7.2.2 A Review of Existing Stochastic Economic Models
Early attempts to incorporate stochastic assumptions into reserving and solvency
calculations frequently involved modelling interest rates (or, more accurately, the
force of interest1) using either an AR(1) process, as is the case in Panjer and Bell-
house (1980), Cairns (2000) and Marceau and Gaillardetz (1999), or an MA(1)
process, as is the case in Frees (1990) and Bowers et al. (1997, Section 21.4).
However, a typical Life Insurer holds a diversified portfolio of investments to back
its liabilities, comprising a number of different asset classes, each with a different
level of risk and yield, and it would be expected that there would exist dependency
relationships between the returns on these asset classes (and with other economic
variables, such as inflation). Consequently, to model only one asset return or interest
rate series (or to model each asset return series separately, assuming independence
with the other economic variables) is overly simplistic. In fact, according to Wilkie
(1986), the “minimum” model that might be used to describe the total investments
of a Life Office “requires us to consider inflation, ordinary shares and fixed interest
securities” (p.342).
In recent years, a number of more realistic models have been proposed for mod-
elling inflation, investment returns and other economic variables, which allow for the
interrelationships between these variables. One of the earliest models of this type
was the Wilkie model. Wilkie (1986) postulated that inflation is the driving force for
share yields, dividend yields and interest rates, and developed a model whereby each
of these investment variables was made dependent on inflation according to a cascade
structure. Interconnected autoregressive and moving average processes were used to
describe each of the random variables within the model. Wilkie (1995) updated and
extended the Wilkie (1986) model to include additional investment variables, such
as property yields, and considered more elaborate forms of time series modelling,
in particular, GARCH models and cointegrated models. Cointegrated models are
described in Hamilton (1994), Pfaff (2006) and Greene (2008).
In the two decades since Wilkie’s seminal model was proposed, a large num-
ber of other stochastic investment models have also been proposed, including the
Smith Jump Equilibrium model (Smith (1996)), the Cairns model (Cairns (1999)),
1The force of interest in time period t, denoted δt is calculated as δt = ln (1 + it), where it
denotes the effective interest rate in time period t.
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the Regime Switching Vector Autoregression model (Harris (1999)) and the Teeger
Yakoubov (TY) model (Yakoubov et al. (1999)), among others. Many such models
have been proposed and it is not feasible to describe and compare them all in this
thesis. Instead, the thesis focusses on three asset models, which are considered to
be typical of asset models currently used by actuaries in practice and prescribed in
solvency legislation:
• the Kemp random walk model (described in Smith (1995, 1996));
• the Wilkie (1995) model; and
• the CAS/SOA model (Ahlgrim et al. (2004)).
The simplest stochastic economic model is a random walk model. Such models
have been criticised for being overly simplistic and unrealistic. However, a random
walk model is used as the asset model in the Swiss Solvency Test, and the widely
used RiskMetrics methodology (J.P. Morgan/Reuters (1996)) also takes a (modified)
random walk approach to modelling asset returns. There are a number of variations
to the basic random walk model in existence, of which the Kemp random walk
model is just one. Many existing random walk models merely model asset returns
but ignore related economic variables, such as inflation. The Kemp model allows
for inflation using a Wilkie-style inflation model.
The Wilkie model was selected because this is one of the best known stochastic
asset models and it is widely used in both actuarial research and practice. In fact,
the Wilkie model (and its variants) is the most widely used stochastic asset model
for actuarial use in the UK.
The recently proposed CAS/SOA model has not come into common use yet,
at the time of writing. This model was proposed following a request by the (US)
Casualty Actuarial Society (CAS) and the Society of Actuaries (SOA) for “a work-
ing model of economic series, coordinated with interest rates, that could be made
public and used by actuaries via the CAS/SOA websites to project future economic
scenarios” (Ahlgrim et al. (2004)). Given the origin of this model, it is anticipated
that this model will come into wide use in the US in the future.
It is recognised that the choice of asset model may impact on the overall results
of this thesis, and ideally it is desirable to consider as many different asset models as
possible. Comparing the above three models, with their wide range of assumptions,
will provide some indication of how great an impact the choice of asset model may
have on the level of solvency capital required.
The three models are described in detail below. A discussion of the appropri-
ateness of these models is given in Section 7.2.4. All three models are variants of
one of the simplest stochastic asset models: a multivariate geometric random walk
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process. Under such a model, the rate of growth for variable i at time t, denoted
generically Vi (t), would be described by
ln (1 + Vi (t)) = ψi + εi (t) , i = 1, 2, . . . , n, t = 1, 2, . . . ; (7.1)
where n is the number of economic variables under consideration. In (7.1) εi (t)
denotes the white noise error process associated with the geometric random walk
model for variable i, and together the εi (t), i = 1, 2, . . . , n, form a time-independent
multivariate normal white noise process with mean 0 and n× n variance-covariance
matrix Σ. That is, E (εi (t)) = 0, for all i and t, and E (εi (s) εj (t)) = σi,j for s = t
and zero otherwise, where σi,j denotes the {i, j} element of Σ. The ψi and σi,j are
parameters to be fitted.
The Kemp Random Walk Model
Smith (1995) reasoned that “in many cases, investors will require high returns at
times of high inflation, and will require lower returns when inflation is more subdued.
(Thus), in order to obtain a useful model, it. . . is necessary to allow some cyclical
inflation behaviour” (p. 348). This is done in what is referred to as the Kemp
random walk model. This model assumes that the price inflation index at time t,
Q (t), follows the AR(1) process2:
∆ lnQ (t) = µQ (1− αQ) + αQ∆ lnQ (t− 1) + εQ (t) , t = 1, 2, . . . ; (7.2)
where µQ and αQ are parameters to be estimated and ∆ is the backwards difference
operator, defined by
∆X (t) = X (t)−X (t− 1) .
The Vi (t) are then modelled by geometric random walks with drift ∆ lnQ (t):
ln (1 + Vi (t)) = ∆ ln Q̂ (t) + ψi + εi (t) i = 1, . . . , n, t = 1, 2, . . . ; (7.3)
where a “hat” ( .̂ ) above a model variable denotes a fitted value of that variable
calculated using a previously fitted model. In this case, Q̂ (t) denotes a fitted value
of Q (t), calculated using the inflation model given in Equation (7.2).
Candidates for the variable Vi (t) in Equation (7.3) are:
Y (t), the share dividend yield at time t;
D (t), the share dividend index at time t;
P (t), the share price index at time t;
2Note that the parameterisation used for the ARMA model described here, and for other ARMA
models throughout this chapter, was adopted because this is the parameterisation used by the R
computer package.
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C (t), the long-term nominal3 interest rate at time t;
B (t), the short-term nominal interest rate at time t;
R (t) , the long-term real4 interest rate at time t;
F (t), the short-term real interest rate at time t;
Z (t), the property performance index at time t; and
U (t), the unemployment rate at time t.
To get the Kemp random walk model, ln (1 + Vi (t)) in Equation (7.3) is replaced
by each of ln (1 + Y (t)), ∆ lnP (t), ln (1 + C (t)), ln (1 +B (t)), and ∆ lnZ (t) in
turn, so as to provide models for the share dividend yield, share price growth, long-
and short-term interest rates, and property price growth.
The Wilkie Model
The Wilkie (1995) model is an updated and extended version of a prior Wilkie
(1986) model. In his original model, Wilkie considered only four variables: retail
price inflation, share dividends, share dividend yields5 and long-term interest rates;
while in the updated model, he extended the model to include wage inflation, short-
term interest rates, property rentals, property yields, and the yields on index-linked
stocks. In this thesis, we do not consider index-linked stocks, property rentals,
nor wage inflation, so these are omitted in the following discussion. Index-linked
stocks are not considered because, although some still exist in Australia, the RBA
ceased issuing indexed bonds in 2003, making them increasingly less relevant to
Australian insurers; (commercial) property rentals are not considered, due to the
lack of available data; and wage inflation is not considered because it is not required
for any of the calculations in this thesis. Omitting these variables from the Wilkie
model has no effect on the forecasting of the other variables considered in the model.
Wilkie chose a “cascade” (or transfer function) structure for his models. Under
this structure, each variable is described using a separate sub-model, and the sub-
models are fitted in a specified order, thus allowing outputs from earlier fitted sub-
models to act as inputs into later fitted sub-models. Price inflation acts as the driving
force for the other variables in the Wilkie model, that is, the price inflation model
is the first fitted and outputs from this sub-model act as either direct or indirect
inputs into most of the other sub-models. The relationships between the variables
in the Wilkie model are illustrated in Figure 7.1, with the arrows indicating how
the different sub-models feed into each other. An arrow pointing from one variable
3A nominal interest rate is an interest rate that has not been adjusted to remove inflation.
4A real interest rate is an interest rate that has been adjusted to remove inflation.
5The share dividend yield at the end of year t is defined (in Daykin et al. (1994, p.243)) as the
ratio of the share dividends at the end of year t to the corresponding share price index at the end
of year t. By modelling both the share dividend yield and share dividends, Wilkie also implicitly
modelled the share price index.
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to a second indicates that outputs from the sub-model describing the first variable
act as inputs into the sub-model that describes the second. Note that, although
the property yield is not linked to any of the other variables in the model, it is still
necessary to model it because we must forecast future property yield values in order
to perform the calculations required later in this thesis.















The economic variables evolve stochastically according to the series of equations
outlined below.
Price Inflation:
∆ lnQ (t) = µQ (1− αQ) + αQ∆ lnQ (t− 1) + εQ (t) , t = 1, 2, . . . . (7.4)
This is the same as Equation (7.2).
Share Dividend Yield:
lnY (t) = φY + αY∆ ln Q̂ (t) +NY (t) ; (7.5)
NY (t) = βYNY (t− 1) + εY (t) , t = 1, 2, . . . . (7.6)
NY (t) is modelled as an AR(1) process.
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Share Dividends:
D (t) = Y (t)P (t) ; (7.7)





i∆ ln Q̂ (t− i)
)
+ αD,2∆ ln Q̂ (t)
+ αD,3ε̂Y (t− 1) + εD (t) + αD,4εD (t− 1) , t = 1, 2, . . . . (7.8)
Share Price Index:
P (t) = D (t) /Y (t) , t = 1, 2, . . . . (7.9)
Long-Term Interest Rates:





i∆ ln Q̂ (t− i)
)
+NC (t) ; (7.10)
lnNC (t) = βC,1 lnNC (t− 1) + βC,2ε̂Y (t) + εC (t) , t = 1, 2, . . . . (7.11)
Short-Term Interest Rates:
lnB (t) = ln Ĉ (t)−NB (t) ; (7.12)
NB (t) = µB (1− αB) + αBNB (t− 1) + εB (t) , t = 1, 2, . . . . (7.13)
NB (t) is modelled as an AR(1) process.
Property Yields:
∆ lnZ (t) = µZ (1− αZ) + αZ∆ lnZ (t− 1) + εZ (t) , t = 1, 2, . . . . (7.14)
∆ lnZ (t) is modelled as an AR(1) process.
In Equations (7.2) to (7.14), the α’s, β’s, µ’s, φ’s and ρ’s are all parameters
to be estimated, and ε (t) with a subscript denotes the white noise error process
associated with the process denoted by the subscript (for example, εQ (t) denotes
the white noise error process associated with the price inflation process).
Wilkie (1995) also detailed a GARCH variant of his model, in which he used
an ARCH(1) process (equivalent to a GARCH(1,0) process) in place of the AR(1)
process to model inflation. In the GARCH variant, instead of assuming that εQ (t)
follows a white noise process with constant variance, Wilkie assumed that the vari-
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ance of εQ (t), denoted σ
2
Q (t), varies with time in accordance with the process:
σ2Q (t)
2 = βQ,1 + βQ,2ε
2
Q (t− 1) , t = 1, 2, . . . . (7.15)
This process provided a better fit to Wilkie’s data than the original AR(1) process,
as assessed by the log-likelihood and the Jarque-Bera statistic6.
The CAS/SOA Model
The CAS/SOA model was developed following a request by the Casualty Actuarial
Society and the Society of Actuaries that a financial scenario model be developed for
use by actuaries for dynamic financial analysis, cashflow testing and other similar
purposes. The model produced considers seven economic random variables: price
inflation, long-term interest rates, short-term interest rates, share price growth, share
dividend yields, property yields and unemployment. As with the Wilkie model, a
cascade structure was employed. However, the relationships between the variables
in the CAS/SOA model are different from those in the Wilkie model. Figure 7.2
illustrates the relationships between the seven variables, with the arrows, once again,
indicating how the different sub-models feed into each other. In this model, the
property yield and the share dividend yield are both assumed independent of the
other model variables.















The CAS/SOA uses a regime-switching model, as well as autoregressive pro-
cesses, to describe the economic variables. The regime-switching model is used to
describe equity returns. Regime switching was first suggested in this context by
6The Jarque-Bera statistic is described in Section 7.2.5.
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Hamilton (1989), although the CAS/SOA regime-switching model is based on a
model outlined in Hardy (2001). “Regime switching allows for the (time series)
process to switch between k regimes randomly (where) each regime is characterised
by different model parameters, and the process describing which regime the (time
series) process is in at any time is assumed to be Markov” (Hardy (2001, p.41)). A
regime-switching model is defined by a time series model (for example, an AR(1)
process) with parameter values conditional on the regime the time series process is
currently in, and a transition matrix, which gives the probabilities of moving be-
tween the regimes. The CAS/SOA regime-switching model assumes two regimes, a
high-volatility regime and a low-volatility regime.
Under the CAS/SOA model, the economic variables evolve stochastically accord-
ing to the series of equations outlined below.
Price Inflation:
∆ lnQ (t) = µQ (1− αQ) + αQ∆ lnQ (t− 1) + εQ (t) , t = 1, 2, . . . . (7.16)
This is the same as Equation (7.2).
Long-Term Interest Rates:
ln (1 +R (t)) = µR (1− αR) + αR ln (1 +R (t− 1)) + εR (t) ;
ln (1 + C (t)) = ln (1 +R (t)) + ∆ ln Q̂ (t) , t = 1, 2, . . . .
Since we are only interested in nominal interest rates and not real interest rates, in
this thesis, these two equations can be combined to give7:
ln (1 + C (t)) = µR (1− αR) + αR ln (1 + C (t− 1)) + (1− αR)∆ ln Q̂ (t)
+ εR (t) , t = 1, 2, . . . ;
or, changing the notation for consistency,
ln (1 + C (t)) = φC (1− αC) + αC ln (1 + C (t− 1)) + (1− αC)∆ ln Q̂ (t)
+ εC (t) , t = 1, 2, . . . . (7.17)
7This is done by rearranging the second equation to give ln (1 +R (t)) = ln (1 + C (t)) −
∆ln Q̂ (t); substituting this, and a similar expression for ln (1 +R (t− 1)), into the first equation;
and rearranging the result.
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Short-Term Interest Rates:
ln (1 + F (t)) = αF ln
(
1 + R̂ (t− 1)
)
+ (1− αF ) ln (1 + F (t− 1)) + εF (t) ;
ln (1 +B (t)) = ln (1 + F (t)) + ∆ ln Q̂ (t) , t = 1, 2, . . . .
These two equations can be combined to give8:
ln (1 +B (t)) = (1− αF )
(




1 + Ĉ (t− 1)
)
+ εF (t) , t = 1, 2, . . . ;
or, changing the notation for consistency,
ln (1 +B (t)) = (1− αB)
(




1 + Ĉ (t− 1)
)
+ εB (t) , t = 1, 2, . . . . (7.18)
Share Price Index:
X (t) = ∆ lnP (t)− ln
(
1 + B̂ (t)
)
, t = 1, 2, . . . . (7.19)
X (t) is referred to as the excess equity return and is assumed to follow a two-regime
regime-switching log-normal process. That is, conditional on ρ (t),
X (t) ∼ N (µρ(t), σ2ρ(t)) ; (7.20)
with transition probabilities
pi,j = Pr [ρ (t+ 1) = j|ρ (t) = i] , i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2; (7.21)
where ρ (t) denotes the regime the process is in at time t.
Share Dividend Yields:
lnY (t) = µY (1− αY ) + αY lnY (t− 1) + εY (t) , t = 1, 2, . . . . (7.22)
Property Yields:
∆ lnZ (t) = µZ (1− αZ) + αZ∆ lnZ (t− 1) + εZ (t) , t = 1, 2, . . . . (7.23)
8This is done by rearranging the second equation to give ln (1 + F (t)) = ln (1 +B (t)) −
∆ln Q̂ (t); substituting this, and a similar expression for ln (1 + F (t− 1)), into the first equa-
tion; substituting in ln
(




1 + Ĉ (t)
)
−∆ln Q̂ (t), from the Long-Term Interest
Rate model; and rearranging the result.
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This is the same as Equation (7.14).
Unemployment Rates:
U (t) = φU (1− αU,1) + αU,1U (t− 1) + αU,2
(
∆ ln Q̂ (t)−∆ ln Q̂ (t− 1)
)
+ εU (t) , t = 1, 2, . . . . (7.24)
7.2.3 Fitting the Models
All time series models fitted in this thesis were fitted using the R computer package9,
with the exception of the CAS/SOA share price index regime-switching model, which
was fitted using S-Plus FinMetrics10, an add-on module for S-Plus. R was used
instead of S-Plus in this section because the R time series functions were found to
be easier to use than the equivalent functions in S-Plus.
7.2.4 A Discussion of the Appropriateness of the Stochastic
Economic Models
A large number of papers have been written that investigate the characteristics
of economic time series data and discuss whether stochastic asset models, such as
the Wilkie model, are appropriate, based on the results of these investigations.
Two recent papers that have evaluated stochastic asset models in the context of
Australian data are Sherris (1997) and Sherris et al. (1999). One major result
of these papers is that many of the time series were found to be non-normally
distributed, with time varying volatility. Thus, the assumption of independent and
identically distributed normal errors, which underlies many of the above mentioned
time series models, is violated. This same point has also been raised in a number of
papers with regards to financial data from other countries. In fact, Wilkie himself
acknowledged this in Wilkie (1995), and it was for this reason that Wilkie proposed
the GARCH variant of his model. Time varying volatility was also allowed for in the
Share Price Index component of the CAS/SOA model through the regime-switching
model.
The only difference between the basic Wilkie model and its GARCH variant is
that the AR(1) process used to model inflation in the basic model is replaced by
a GARCH(1,0) process in the GARCH variant. All three of the stochastic asset
models considered in this thesis use the same AR(1) process to model inflation, thus
a GARCH variant of the Kemp model and the CAS/SOA model can be devised by
replacing the AR(1) inflation process with a GARCH inflation process in each case
9R version 2.2.1. Copyright c©2005 The R Foundation for Statistical Computing.
10S-Plus FinMetrics version 2.0.2. Copyright c©2005 Insightful Corp.
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(in the case of the CAS/SOA model, this would be in addition to the allowance
for time varying volatility in the Share Price Index sub-model, and may potentially
render this second allowance unnecessary). A second GARCH variant can also be
devised by substituting a GARCH(1,1) process for the AR(1) inflation process. That
is, assuming that σ2Q (t) varies with time in accordance with the process:
σ2Q (t) = βQ,1 + βQ,2ε
2
Q (t− 1) + βQ,3σ2Q (t− 1) , t = 1, 2, . . . . (7.25)
All three of these versions of each of the three stochastic asset models are considered
in this thesis.
There is much debate as to the exact nature of the relationships between the
different economic variables and as to how these relationships should be allowed for
in an asset model. In particular, there is debate as to whether a “cascade” structure
should be used to model the variables or whether an alternative model structure,
such as a Vector Autoregressive process, that allows for feedback relationships be-
tween the various economic time series, should be used. The fact that this contention
exists indicates that different statistical tests and different data sets have given rise
to conflicting results in this matter, and it is for this reason that so many different
stochastic asset models have been proposed.
Just as it is infeasible to consider, in this thesis, every stochastic asset model that
has been proposed, so it is infeasible to repeat the large volume of tests that have
been used in the past to determine which economic variables are related and how
best to model these dependencies. Instead, it shall be assumed that a “cascade”
structure is an appropriate means of describing the economic variables (all three
of the models considered employ a “cascade” structure, and in spite of criticism,
“cascade” structures are employed in a large number of stochastic asset models
including recent models such as the CAS/SOA model), and we shall limit ourselves
to determining the most appropriate of the three models previously described for
the data we have. In order to determine the most appropriate of these models, we
will employ some of the tests used by Harris (1995) in his comparison of stochastic
asset models. These tests are described in Section 7.2.5 and the results of these tests
are presented in Section 7.2.7.
In Sections 6.3 and 6.4, evidence was provided which suggested that significant
relationships exist between unemployment rates and mortality, and between unem-
ployment rates and lapsation. Thus, any stochastic economic sub-model used in the
overall stochastic asset-liability model should be capable of forecasting unemploy-
ment rates. Of the three models considered, only the CAS/SOA model does this (in
the CAS/SOA model, unemployment was linked to the other model variables using
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a relationship based on the Phillips curve11). Consequently, it is necessary for us to
extend both the Wilkie model and the Kemp model to include an unemployment
sub-model.
In the case of the Kemp model, it was decided to model the unemployment rate
using a geometric random walk with drift of the form:
ln (1 + U (t)) = ∆ ln Q̂ (t) + ψU + εU (t) . (7.26)
This is of the same form as the models used by Kemp to describe the evolution of
asset returns.
In the case of the Wilkie model, there is no “obvious” sub-model to use to model
the unemployment rate. It is uncommon for stochastic asset models to include the
unemployment rate as one of the variables in the model and no alternatives to this
model were found in the review of stochastic asset models. We decided, therefore, to
use the process given in Equation (7.24) (Model 1), along with three slight variants
on this model:
Model 2:
U (t) = φU (1− αU,1) + αU,1U (t− 1) + αU,2∆ ln Q̂ (t) + αU,3∆ ln Q̂ (t− 1) + εU (t) ;
(7.27)
Model 3:
ln (1 + U (t)) = φU (1− αU,1) + αU,1 ln (1 + U (t− 1))
+ αU,2
(
∆ ln Q̂ (t)−∆ ln Q̂ (t− 1)
)
+ εU (t) ; (7.28)
Model 4:
ln (1 + U (t)) = φU (1− αU,1) + αU,1 ln (1 + U (t− 1))
+ αU,2∆ ln Q̂ (t) + αU,3∆ ln Q̂ (t− 1) + εU (t) . (7.29)
These were all considered and compared as possible unemployment sub-models.
7.2.5 Tests for Comparing Stochastic Asset Models
In Harris (1995), Harris conducted a battery of statistical tests to compare five
stochastic asset models. The tests proposed in this section are, in most cases, either
identical to or variants of those used by Harris.
11The Phillips curve was first proposed by Phillips (1958). A modified version of the original
curve is used by modern economists. This modern Phillips curve is given in many economics
textbooks, including Mankiw (2000), as: ∆ lnQ (t) = ∆ lnQ (t− 1)− α (U (t)− µU ) + β, where α
and β are constants and µU denotes the “natural” or mean unemployment rate.
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The stochastic asset models considered in this thesis were compared on the basis
of goodness of fit to historical data. To determine goodness of fit to the historical
data, the following quantities can be examined for each of the sub-models within
each of the stochastic asset models:
• The standard deviation of the model residuals (s.e. res.): a model with a
lower standard deviation of its residuals is preferred to a model with a higher
standard deviation, all other things being equal;
• The lag one autocorrelation coefficient of the standardised residuals12 (acf(1)):
if this value lies outside the range−1.96/√n to 1.96/√n, where n is the number
of observations, then the null hypothesis of independence of the residuals is
rejected;
• The Jarque-Bera test statistic for the standardised residuals: the Jarque-Bera










where n denotes the number of observations, S denotes the sample skewness
of the observations, K denotes the sample kurtosis of the observations, and JB
has an asymptotic chi-squared distribution with 2 degrees of freedom. If JB is
greater than 5.991, then the null hypothesis of normality (and zero skewness
and excess kurtosis13) is rejected. Note that Harris (1995) tested for normality
by examining the coefficients of skewness and excess kurtosis separately, rather
than combining them, as in this test.
7.2.6 The Data
The stochastic economic models were fitted to the economic data described in Sec-
tion 5.4. Table 5.17 lists the financial time series used to represent each of the
economic variables required for the three models.
The frequency of data used to fit stochastic asset models varies between research
papers. For example, Wilkie (1986) used annual data, as did Harris (1995); Wilkie
(1995) used both annual and monthly data; while Sherris et al. (1999) used quarterly
data. As was demonstrated by Wilkie (1995), in some cases economic time series
that are observed more frequently than annually can give rise to seasonal variation
(with a one year period), which should be removed through differencing before the
12The standardised residuals are the model residuals divided by the standard deviation of the
residuals.
13Excess kurtosis is defined as kurtosis− 3.
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model is fitted. Nevertheless, the higher the frequency of a time series, the more
data points that are available for fitting the model.
With the exception of the consumer price index (CPI) and the property perfor-
mance index, all of the time series in Section 5.4 are given at monthly intervals. The
CPI was available only at quarterly intervals, while the property performance index
was available at quarterly intervals from June 1995 onwards, but only at half-yearly
intervals prior to this time. Nevertheless, we decided to fit the models only to quar-
terly data. This is because actual or fitted values of Q (t), the CPI at time t, are
required as inputs to many of the models to be fitted. Since these values are only
available at quarterly intervals, if some of the models were fitted to monthly data,
it would be necessary to interpolate between the Q (t), which is undesirable.
The longest time period for which quarterly data was available for all of the
economic variables was from June 1995 to March 2007, so data covering this 48
quarter period was used to fit the model, with observations of the time series taken
at March, June, September and December of each year. For time series that comprise
rates reported more frequently than quarterly (that is, the interest rates, the share
dividend yield and the unemployment rates), the “quarterly” observation of the time
series was set equal to the arithmetic mean of the three monthly observations of that
rate for the quarter in question.
Before the models were fitted, the data plot and correlogram for each time series
was examined for evidence of seasonality, and it was identified in the property yield
data (the correlogram for ∆ lnZ (t) is presented in Figure 7.3). Seasonal variation
should be removed before any time series models are fitted, and this was done by
taking seasonal differences of the Z (t), denoted Z∗ (t), where
Z∗ (t) = Z (t)− Z (t− 4) ; (7.31)
and replacing Z (t) with Z∗ (t) in all of the above mentioned models.
7.2.7 Results
Each of the stochastic asset models described in Section 7.2.2 was fitted to the data.
In the cases of the Wilkie model and the CAS/SOA model, after the initial model
fittings, some slight changes were made to the models described in Section 7.2.2, in
most cases to remove variables that are not significant in the model. No changes
were made to the Kemp Random Walk model, in spite of observed inadequacies
with the fit of the model, because we wish to keep this model as a baseline model
for comparison. A fourth stochastic asset model is also proposed in this section,
in response to the observed characteristics of the data set used. This model is
essentially a variant on the other three models. The fitting of each of these models
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Note: the dotted lines on this graph indicate the 5% significance level for the auto-
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is now discussed.
The Kemp Random Walk Model
The Kemp model, described in Equations (7.2) and (7.3), was fitted to the price infla-
tion (∆ lnQ (t)), share dividend yield (ln (1 + Y (t)), share price index (∆ lnP (t)),
long-term interest rate (ln (1 + C (t))), short-term interest rate (ln (1 +B (t))), prop-
erty yield (∆ lnZ∗ (t)) and unemployment rate (ln (1 + U (t))) time series. Because
the price inflation variable is an important input to all three asset models, we in-
vestigate it in some detail.
The basic price inflation AR(1) process and the ARCH(1) and GARCH(1,1)
variants of this process (given by Equations (7.15) and (7.25)) were fitted to the
price inflation time series. In the case of the ARCH(1) variant, the fitted value of
βQ,2 was not significantly different from zero (with a p-value of 1), and in the case
of the GARCH(1,1) variant, both βQ,2 and βQ,3 were not significant in the model
(with a p-value of 1). Thus, using an ARCH or GARCH model in place of the
AR(1) model, to which they reduce when βQ,2 (= βQ,3) = 0, does not significantly
improve the fit of the model to the data. Furthermore, the fitted value of αQ was
not significantly different from zero (α̂Q = 0.1387, with a standard error of 0.1512
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and a p-value of 0.342), so αQ is set equal to zero throughout the remainder of the
analysis. This reduces the model for the other economic variables to a geometric
random walk.
Table 7.1 presents the fitted parameter values (with standard errors shown in
brackets) for the Kemp model and Table 7.2 presents the correlations of the model
residuals (with p-values shown in brackets). Note that only two of the correlations
are significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level. Thus, there is little
difference between the fitted model and an uncorrelated geometric random walk
model.
Table 7.1: Fitted Parameter Values for the Kemp Model with Standard Errors
Shown in Brackets
Variable ψ̂i
Price Inflation, Q (t) 0.006 (0.001)
Share Dividend Yield, Y (t) 0.036 (0.000)
Share Price Index, P (t) 0.023 (0.008)
Long-Term Interest Rate, C (t) 0.057 (0.001)
Short-Term Interest Rate, B (t) 0.053 (0.001)
Property Yield, Z∗ (t) 0.043 (0.008)
Unemployment Rate, U (t) 0.062 (0.002)
Table 7.2: Correlation Matrix for the Kemp Model with p-values Shown in Brackets
D. Yield, Y (t) SPI, P (t) L-T Int, C (t)
SPI, P (t) -0.033 (0.835)
L-T Int. Rate, C (t) -0.086 (0.586) 0.017 (0.914)
S-T Int. Rate, B (t) 0.078 (0.621) 0.157 (0.317) 0.459* (0.002)
Property Yield, Z∗ (t) 0.195 (0.212) 0.134 (0.394) -0.110 (0.485)
Unemp. Rate, U (t) -0.122 (0.438) -0.146 (0.352) 0.572* (0.000)
S-T Int, B (t) P. Yield, Z∗ (t)
Property Yield, Z∗ (t) 0.186 (0.234)
Unemp. Rate, U (t) -0.198 (0.204) -0.150 (0.339)
Note: * indicates significance at the 5% significance level.
Table 7.3 presents the goodness of fit statistics for the Kemp model. These statis-
tics indicate that the model assumptions have been violated on a number of counts.
In four of the seven random walk sub-models, there is evidence of significant lag one
autocorrelation in the standardised residuals, while the standardised residuals of the
price inflation and long-term interest rate sub-models have very high JB statistics,
indicating significant deviance from normality.
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Table 7.3: Goodness of Fit Statistics for the Kemp Random Walk Model
Variable S.E. Res. ACF(1) JB
Price Inflation, Q (t) 0.006 0.138 285.678*
Share Dividend Yield, Y (t) 0.003 0.788* 1.073
Share Price Index, P (t) 0.055 -0.215 1.443
Long-Term Interest Rate, C (t) 0.007 0.741* 19.743*
Short-Term Interest Rate, B (t) 0.006 0.761* 1.953
Property Yield, Z∗ (t) 0.055 0.200 2.447
Unemployment Rate, U (t) 0.011 0.925* 2.039
Note: in each case n = 47, the standard error of all of the ACF(1) values is 0.152,
and * indicates significance at the 5% significance level.
From Table 7.1 and Equation (7.2) we see that ∆ ln Q̂ (t) satisfies the random
walk recursion: ∆ ln Q̂ (t) = ∆ ln Q̂ (t− 1)+0.006. Thus, Q̂ (t) = Q̂ (0) e0.006t, where
Q̂ (0) is the most recently observed price index value. These predicted values of Q̂ (t)
were carried forward into the Wilkie and CAS/SOA models. Because ∆ ln Q̂ (t) is
equal to a constant for all t (due to the fact that αQ was found to be insignificant
in the AR(1) process), several of the sub-models that make up these models reduce
to simpler models.
The Wilkie Model
Given the simplified model for Q (t), Equations (7.5), (7.8), and (7.10) can be,
respectively, rewritten as:
lnY (t) = δY +NY (t) , t = 1, 2, . . . ; (7.32)
∆ lnD (t) = δD,0 + δD,1ε̂Y (t− 1) + εD (t) + δD,2εD (t− 1) , t = 1, 2, . . . ; (7.33)
and
C (t) = δC +NC (t) , t = 1, 2, . . . ; (7.34)
where the δ’s are parameters to be fitted. Similarly, of the four unemployment
models proposed, Models 1 and 2 (Equations (7.24) and (7.27)) can both be rewritten
as:
U (t) = µU (1− αU) + αUU (t− 1) + εU (t) . (7.35)
and Models 3 and 4 (Equations (7.28) and (7.29)) can both be rewritten as:
ln (1 + U (t)) = µU (1− αU) + αU ln (1 + U (t− 1)) + εU (t) ; (7.36)
When fitting the long-term interest rate process, several of the NC (t) values
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were found to be negative, resulting in undefined values of lnNC (t) (required to fit
Equation (7.11)). To avoid this problem, Equation (7.11) was modified slightly, its
new form being:
ln (1 +NC (t)) = βC,1 ln (1 +NC (t− 1))+βC,2ε̂Y (t)+εC (t) , t = 1, 2, . . . . (7.37)
Furthermore, when fitting the model, several of the model parameters were found
not to be significantly different from zero, these were: δD and δD,2 in the share
dividend model (Equation (7.33)), with p-values of 0.082 and 0.139, respectively;
βC,2 in the long-term interest rate model (Equation (7.37)), with a p-value of 0.107;
µB in the short-term interest rate model (Equation (7.13)), with a p-value of 0.121
and αZ in the property yield model (Equation (7.14)), with a p-value of 0.164. The
Wilkie model was refitted, setting all of these parameters equal to zero, thus reducing
Equations (7.33) and (7.14) to geometric random walk processes and Equation (7.37)
to an AR(1) process.
Of the two unemployment rate processes fitted, given by Equations (7.35) and
(7.36), the latter model was preferred, with an AIC value of -417.48 (as opposed to
-412.15 for the former). However, the lag one autocorrelation of the standardised
residuals for this model was found to be significantly greater than zero (with a p-
value of 0.029), indicating that there is still some autocorrelation structure remaining
in the errors of this model. In an attempt to correct this problem, ARMA(p, q) pro-
cesses for all values of p and q less than or equal to 2 were fitted to the ln (1 + U (t))
time series and the best of these models was selected (based on AIC). The model
that provided the best fit to the data was an AR(2) process of the form:
ln (1 + U (t)) = µU (1− αU,1 − αU,2) + αU,1 ln (1 + U (t− 1))
+ αU,2 ln (1 + U (t− 2)) + εU (t) , t = 1, 2, . . . . (7.38)
This model is subsequently used throughout this thesis as the unemployment sub-
model for the Wilkie model.
Table 7.4 provides a summary of the final version of the Wilkie model used in
this thesis. The fitted values of the model parameters (with standard errors given
in brackets) are presented in Table 7.5.
Table 7.6 presents the goodness of fit statistics calculated for the economic vari-
ables. None of the lag one autocorrelations indicate a significant departure from the
assumption of independent errors, while only one of the Jarque-Bera statistics, that
for the short-term interest rates, indicates a significant departure from the assump-
tion of normally distributed errors, and the extent of departure is quite mild.
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Table 7.4: A Summary of the Wilkie Model Sub-Models Used in this Thesis
Variable Equation(s)
Price Inflation ∆ lnQ (t) = µQ + εQ (t)
Share Dividend Yield lnY (t) = δY +NY (t)
NY (t) = βYNY (t− 1) + εY (t)
Share Dividends D (t) = Y (t)P (t)
∆ lnD (t) = δD,0 + εD (t)
Share Price Index P (t) = D (t) /Y (t)
Long-Term Interest Rate C (t) = δC +NC (t)
ln (1 +NC (t)) = βC,1 ln (1 +NC (t− 1)) + εC (t)
Short-Term Interest Rate lnB (t) = ln Ĉ (t)−NB (t)
NB (t) = αBNB (t− 1) + εB (t)
Property Yield ∆ lnZ∗ (t) = δZ + εZ (t)
Unemployment Rate ln (1 + U (t)) = µU (1− αU,1 − αU,2) + αU,1 ln (1 + U (t− 1))
+αU,2 ln (1 + U (t− 2)) + εU (t)
Note: all variables are defined on the range t = 0, 1, 2, . . ..
Table 7.5: Fitted Parameter Values for the Wilkie Model
Model Parameter Fitted Value
Price Inflation, Q (t) µQ 0.006 (0.001)
Share Dividend Yield, Y (t) δY -3.314 (0.012)
βY 0.811 (0.087)
Share Dividends, D (t) δD,0 0.021 (0.006)
Long-Term Interest Rate, C (t) δC 0.059 (0.001)
βC,1 0.911 (0.075)
Short-Term Interest Rate, B (t) αB 0.920 (0.049)
Property Yield, Z∗ (t) δZ 0.043 (0.008)
Unemployment Rate, U (t) µU 0.062 (0.013)
αU,1 1.490 (0.131)
αU,2 -0.499 (0.134)
Table 7.6: Goodness of Fit Statistics for the Wilkie Model Time Series Processes
Model S.E. Res. ACF(1) JB
Share Dividend Yield, Y (t) 0.044 0.022 1.637
Share Dividends, D (t) 0.042 -0.203 0.406
Long-Term Interest Rate, C (t) 0.004 -0.044 0.211
Short-Term Interest Rate, B (t) 0.062 0.129 7.183*
Property Yield, Z∗ (t) 0.055 0.200 2.447
Unemployment Rate, U (t) 0.001 -0.170 0.003
Note: the standard error of all of the ACF(1) values is 0.152 and * indicates signif-
icance at the 5% significance level.
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The CAS/SOA Model
The CAS/SOA model was fitted to the data. The CAS/SOA price inflation and
property yield models are the same as those in the Wilkie model, so are not discussed
again in this section. As in the case of the Wilkie model, because ∆ ln Q̂ (t) is a
constant for all t, several of the sub-models that make up the CAS/SOA model
reduce to simpler models. Specifically, Equations (7.17), (7.18) and (7.24) can be,
respectively, rewritten as:
ln (1 + C (t)) = µC (1− αC) + αC ln (1 + C (t− 1)) + εC (t) ; (7.39)
ln (1 +B (t)) = (1− αB) ln (1 +B (t− 1)) + αB ln
(
1 + Ĉ (t− 1)
)
+ εB (t) ; (7.40)
and
U (t) = µU (1− αU) + αUU (t− 1) + εU (t) . (7.41)
Before fitting the SPI regime-switching process, the BDS (Brock, Dechert and
Scheinkman) test (proposed by Brock et al. (1996) and also described in Zivot and
Wang (2005)) was conducted to see whether there did, in fact, exist non-linearity
in the X (t) time series that would justify the use of a regime-switching model.
The results of this test produced no evidence (at the 5% significance level) of non-
linearity in the data. In addition, to test for heteroskedasticity in the data, a
GARCH(1,1) model was fitted to the X (t) time series. However, neither of the
GARCH parameters was found to be significantly different from zero. Further, an
attempt was made to fit a regime-switching process using the S-Plus FinMetrics
Markov switching state space model fitting command (SsfFitMS). However, S-Plus
was unable to fit this model to the data. Consequently, following all this exploratory
analysis, it was concluded that a regime-switching process is not justified for the SPI
data and the regime-model was replaced by a standard (single regime) log-normal
process for X (t). That is,
X (t) = φX + εX (t) , t = 1, 2, . . . ; (7.42)
or
X (t) ∼ N (φX , σ2X) , t = 1, 2, . . . ; (7.43)
where σ2X denotes the variance of the error terms (εX (t)).
In addition to this, when fitting the model given by Equation (7.40) to the short-
term interest rate data, the fitted value of αB was not found to be significantly
different from zero (p-value = 0.496), so this model was refitted with this parameter
set equal to zero.
The fitted values of the model parameters of the CAS/SOA model (with standard
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errors) are presented in Table 7.7. The parameters of sub-models that were also
fitted as part of the Wilkie model are excluded from this table and can be found in
Table 7.5
Table 7.7: Fitted Parameter Values for the CAS/SOA Model
Model Parameter Fitted Value
Long-Term Interest Rate, C (t) µC 0.060 (0.005)
αC 0.910 (0.072)
Share Price Index, P (t) φX -0.030 (0.008)
Share Dividend Yield, Y (t) µY -3.303 (0.033)
αY 0.811 (0.086)
Unemployment Rate, U (t) µU 0.064 (0.017)
αU 0.995 (0.007)
Table 7.8 presents the goodness of fit statistics for the economic variables in the
CAS/SOA model. Based on these statistics, there is no evidence to suggest that
the assumption of normality has been violated in any of the models. However, the
lag one autocorrelations of the residuals indicate that there is some autocorrelation
structure unaccounted for by the short-term interest rate and unemployment rate
models. This shortcoming is addressed in the next section.
Table 7.8: Goodness of Fit Statistics for the CAS/SOA Model Time Series Processes
Model S.E. Res. ACF(1) JB
Long-Term Interest Rate, C (t) 0.003 -0.037 0.168
Short-Term Interest Rate, B (t) 0.003 0.470* 5.312
Share Price Index, P (t) 0.054 -0.252 0.904
Share Dividend Yield, Y (t) 0.044 0.024 1.660
Unemployment Rate, U (t) 0.002 0.332* 5.009
Note: the standard error of all of the ACF(1) values is 0.152 and * indicates signif-
icance at the 5% significance level.
A Comparison of the Three Models
All three of the models fitted share the same sub-model for price inflation and
property yield. Thus, it is only necessary to compare the remaining sub-models.
Table 7.9 presents the AIC for each of these models. Note that the Wilkie model
does not contain a share price index sub-model, and the Kemp and CAS/SOA
models do not contain a share dividend model.
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Table 7.9: A Comparison of the AIC for the Kemp, Wilkie and CAS/SOA Models
Sub-Model Kemp Model Wilkie Model CAS/SOA Model
Share Dividend Yield, Y (t) -384.08 -96.00 -138.96
Share Dividends, D (t) - -143.48 -
Share Price Index, P (t) -124.59 - -126.30
LT Int. Rate, C (t) -307.55 -302.23 -357.27
ST Int. Rate, B (t) -314.61 -111.12 -365.00
Unemployment Rate, U (t) -263.47 -427.54 -412.15
In the case of each sub-model, on the basis of the Akaike Information Criteria,
with the exception of the unemployment rate sub-model, the Kemp model outper-
forms the Wilkie model, and with the exception of the share dividend yield sub-
model, the CAS/SOA models outperform the Kemp model, although the Wilkie
model better allows for autocorrelation structure in the data than the Kemp model,
as is evidenced by the lag one residual autocorrelations shown in Tables 7.3 and
7.6. The CAS/SOA model also better allows for autocorrelation structure in the
data than the Kemp model (see Table 7.8). Note that, in part, the reason why the
Kemp model provides a better fit to the dividend yield data than the other two
models is because it is fitted to the ln (1 + Y (t)) time series rather than the lnY (t)
series (as the Wilkie and CAS/SOA models are). If the Kemp model is fitted to the
lnY (t) time series instead of the ln (1 + Y (t)) series, the AIC for the dividend yield
sub-model becomes -96.00 and the CAS/SOA model is now preferred.
The CAS/SOA model, however, is not without flaws. As was mentioned in the
previous section, the residuals of the CAS/SOA short-term interest rate and unem-
ployment rate models exhibit evidence of lag one autocorrelation. Taking this into
account (and other previously mentioned problems, such as the non-normal errors
in the price inflation model), a fourth stochastic economic model was devised, based
on the CAS/SOA model. Under this new model, which is subsequently referred
to as the modified CAS/SOA model, the economic variables evolve stochastically
according to the following series of equations.
Price Inflation: 1 + ∆ lnQ (t) is assumed to follow a gamma distribution with
mean µQ and variance σ
2
Q, for t = 1, 2, . . .. Note that 1 + ∆ lnQ (t) is modelled,
rather than ∆ lnQ (t), because ∆ lnQ (t) can take on negative values, whereas the
gamma distribution is defined for non-negative values only. Adding 1 to ∆ lnQ (t)
removes this problem.
Share Dividend Yield:
ln (1 + Y (t)) = µY (1− αY ) + αY ln (1 + Y (t− 1)) + εY (t) , t = 1, 2, . . . . (7.44)
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Long-Term Interest Rates:
ln (1 + C (t)) = µC (1− αC) + αC ln (1 + C (t− 1)) + εC (t) , t = 1, 2, . . . .
(7.45)
Short-Term Interest Rates:
ln (1 +B (t)) = µB (1− αB,1 − αB,2) + αB,1 ln (1 +B (t− 1))
+ αB,2 ln (1 +B (t− 2)) + εB (t) , t = 1, 2, . . . . (7.46)
Share Price Index:
∆ lnP (t) = φP + ln
(
1 + B̂ (t)
)
+ εP (t) , t = 1, 2, . . . . (7.47)
Property Yield:
∆ lnZ∗ (t) = µZ + εZ (t) , t = 1, 2, . . . . (7.48)
Unemployment Rate:
ln (1 + U (t)) = µU (1− αU,1 − αU,2) + αU,1 ln (1 + U (t− 1))
+ αU,2 ln (1 + U (t− 2)) + εU (t) , t = 1, 2, . . . . (7.49)
Note that the long-term interest rates, share price index and property yield are
modelled using the CAS/SOA sub-models for these variables; and the unemployment
rate is modelled using the Wilkie sub-model.
Table 7.10 presents the fitted parameter values for the modified CAS/SOAmodel,
while Table 7.11 presents the goodness of fit statistics for the economic variables in
this model (including the AIC values). From Table 7.11 it can be seen that there
is no evidence to suggest that any of the model assumptions have been violated in
any way. Furthermore, the AIC values for each of the sub-models in the modified
CAS/SOA model are either less than or close to the corresponding AIC values given
in Table 7.9, indicating that the modified CAS/SOA model provides a better fit
to the thesis data than any of the previously considered models. Note that the
Jarque-Bera statistic was not calculated for the price inflation sub-model because
price inflation is assumed to follow a gamma distribution, rather than a normal
distribution. However, a Pearson chi-squared goodness of fit test14 conducted using
eight equal-count bins, gives a test statistic of 10.021, which has a p-value of 0.075,
implying that the null hypothesis, that price inflation is gamma distributed, should
not be rejected (at the 5% significance level).
14See Klugman et al. (2004) for a description of this test.
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Table 7.10: Fitted Parameter Values for the Modified CAS/SOA Model
Model Parameter Fitted Value
Price Inflation, Q (t) µQ 1.006 (0.001)
Share Dividend Yield, Y (t) µY 0.036 (0.001)
αY 0.811 (0.087)
Long-Term Interest Rate, C (t) µC 0.060 (0.005)
αC 0.910 (0.072)
Short-Term Interest Rate, B (t) µB 0.054 (0.003)
αB,1 1.442 (0.131)
αB,2 -0.592 (0.138)
Share Price Index, P (t) φP -0.030 (0.008)
Property Yield, Z∗ (t) µZ 0.043 (0.008)
Unemployment Rate, U (t) µU 0.062 (0.013)
αU,1 1.490 (0.131)
αU,2 -0.499 (0.134)
Table 7.11: Goodness of Fit Statistics for the Modified CAS/SOA Model
Variable S.E. Res. ACF(1) JB AIC
Price Inflation, Q (t) 0.006 0.138 - -311.94
Share Dividend Yield, Y (t) 0.002 0.020 2.684 -426.71
Share Price Index, P (t) 0.002 -0.245 0.728 -126.18
Long-Term Interest Rate, C (t) 0.003 -0.037 0.168 -357.27
Short-Term Interest Rate, B (t) 0.002 -0.214 2.321 -383.83
Property Yield, Z∗ (t) 0.055 0.200 2.447 -124.40
Unemployment Rate, U (t) 0.001 -0.170 0.003 -427.54
Note: the standard error of all of the ACF(1) values is 0.152.
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7.2.8 Conclusion
In this section, three commonly used stochastic asset models were described and
compared: the Wilkie model, the CAS/SOA model and a random walk model pro-
posed by Kemp. Random walk models are often used in practice due to their
simplicity. However, it was shown that the CAS/SOA model provided a superior fit
to the data, based on a number of different criteria.
The CAS/SOA model is more complex than the Kemp model, and in turn, the
Wilkie model is more complex than the CAS/SOA model. However, it does not
follow that the Wilkie model is superior to the CAS/SOA model, because they are
not nested. In fact, based on the criteria considered, the CAS/SOA model was
the preferred model. Nevertheless, it was possible to propose a fourth model, the
modified CAS/SOA model, which provided a better fit to the thesis data than any
of the previously considered models.
These four models are considered and compared again in Chapter 9 in the context
of the overall stochastic solvency testing model.
7.3 Stochastic Mortality Models
7.3.1 Poisson and Binomial Models
“The assumption of binomial or Poisson type randomness is the basis of (most)
grouped mortality analyses” (Alho (2005, p.33)). The GLM methodology we use
for modelling mortality was set out in Chapter 4. In Section 4.2.4, a Poisson GLM
for modelling Dx,t (where Dx,t is the number of deaths observed among a group of
lives aged x in year t) was proposed (see Equation (4.15)) in which Dx,t is assumed
to follow a Poisson distribution with mean − ln (1− qsx,t)Ecx,teη (where Ecx,t is the
central exposed to risk for lives aged x in year t, treated as an offset, and η is the
linear predictor), that is,
Dx,t ∼ Pois
(− ln (1− qsx,t)Ecx,teη) . (7.50)
Appropriateness of the Poisson distribution for Dx,t is based on a number of
assumptions, including that the lives under observation all have the same probability
of dying during the year of observation (that is, the lives are homogeneous) and
that occurrences of deaths are mutually independent. The assumption of equal
probabilities of death is made more tenable by dividing the lives under observation
into groups possessing similar characteristics (such as sex and policy type) and
allowing different mortality rates for each group. However, in spite of the efforts of
insurers, it is still not always the case that the homogeneity assumption will hold,
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in which case heterogeneity is said to be present in the data.
If all of the lives under consideration in a mortality investigation are truly ho-
mogeneous, then a binomial or Poisson assumption may be seen to be reasonable.
If, however, despite stratification in an attempt to achieve homogeneity, there re-
mains heterogeneity between the lives within the sub-classes, then the underlying
mean mortality rate is not constant for all of the lives under investigation, and this
will lead to over-dispersion in both the binomial and the Poisson mortality models.
Pollard (1970) demonstrated that this was true for the binomial model and a similar
demonstration can be given to show that heterogeneity also leads to over-dispersion
in the Poisson model.
It is common practice among actuaries to assume that different Life Insurance
contracts are independent. This is done for simplicity. However, there are many
cases where the independence assumption clearly does not hold. For example:
• Family members who hold policies in the same portfolio: family members
are likely to be exposed to similar risks of death (for example, house fires, car
accidents, contagious diseases, lifestyle factors etc). Furthermore, studies, such
as that conducted by Jagger and Sutton (1991), have shown that there is an
increased risk of mortality among people whose spouses have died in the period
immediately following the death. Although spouses are rarely considered in the
same model (males and females are usually considered in separate mortality
models due to mortality differences between the sexes), it is not unreasonable
to believe that there might be some instances where a parent and a child or
two siblings of the same sex, living at the same address, both hold policies in
the same portfolio.
• Policies written on the same life will be dependent.
• In areas with a high density of insured lives (for example, capital cities), catas-
trophes (including epidemics) can lead to an accumulation of mortality claims
for the insurer.
Besides these three, there may be many other causes of a lack of independence
among lives.
The presence of any of the causes of mortality dependence mentioned is likely
to give rise to over-dispersion. This is because all of the abovementioned scenarios
imply a positive correlation between the deaths occurring in the respective scenarios.
For the variance to decrease due to a mortality dependency relationship, it would
require a negative correlation between the mortality rates of the lives involved. It
is possible to theorise some situations where this might occur. For example, the
accidental death of a factory worker at work may result in improved workplace safety,
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thus reducing the mortality rates of his or her co-workers. If any such situations
do exist, then they will tend to reduce the variance, cancelling out some of the
over-dispersion that may be present. Situations where under-dispersion occurs may
exist, but are considered unlikely.
Consequently, there are several situations where the Poisson assumptions may
be violated and which may give rise to over-dispersion. In such situations, it is
inappropriate to use a Poisson error GLM to model Dx,t and an alternative model
that allows for over-dispersion should be used. Such models were discussed in Section
4.3.2.
Pollard (1970) and Daw (1974) both conducted analyses of insured life and popu-
lation mortality data. Both authors found evidence of over-dispersion in their data.
Based on this, there is reason to believe that over-dispersion may be present in the
mortality data used in this thesis and it is necessary to test for it. We investigate
this in the next section.
7.3.2 Testing for Over-Dispersion in the Insured Life Mor-
tality Data
To test for over-dispersion in the insured life mortality data, a Poisson GLM of the
form specified in Equation (4.11) was fitted to the IAAust Data set. This model
was then extended to allow for over-dispersion in the data. Table 7.12 provides a
list of the models fitted (these models were all described in Section 4.3.2). In each
case, a linear predictor of the following form was used:
η = β0 + β1Age+ β2Duration+ β3Age×Duration
+ β4STI + β5STI × Age+ β6STI ×Duration; (7.51)
where STI denotes the the short-term interest rate, and duration was fitted using a
continuous covariate for durations of less than 10 years and an indicator variable for
durations of 10 years and greater, as was done in Section 6.3. The unemployment
rate was not included as a covariate in the model, as a significant relationship
between the unemployment rate and the mortality ratio (for insured lives) was not
found in Section 6.3.
The models were fitted separately to subsets of the data set defined by policy
type and sex. This was done so as to determine whether the existence of over-
dispersion varies by policy type or sex. This would not be possible if the models
were fitted to the all-policy type, both-sex data set.
Once the models were fitted, the over-dispersion tests described in Section 4.3
were conducted. The results of these tests are discussed in the next section.
Stochastic Sub-Models 133







All over-dispersion models were fitted using the Stata computer package15.
7.3.3 Results
The Poisson GLM described in Section 7.3.2 was fitted to each of the data subsets.
In each case, any variates whose parameter values were not significantly different
from zero were removed and the models refitted. The final linear predictors used
were as follows: for the Type 1 Males data, β0 and β6 were both set equal to zero.
In addition, the continuous duration covariate was found to be insignificant in the
model and removed. The linear predictor of the final model is:
η = β1Age+ β2I (d ≥ 10) + β3Age× I (d ≥ 10)
+ β4STI + β5STI ×Age. (7.52)
where I (d ≥ 10) is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the duration is greater than
or equal to 10 years, and 0 otherwise.
For the Type 1 Females data, β0, β4, β5 and β6 were all set equal to zero, and as
in the case of the Type 1 Males data, the continuous duration covariate was found
to be insignificant in the model and removed. The linear predictor of the final model
in this case is:
η = β1Age+ β2I (d ≥ 10) + β3Age× I (d ≥ 10) . (7.53)
For the Type 2 Males and Type 3 Males and Females data, all parameters were set
equal to zero, except for the constant, β0. For the Type 2 Females and Type 4 Males
data, all parameters except for β0 and β2 were set equal to zero. That is,
η = β0 + β2Duration; (7.54)
and for the Type 4 Females data, all parameters except for β0 and β2 were set
15Stata version 8.2. Copyright c©1984–2003 StataCorp.
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equal to zero, and in addition, the continuous duration covariate was found to be
insignificant and removed from the model, leaving the linear predictor of the refitted
model as:
η = β0 + β2I (d ≥ 10) . (7.55)
Table 7.13 presents the over-dispersion statistics (with p-values shown in brack-
ets) for the Poisson GLMs. Based on these statistics, there is little evidence of
over-dispersion in any of the IAAust Data subsets, with the exceptions of the Type
1 Males data set, for which X2/(n − p) is significantly greater than one and Z is
significantly greater than zero; the Type 1 Females data set, for which Z is signifi-
cantly greater than zero; and the Type 2 Females, Type 3 Males and Type 4 Females
data sets, for which X2/(n− p) is significantly greater than one. Note that in none
of the cases is X2/(n− p) greater than two, which was Lindsey (1999b)’s criterion
for detecting over-dispersion. Further note that, in all of the IAAust Data subsets,
the proportion of zero observations is very high (the percentage of zero observations
is given by the final column of the table), so it is possible that over-dispersion is
present in some of these data subsets but was undetected by these statistics.
Table 7.13: Over-Dispersion Statistics for the Poisson GLMs with p-values Shown
in Brackets
Data Subset n− p D/(n− p) X2/(n− p) Z % Zero
Type 1 M 2811 0.677 (1.000) 1.085* (0.001) 6.349* (0.000) 71.02%
Type 1 F 2810 0.481 (1.000) 0.979 (0.212) 3.235* (0.000) 78.10%
Type 2 M 2423 0.464 (1.000) 0.848 (1.000) 0.211 (0.416) 81.52%
Type 2 F 2269 0.256 (1.000) 1.074* (0.008) 0.762 (0.223) 92.39%
Type 3 M 1881 0.270 (1.000) 1.158* (0.000) -0.337 (0.632) 92.83%
Type 3 F 1617 0.161 (1.000) 0.833 (1.000) -0.173 (0.569) 96.66%
Type 4 M 2708 0.739 (1.000) 0.896 (1.000) 0.655 (0.256) 66.91%
Type 4 F 2656 0.509 (1.000) 1.103* (0.000) 0.889 (0.187) 83.78%
Note: * indicates significance at the 5% significance level.
The over-dispersion models (that is, Models 2–5) were then fitted to the data
subsets using the linear predictors stated above. The over-dispersion parameters for
each of these models (that is, δ in the NB1 model, α in the NB2 model, pi in the ZIP
model and σ2 in the normal-Poisson model), and associated p-values, are presented
in Table 7.14. For the IAAust Data, only seven of the values shown in this table
are significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level, these being three
of the four over-dispersion parameters for each of the Type 1 Males and Type 1
Females data sets and one of the parameters for the Type 2 Females data set. In
the case of the Type 2 Females data set, only the over-dispersion parameter of the
normal-Poisson model (σ2) is (just) significant at the 5% significance level, based
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on the likelihood ratio test. This parameter has a standard error of 0.100, thus the
fitted value of σ2 is less than 1.5 times its standard error, suggesting a minimal
degree of over-dispersion in this data subset.
Based on this analysis, and on the conclusions drawn from the Poisson GLM
over-dispersion statistics discussed previously, there is strong evidence to suggest
the presence of over-dispersion in the Type 1 Males and Type 1 Females data sets,
and minimal evidence to suggest over-dispersion in any of the other data subsets.
Table 7.14: Over-Dispersion Parameters for the Over-Dispersion Models with p-
values Shown in Brackets
Data Subset NB1 (δ̂) NB2 (α̂) ZIP (pi) Norm.-Pois. (σ̂2)
Type 1 M 0.354* (0.000) 0.007* (0.000) 0.000 (1.000) 0.007* (0.000)
Type 1 F 0.163* (0.008) 0.014* (0.018) 0.000 (0.487) 0.014* (0.018)
Type 2 M 0.007 (0.413) 0.000 (1.000) 0.007 (0.366) 0.000 (1.000)
Type 2 F 0.079 (0.103) 0.153 (0.052) 0.065 (0.200) 0.147* (0.049)
Type 3 M 0.000 (1.000) 0.000 (1.000) 0.033 (0.387) 0.000 (1.000)
Type 3 F 0.000 (1.000) 0.036 (0.469) 0.113 (0.367) 0.030 (0.480)
Type 4 M 0.025 (0.230) 0.014 (0.309) 0.012 (0.249) 0.013 (0.309)
Type 4 F 0.034 (0.166) 0.085 (0.118) 0.031 (0.287) 0.083 (0.116)
Note: * indicates significance at the 5% significance level.
The results for Type 1 policies are consistent with those of Pollard (1970) and
Daw (1974). It should be noted that, although it is not specifically stated in their
papers, the analyses of Pollard and Daw almost certainly focussed on Type 1 and
3 policies, as Type 2 and 4 policies did not exist when their investigations were
conducted. It is uncertain as to the proportions of Type 1 and 3 policies represented
in Pollard and Daw’s respective data sets.
Daw (1974) believed that the over-dispersion in his data set was due to the
presence of duplicate policies. It was not possible to obtain detailed information on
the distribution of duplicate policies in our data set. However, IAAust Mortality
Committee (2001), which used the 1995–97 portion of the IAAust Data Set in their
investigations, estimated that “about 19% of male insured lives own more than one
policy, compared to only 6% of female insured lives. . . (and) in terms of policies,
only 64% of male policies are singletons compared to 88% of female policies” (p.17).
Furthermore, the IAAust Mortality Committee estimated that, due to the presence
of multiple policies, male (death) variances should be inflated by a factor of 1.56
on average, and female variance should be inflated by a factor of 1.15. The female
factor is within one standard deviation of one plus the over-dispersion factor (δ) for
the Type 1 Females NB1 model (the standard error of δ for this model is 0.053),
but the male factor differs by more than two standard errors from one plus the
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over-dispersion factor for the Type 1 Males NB1 model (the standard error of δ for
this model is 0.062).
The IAAust Mortality Committee variance inflation factors were estimated for all
policy types combined. However, in Australia, duplicate policies have, historically,
been far more common for savings motivated forms of insurance, that is, Type 1
policies, than for risk management motivated forms of insurance (Type 2, 3 and 4
policies). For risk management motivated forms of insurance, if more insurance is
required, it is generally cheaper for the insured life to increase the sum insured on
an existing policy than to take out a second policy (although, some policyholders
do still take out multiple policies of this type for various reasons). This is because
taking out a second policy would lead to duplication of the administrative charges
associated with the policy, which is likely to be greater than any policy alteration
fees charged. On the other hand, whole of life and endowment (Type 1) policies,
which were most common (in Australia) prior to the introduction of compulsory
superannuation, were often used in place of superannuation as retirement savings
vehicles, with many insured lives holding a number of policies maturing at staggered
points in time (for example, at five-year intervals from age 55 onwards). This was
more common for males than females since, traditionally, it was seen as a man’s
duty to provide financially for his family.
Thus, the existence of duplicate Type 1 policies seems a plausible explanation
for the presence of over-dispersion in the Type 1 Male and Female data subsets.
An alternative explanation for this is that, since Type 1 policies tend to have
been held for longer durations than the other policy types, any initial selection
effects have had more time to “wear off” (that is, a longer period has elapsed since
the initial underwriting process, resulting in a greater probability that the health
of the policyholders has deteriorated), and the Type 1 policyholders are now more
similar, with respect to mortality, to the general population, which exhibits over-
dispersion (due to heterogeneity), than the other policyholders.
Table 7.15 presents the AIC values for the models fitted to the Type 1 Males
and Females data sets (the AIC values for the models fitted to the other data sets
were not shown because, from Table 7.14, it is clear that none of the over-dispersion
models provide a significant improvement on the basic Poisson GLM). From this
table it can be seen that, for both data sets, the NB1 model provides the best fit to
the data of all of the models considered.
Consequently, in the final stochastic solvency model, it was decided to assume
that Dx,t follows an NB1 distribution for Type 1 policies and a Poisson distribution
for all other policy types.
For the Type 1 policies, the NB1 models fitted above were used to describe Dx,t,
while for the other policy types, a single Poisson GLM was fitted to the data subset
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Table 7.15: AIC for the Models Fitted to the Type 1 Males and Females Data






comprising all Type 2, 3 and 4 policies. Initially, all of the covariates, age, duration,
type, sex and STI and all two-way interactions were included in the linear predictor
for the Poisson GLM. However, many of the parameters proved to be insignificant in
the model. After all insignificant variates were removed, the linear predictor reduced
to:
η = β0 + β1I (Type 3) + β2Duration. (7.56)
The over-dispersion tests described above were also run on this data set using models
with the linear predictor given by Equation (7.56) and these tests confirmed that a
Poisson GLM is still the best model for describing this data.
Table 7.16 presents the fitted parameter estimates for each of the models with
standard errors shown in brackets. Note that, in this table, I(Type 3) is an indicator
variable that equals 1 if a policy is of Type 3 and 0 otherwise, and I (d < 10) =
1− I (d ≥ 10).
Table 7.16: Fitted Coefficients for the Over-Dispersion Models with Standard Errors
Shown in Brackets
Type 1 M Type 1 F Types 2–4
Covariate
NB1 Model NB1 Model Poisson GLM
Intercept - - -0.302 (0.039)
I(Type 3) - - 0.280 (0.070)
Age 0.004 (0.001) 0.007 (0.001) -
Duration× I (d < 10) - - 0.033 (0.007)
I (d ≥ 10) 0.786 (0.113) 0.192 (0.084) 0.314 (0.051)
Age× I (d ≥ 10) -0.018 (0.002) -0.009 (0.001) -
STI -8.676 (1.843) - -
STI ×Age 0.186 (0.026) - -
It should be noted that, although a significant relationship was observed between
the mortality ratio and the short-term interest rate in Section 6.3, a significant
relationship between the mortality ratio and the short-term interest rate was only
detected for the Type 1 Males subset. Mortality is assumed to be independent of
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the economy for all other policy type/sex combinations.
7.4 Stochastic Lapsation Models
7.4.1 Introduction
Unlike the cases of mortality rates and economic variables, very little has been
written on the topic of stochastic models for lapsation rates, and in most cases,
when a stochastic lapse model is proposed, this is as a component of a larger model
(for example, as a sub-model of an asset-liability model) and very little attention is
paid, by the author, to this component. Two instances where stochastic lapsation
models have been used are in Lang (1998) and Tsai et al. (2001). Lang modelled
lapsation rates in a univariate way, with normally distributed errors, while Tsai et
al. used a vector autoregressive (VAR) model to model the evolution of lapsation
rates and mortality rates over time.
In this section, stochastic lapse models analogous to the stochastic mortality
models considered in the previous section, are considered. That is, a Poisson GLM
and a range of over-dispersion models are considered for modelling Wd,t, the num-
ber of lapses at duration d in year t. Tests are made to determine whether over-
dispersion is present in the data, and following this, the “best” model is determined
based on the AIC. No attempt is made to model mortality rates and lapsation rates
together using a multivariate model, such as a VAR model, because in Section 6.2 it
was determined that a significant relationship does not exist between lapsation and
mortality.
7.4.2 Testing for Over-Dispersion in the Lapsation Data
To test for over-dispersion in the lapsation data, a Poisson GLM of the form given
by Equation (6.24) was fitted to each policy type/sex subset of the Single Insurer
Mortality Data (for all ages and ages 15–64 only) and each policy type subset of the
Single Insurer Lapse Data, along with an NB1 model, NB2 model, a ZIP model and
a normal-Poisson model, all with the same linear predictor (for convenience, these
models were numbered 1 to 5, as given in Table 7.12). The linear predictor used in
each model was of the form:
η = β0 + β1Age+ β2Duration+ β3Age×Duration
+ β4STI + β5STI × Age+ β6STI ×Duration
+ β7U + β8U ×Age+ β9U ×Duration; (7.57)
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where U denotes the unemployment rate. Age was excluded from the models fitted
to the Single Insurer Lapse Data Set, as age information was not available for this
data set, reducing the linear predictor to:
η = β0+β1Duration+β2STI+β3STI×Duration+β4U+β5U×Duration. (7.58)
Duration was treated as a continuous covariate when the model was fitted to the
Single Insurer Mortality Data, and as a combination of a continuous covariate and
an indicator variable (for durations of 21 years and greater) when the model was
fitted to the Single Insurer Lapse Data.
Once the models were fitted, the over-dispersion tests described in Section 7.3
were conducted and the “best” of the models was determined based on the AIC.
These results are discussed in Section 7.4.3.
7.4.3 Results
Poisson GLMs with linear predictor given by Equation (7.57) were fitted to the Single
Insurer Mortality Data. As was done in Section 7.3.3 in the case of the mortality
over-dispersion models, any variates whose parameter values were not significantly
different from zero were removed from the model and the models refitted. When
all ages were considered, no variates were removed from the model for the Type 1
Males or Females data or the Type 4 Males data, but for the Type 4 Females data,
β5 was set equal to zero (that is, the interaction between the short-term interest rate
and age was removed from the model). For the age 15–64 subset of the data, no
variates were removed from the model for the Type 4 Males data; β5 was set equal
to zero for the Type 1 Males and Type 4 Females data; and β3 was set equal to zero
for the Type 1 Females data (that is, the interaction between age and duration was
removed from the model).
In the case of the Single Insurer Lapsation Data, Poisson GLMs with linear
predictor given by Equation 7.58 were fitted and any insignificant variates were
removed. In the case of the Type 1 and Type 4 policy data, no variates were
removed, while for the Type 3 data, only β0 was found to be significant.
Table 7.17 presents the over-dispersion statistics for each of the final-fitted Pois-
son GLMs. It can be seen that every statistic in this table indicates strong over-
dispersion in the data set to which it applies.
The over-dispersion models (Models 2–5) were then fitted to the data using the
reduced linear predictors described above, and the over-dispersion parameters for
each of these models are given in Table 7.18. Again, there is strong evidence of
over-dispersion for each of the data sets under consideration.

















Table 7.17: Over-Dispersion Statistics for the Lapsation Data Poisson GLMs with p-values Shown in Brackets
Data Subset n− p D/(n− p) X2/(n− p) Z % Zero
Single Insurer Mortality Data - All Ages
Type 1 M 21,156 2.331* (0.000) 3.996* (0.000) 257.230* (0.000) 45.90%
Type 1 F 17,064 1.147* (0.000) 2.051* (0.000) 35.101* (0.000) 54.39%
Type 4 M 6,840 1.934* (0.000) 3.261* (0.000) 88.376* (0.000) 28.45%
Type 4 F 6,257 1.568* (0.000) 2.718* (0.000) 64.220* (0.000) 34.98%
Single Insurer Mortality Data - Ages 15–64 Only
Type 1 M 11,100 3.007* (0.000) 3.848* (0.000) 209.101* (0.000) 25.07%
Type 1 F 10,189 1.325* (0.000) 1.583* (0.000) 30.607* (0.000) 35.69%
Type 4 M 5,681 2.070* (0.000) 3.339* (0.000) 89.373* (0.000) 21.81%
Type 4 F 5,362 1.695* (0.000) 2.960* (0.000) 70.744* (0.000) 27.56%
Single Insurer Lapsation Data
Type 1 167 125.445* (0.000) 132.999* (0.000) 1205.914* (0.000) 1.70%
Type 3 79 1.993* (0.000) 2.007* (0.000) 7.000* (0.000) 55.00%
Type 4 101 24.700* (0.000) 24.603* (0.000) 167.622* (0.000) 0.00%
Note: * indicates significance at the 5% significance level.
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Table 7.18: Over-Dispersion Parameters for the Lapsation Over-Dispersion Models
with p-values Shown in Brackets
Data Subset NB1 (δ̂) NB2 (α̂) ZIP (pi) Norm.-Pois. (σ̂2)
Single Insurer Mortality Data - All Ages
Type 1 M 1.976* (0.000) 0.472* (0.000) 0.063* (0.000) 0.401* (0.000)
Type 1 F 0.431* (0.000) 0.158* (0.000) 0.017* (0.000) 0.159* (0.000)
Type 4 M 0.902* (0.000) 0.109* (0.000) 0.001* (0.000) 0.112* (0.000)
Type 4 F 0.602* (0.000) 0.100* (0.000) 0.001* (0.042) 0.117* (0.000)
Single Insurer Mortality Data - Ages 15–64 Only
Type 1 M 2.261* (0.000) 0.363* (0.000) 0.020* (0.000) 0.317* (0.000)
Type 1 F 0.446* (0.000) 0.135* (0.000) 0.011* (0.000) 0.136* (0.000)
Type 4 M 1.009* (0.000) 0.104* (0.000) 0.001* (0.000) 0.112* (0.000)
Type 4 F 0.645* (0.000) 0.098* (0.000) 0.001* (0.038) 0.114* (0.000)
Single Insurer Lapsation Data
Type 1 112.834* (0.000) 0.095* (0.000) 0.000 (1.000) 0.049* (0.000)
Type 3 2.262* (0.000) 0.305* (0.000) 0.220* (0.000) 0.229* (0.000)
Type 4 21.804* (0.000) 0.049* (0.000) 0.000 (1.000) 0.030* (0.000)
Note: * indicates significance at the 5% significance level.
seen that no one model is consistently favoured for all of the data sets. In the case
of the Single Insurer Mortality Data, Model 5 is the preferred model for most of the
data subsets. However, Model 2 is preferred in the case of the Type 4 Female data
(with Model 5 being the second best model), and in the case of the Type 4 Males
data for ages 15–64 only, Model 3 provides the best fit, with Model 5 providing a
worse fit than the basic Poisson GLM. In the case of the Single Insurer Lapsation
Data, Model 2 provides the best fit to the Type 3 and 4 data, while Model 3 provides
the best fit to the Type 1 data.
For the purpose of developing a stochastic lapsation model for use in this thesis,
it was decided to focus on the all age Single Insurer Mortality Data. The Single
Insurer Mortality Data was preferred to the Single Insurer Lapsation Data because,
although the Single Insurer Lapsation Data Set was specifically constructed for use
in lapsation investigations, it does not include age information. As was mentioned in
Section 5.3.1, it is common for insurers to assume that lapsation rates do not vary by
the age of the policyholder. However, age was shown to be a significant explanatory
variable in each of the models fitted to the Single Insurer Mortality Data, thus
refuting this assumption. Since age is a significant predictor of the lapsation rate,
it is also likely that its omission is the cause of some of the over-dispersion in the
Single Insurer Lapsation Data. Consequently, although the Single Insurer Mortality
Data has some drawbacks, primarily that the number of lapses are not specifically
stated but must be inferred, it is believed that these drawbacks are outweighed by
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Table 7.19: AIC for the Lapsation Over-Dispersion Models
Model
Data Set
1 2 3 4 5
Single Insurer Mortality Data - All Ages
Type 1 M 85,586.73 70,107.22 70,225.96 85,141.06 69,063.53
Type 1 F 41,713.01 40,871.94 40,747.45 41,635.90 40,722.15
Type 4 M 31,008.24 29,147.71 28,665.64 30,995.10 28,630.68
Type 4 F 23,765.89 22,754.22 23,020.23 23,764.92 22,934.20
Single Insurer Mortality Data - Ages 15–64 Only
Type 1 M 62,206.70 50,352.79 49,990.48 62,053.10 49,469.30
Type 1 F 33,023.78 32,348.70 32,211.10 32,957.28 32,198.29
Type 4 M 28,475.30 26,586.75 26,234.96 28,461.96 28,630.68
Type 4 F 22,653.07 21,597.67 21,923.70 22,651.92 21,841.20
Single Insurer Lapsation Data
Type 1 22,310.16 2,386.33 2,200.90 22,312.16 2,903.49
Type 3 292.52 257.56 275.50 282.96 277.34
Type 4 3,388.74 1,351.16 1,359.23 3,390.74 1,422.42
the advantages of the age information given in this data set, leading us to prefer
this data set to the Single Insurer Lapsation Data Set.
It was decided to use the all age Single Insurer Mortality Data set rather than the
age 15–64 subset of this data because it is desirable to be able to use the Stochastic
Lapsation Model for lives that are over 65 years of age. Although it is believed
that some of the policy withdrawals inferred for ages over 65 are, in fact, due to the
actions of the insurer, rather than of the policyholder, thus are not lapses, as defined
in this thesis, in all of the tests that have been conducted throughout this thesis,
the all age data set and the age 15–64 data set have produced broadly consistent
results, so it is believed that this will not adversely affect our findings.
For consistency, it was decided to use a normal-Poisson model for modelling all
policy type/sex combinations, in spite of the fact that the normal-Poisson model
was found to be only the second best model for describing the Type 4 Females data.
Our next step was to fit a single normal-Poisson model to the entire Single Insurer
Mortality Data set, so as to avoid having to work with four separate models. Due to
the fact that different policy type/sex combinations exhibit different levels of over-
dispersion, it was necessary to fit a more complex model than was previously fitted,
that is, a Poisson random coefficient model, as was described in Section 4.3.2.
In fitting the model to the entire data set, initially all economic and non-economic
covariates and all two-way interactions (except for that between the unemployment
rate and the short-term interest rate, which has not previously been included in any
of the models) were included in the linear predictor. The interaction between the
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unemployment rate and sex was found to be insignificant in the model, and this
interaction was removed, reducing the non-random part of the linear predictor to:
η = β0 + β1Age+ β2Duration+ β3Sex+ β4Type
+ β5Age×Duration+ β6Age× Sex+ β7Age× Type
+ β8Duration× Sex+ β9Duration× Type+ β10Sex× Type
+ β11U + β12U ×Age+ β13U ×Duration+ β14U × Type
+ β15STI + β16STI × Age+ β17STI ×Duration
+ β18STI × Sex+ β19STI × Type. (7.59)
A random intercept and random coefficients of sex and type were also included,
such that
ζ = ψ0 + ψ1Sex+ ψ2Type; (7.60)
where ψ ∼ N (0, σ2i ) and Cov (ψi, ψj) = σi,j. That is, there is a random intercept
of ψ0 (with variance σ
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The fitted coefficients of each of the terms in the linear predictor are presented
in Table 7.20, while the variance and covariance terms (that is, the σ2i and σi,j) are
presented in Table 7.21. Using the formulae given above, and the values presented
in Table 7.21, the variances of the random intercepts were calculated to be 0.396 for
Type 1 Males, 0.161 for Type 1 Females, 0.139 for Type 4 Males and 0.140 for Type
4 Females.
The model described above was fitted only to Type 1 and 4 policy data. For
later sections of this thesis, however, it is necessary to have a lapsation model that
can also forecast lapsation rates for Type 2 and 3 policies. For such purposes it is
assumed that the above model can also be applied to Type 2 and 3 policies, subject
to the following minor adjustments:
• The Type 4 policy indicator variable, I(Type 4), is changed to an indicator
variable for both Type 2 and 4 policies, with the coefficients of this variable,
and any interaction terms containing this variable, assumed to remain the
same.
• The fitted variances of the random intercepts for Type 2 and 3 policies are
assumed to be the same as those for Type 4 policies. Note that, in this case,
the Type 3 variance is assumed to be the same as the Type 4 variance, rather
than the Type 1 variance, as would be expected, because in Table 7.17, for
the Single Insurer Lapsation Data the Type 3 policy data subset showed levels
of over-dispersion much lower than those exhibited by the Type 1 data and
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Table 7.20: Fitted Coefficients for the Normal-Poisson Random Coefficient Model





I (F ) -0.04146 (0.08972)




Age× I (F ) -0.00580 (0.00061)
Age× I (Type 4) 0.00480 (0.00081)
Duration× I (F ) 0.00999 (0.00104)
Duration× I (Type 4) 0.01028 (0.00119)
I (F )× I (Type 4) 0.02067 (0.02227)
U ×Age -0.72644 (0.06481)
U ×Duration 2.20917 (0.10272)
U × I (Type 4) 120.67760 (2.36519)
STI × Age -0.11394 (0.06713)
STI ×Duration 1.46987 (0.10228)
STI × I (F ) 2.24217 (1.64524)
STI × I (Type 4) 85.14469 (2.27405)
Table 7.21: Fitted Variances and Covariances for the Normal-Poisson Random Co-









closer to those exhibited by the Type 4 data. Consequently, using the Type 1
variance as a proxy for the Type 3 variance is likely to lead to over-estimation
of the Type 3 variance.
7.5 Summary
In this chapter, a number of different models were fitted to the economic and policy
data. Three economic models were fitted to the economic data: the Wilkie model,
the Kemp random walk model, and the CAS/SOA model; while Poisson GLMs
and a range of over-dispersion models were fitted to the mortality and lapsation
data. Of the economic models, the Wilkie model and the CAS/SOA model were
both preferred to the Kemp random walk model, and a newly constructed, modified
model was preferred to all of the other models (nevertheless, all four of these models
shall be considered again in Chapter 9). Of the models fitted to the mortality data,
the NB1 model was found to best describe the Type 1 policies, while a Poisson GLM
was found to best describe the Type 2–4 policies; and of the models fitted to the
lapsation data, the normal-Poisson mixture model was preferred. These models can
be connected using a cascade structure, as is illustrated by Figure 7.4, with outputs
from the economic sub-model acting as inputs to the mortality and lapsation sub-
models.








From these interconnected stochastic sub-models, economic and insured life ran-
dom variates can be simulated and these simulated values can act as inputs to the
solvency testing spreadsheet models. The solvency testing spreadsheet models were





In Chapter 7, we developed three interconnected stochastic sub-models: an eco-
nomic model, a mortality model and a lapsation model. These models are required
in order to simulate input values to the solvency testing spreadsheets. In this chap-
ter, we describe the solvency testing methodology, as well as the solvency testing
spreadsheets that are used in this thesis and the simulation techniques employed.
8.2 Solvency Testing Methodology
One of the aims of this thesis is to determine how the deterministically calculated
solvency and capital adequacy requirements (calculated using the methodology out-
lined in LPS2.04 and LPS3.04 respectively, and summarised in Appendix B) compare
with the solvency capital as calculated under several different stochastic criteria (for
example, the 99.5% VaR of the capital distribution over a one year time horizon).
The stochastic solvency testing methodology used, in this thesis, to achieve the above
aim is outlined below. The methodology is loosely based on the Swiss Solvency Test
methodology, as outlined in FOPI (2004) and Betz (2006).
Assuming a one year time horizon for solvency testing:
1. (Deterministically) determine the value of the insurer’s policy liabilities at the
valuation data (time t = 0), denoted PL (0), using the methodology outlined
in LPS1.04, but making no allowance for future shareholder profits.
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2. Simulate the mortality, lapsation and economic experience over the period
from t = 0 to t = 1 using the stochastic sub-models developed in Chapter 7.
3. Assuming the experience simulated in Step 2, determine the value of the in-
surer’s policy liabilities at time t = 1, denoted PL (1), and the value of the
insurer’s net cash inflows at the beginning and the end of the time period,
denoted CFboy (0, 1) and CFeoy (0, 1) respectively, and determine the rate of
return on the insurer’s assets over the period from time 0 to time 1, denoted
R (0, 1).
4. Using the results of Step 3, calculate the change in capital, ∆C (1), using the
formula (see Appendix C.1 for the proof of this):
∆C (1) = PL (0) + CFboy (0, 1) +
CFeoy (0, 1)− PL (1)
1 +R (0, 1)
. (8.1)
Note that this result is based on the assumptions that all cash-flows occur at
either the beginning or the end of each time period, and that the insurer has no
non-policy liabilities. These assumptions are made throughout the remainder
of this thesis.
5. Repeat Steps 2–4 a “large number” of times and from these simulated values
of ∆C (1), determine an empirical probability distribution of −∆C (1).
6. Using the empirical distribution of −∆C (1) determined in Step 6, calculate
the 99.5% VaR and the 99.5% TVaR.
The 99.5% VaR of the distribution of −∆C (1) is the amount of capital required
at time t = 0 such that Pr (C (1) > 0) > 0.995 (a proof of this is given in Appendix
C.2), that is, such that there is a 99.5% probability that the assets exceed the
liabilities at time t = 1 (or equivalently, that capital at time t = 1, denoted C (1),
exceeds 0), while the 99.5% TVaR is the expected shortfall in capital if the 99.5%
VaR amount of capital is held at time 0.
If a three year time horizon is assumed for solvency testing, instead of a one year
time horizon, then the above algorithm must change slightly, as follows:
1. (Deterministically) determine the value of the insurer’s policy liabilities at the
valuation data (time t = 0) using the methodology outlined in LPS1.04, but
making no allowance for future shareholder profits.
2. Simulate the mortality, lapsation and economic experience over the period
from t = 0 to t = 3 using the stochastic sub-models developed in Chapter 7.
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3. Assuming the experience simulated in Step 2, determine the value of the in-
surer’s policy liabilities at times t =1, 2 and 3, denoted PL (1), PL (2) and
PL (3) respectively, and the value of the insurer’s net cash inflows at the begin-
ning and the end of each year within the time period, CFboy (0, 1), CFeoy (0, 1),
CFboy (1, 2), CFeoy (1, 2), CFboy (2, 3), and CFeoy (2, 3); and determine the rate
of return on the insurer’s assets between each of the balance dates in the period
from time 0 to time 3, R (0, 1), R (1, 2) and R (2, 3).
4. Using the results of Step 3, calculate ∆C (1), ∆C (0, 2) and ∆C (0, 3), where
∆C (0, t) = C (t)− C (0) , t = 2, 3. (8.2)
These quantities can be calculated using Equation (8.1) and the following
formulae (see Appendix C.3 for the proofs of these equations):
∆C (0, 2) = PL (0) + CFboy (0, 1) +
CFeoy (0, 1)− CFboy (1, 2)
1 +R (0, 1)
+
CFeoy (1, 2)− PL (2)
1 +R (0, 2)
; (8.3)
and
∆C (0, 3) = PL (0) + CFboy (0, 1) +
CFeoy (0, 1)− CFboy (1, 2)
1 +R (0, 1)
+
CFeoy (1, 2)− CFboy (2, 3)
1 +R (0, 2)
+
CFeoy (2, 3)− PL (3)
1 +R (0, 3)
; (8.4)
where
1 +R (0, 2) = (1 +R (0, 1)) (1 +R (1, 2)) ; (8.5)
and
1 +R (0, 3) = (1 +R (0, 1)) (1 +R (1, 2)) (1 +R (2, 3)) . (8.6)
5. Determine the minimum of ∆C (1), ∆C (0, 2) and ∆C (0, 3), denoted
∆Cmin (0, 3).
6. Repeat Steps 2–5 a “large number” of times and from these simulated values
of ∆C (0, 3), determine an empirical probability distribution of −∆Cmin (0, 3).
7. Using the empirical distribution of −∆Cmin (0, 3) determined in Step 7, cal-
culate the 95% VaR and the 95% TVaR.
The 95% VaR of the distribution of −∆Cmin (0, 3) is the amount of capital re-
quired at time t = 0 such that Pr (C (1) > 0, C (2) > 0, C (3) > 0) > 0.95 (a proof
of this is given in Appendix C.4), that is, such that there is a 95% probability that
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the assets exceed the liabilities (or equivalently, that capital exceeds 0) at each of
the three times t = 1, 2 and 3.
Since values of ∆C (1) are calculated as an interim step in determining ∆Cmin (0, 3),
the empirical distributions of −∆C (1) and −∆Cmin (0, 3) can be simulated simul-
taneously. The simulation techniques used in the above algorithms are discussed
in Section 8.3.1. Most of the required calculations are performed using cash-flow
projection techniques, implemented using spreadsheet models (for example, the cal-
culation of PL (1) in Step 3 of the first algorithm). The spreadsheet models used in
this thesis are described in Section 8.4. In both of these algorithms, a “large num-
ber” of iterations1 must be performed. The determination of how large a number is
discussed in Section 8.3.2.
8.3 Simulation
8.3.1 Simulation Techniques
In both of the algorithms given in Section 8.2, it is necessary to simulate the mortal-
ity, lapsation and economic experience over the period under consideration; that is,
to simulate numbers of deaths and withdrawals and values of each of the economic
variables. This is done using the stochastic sub-models developed in Chapter 7 and
a specified sampling method. For example, in Section 7.3 it was determined that the
best model for describing the number of deaths among Type 1 Male policyholders
is the NB1 model. This model implies that the number of deaths among Type 1
Males follows a negative binomial probability distribution with mean (µ) given by
the model’s expected value (eη) and variance µ (1 + δ). Thus the number of Type
1 Male deaths in a given year can be simulated by sampling numbers from this
negative binomial distribution.
The oldest and most commonly used sampling method is Monte Carlo sampling.
This method was first introduced during World War II by Stan Ulam, Nicholas
Metropolis and John von Neumann (see Metropolis and Ulam (1949)). Monte Carlo
sampling involves repeatedly sampling random numbers from the input distribution
under consideration (for example, the negative binomial distribution of the number
of deaths, in the previous example), using techniques such as those described in Ross
(2006). As any individual sample may lie anywhere within the entire range of the
input distribution, this can lead to the problem of over-sampling or under-sampling
in some parts of the input distribution unless a very large number of iterations is
1The term iteration is taken, throughout the remainder of this thesis, to refer to a single
simulation trial, that is a single calculation of the quantity of interest, for example −∆C (1),
within a simulation. This definition is the same as that used in the @Risk computer package
documentation (see Palisade Corporation (2002)).
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performed. This problem is particularly pronounced in the case of highly skewed
input distributions.
In the more than six decades that have passed since World War II ended, more
sophisticated sampling methods have been developed, which overcome the prob-
lems associated with Monte Carlo sampling. One such method is Latin Hypercube
sampling (first described by McKay et al. (1979)). When Latin Hypercube sam-
pling is used, the input probability distribution is stratified into n intervals of equal
probability, where n is the number of iterations to be performed, and one sample
is then drawn from each of these intervals. This method removes the problem of
clustering that can occur in Monte Carlo sampling. As a result, Latin Hypercube
sampling is generally preferred to Monte Carlo sampling. Such a preference was
expressed by Ahlgrim et al. (2004), in the context of sampling from their stochastic
economic model for actuarial use (the CAS/SOA model), and, consequently, the
Latin Hypercube sampling method is used in this thesis.
Other sampling techniques also exist. However, Latin Hypercube sampling is of
particular interest as it is included as an option in many risk analysis simulation
software programs, including @Risk. Techniques used to draw samples from each of
the strata while implementing the Latin Hypercube technique are not discussed here
because these techniques are implemented automatically by the simulation software
program used. For more information on the Monte Carlo and Latin Hypercube
techniques, see Palisade Corporation (2002).
All simulations conducted as part of this thesis were carried out using @Risk2,
a simulation add-on for Microsoft Excel.
8.3.2 Convergence and Accuracy
In the two algorithms presented in Section 8.2, it is required that a “large num-
ber” of iterations be performed. What is meant by this is that iterations should
be performed until convergence occurs. “At the point of convergence, the output
distributions are stable (additional interations do not markedly change the shape or
statistics of the sampled distribution)” (Palisade Corporation (2002, p.455)).
To determine whether convergence has occurred, the @Risk convergence moni-
toring capability is used. If an @Risk simulation is run in “auto-stop” mode, @Risk
will calculate the mean, standard deviation and percentile values (5% to 95%, in-
clusive, in 5% increments) of the output at selected intervals, and if all of these
statistics change by less than a specified (threshold) percentage, then the output
is deemed to have “converged” and the simulation process is stopped. All @Risk
simulations conducted as part of this thesis were run in “auto-stop” mode with the
2@Risk version 4.5. Copyright c©2002, Palisade Corporation.
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output statistics recalculated every 100 iterations and a threshold percentage of 1%.
As the focus of the analysis in this thesis is on the tails of the output distributions,
it is important that the number of iterations performed be large enough so that
statistics about the tails of the distibutions can be calculated with a high level of
accuracy; in particular the 99.5% quantile of the distribution of −∆C (1), and the
95% quantile of the distribution of −∆Cmin (0, 3) are of major importance. The
@Risk convergence monitor does not consider any quantiles higher than 95% when
determining whether convergence has occurred, so it is necessary to provide some
further analysis.
In this thesis we set the required accuracy criterion for the 99.5% quantile of the
distribution of −∆C (1) to be that it is estimated within ±5% of its true value
with 95% confidence, and similarly, for the 95% quantile of the distribution of
−∆Cmin (0, 3).
If xp is the p
th quantile of a probability distribution with density f (.) and x̂p,n
is the sample pth quantile of n observations drawn from that distribution, then√
n (x̂p,n − xp) is asymptotically normally distributed with mean 0 and variance
p (1− p) /nf 2 (xp) (Walker (1968)). Based on this fact, it can be shown that the
minimum number of iterations, n1, necessary to meet the accuracy criterion for the






and the minimum number of iterations, n3, necessary to meet the accuracy criterion






where z0.975 = 1.96 is the 97.5% quantile of the standard normal distribution. In
calculating n1 and n3, an initial simulation is run until convergence is achieved
with the @Risk algorithm. f1 (.) and f3 (.) are then determined using the @Risk
distribution function3 applied to the initial simulation outputs; x0.995 is set equal to
the 99.5% quantile of the fitted empirical density f1 (.); and y0.95 is set equal to the
95% quantile of f3 (.). If the number of iterations required for the convergence of the
@Risk algorithm, for empirical distributions of both −∆C (1) and −∆Cmin (0, 3), is
less than nmin = max (n1, n3), then the simulation is re-run (using the same random
number generator seed, so that the exact same sequence of random numbers will be
3The @Risk distribution fitting function identifies the distribution (gamma, inverse Gaussian,
log-normal, triangular, uniform, Pareto or exponential) most likely to have produced the data,
based on their chi-squared, Anderson-Darling and Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics (see Palisade
Corporation (2002) for more information on this function).
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repeated) with the number of iterations set equal to nmin.
8.4 The Spreadsheet Models
8.4.1 Introduction
As was mentioned in Chapter 2, it is common for contemporary Australian Life In-
surers to use cashflow projection techniques when calculating their policy liabilities
and such techniques can easily be extended to allow the insurer to project their
solvency position at future points in time. Projection techniques are usually imple-
mented using spreadsheet models, and for the purposes of the investigations in this
thesis, it is necessary to build four spreadsheet models: a policy model, a payment
model, an asset model and a capital model. These models are now described in detail.
Each of the models is for a portfolio of business made up of “identical” poli-
cyholders (that is, lives that are the same age and sex and hold identical policies
of identical duration), all aged x at the valuation date, time t = 0. If the insurer
sells the same product type to non-identical lives, or sells more than one product
type (both of which are likely to be true), then the following calculations can be
repeated for each age/sex/sum insured/duration/policy type combination and the
results summed.
The spreadsheet methodology described below is for the deterministic calculation
of the quantities of interest, such as C (1). These spreadsheets can also be used to
implement the stochastic solvency testing algorithms given in Section 8.2. However,
in such cases, the expected values of Dx,t, Wx,t and the economic variables in year 1
(and years 2 and 3, in the three year time horizon case) are replaced by simulated
values of these quantities (sampled from the stochastic sub-model processes deter-
mined in Chapter 7) and the calculations are repeated a “large number” of times
(with different simulated values used each time).
All spreadsheet models required for this thesis were built using Microsoft Excel4.
8.4.2 The Policy Model
The purpose of the policy spreadsheet model is to forecast the number of policies
in force at discrete intervals of time, as well as the numbers of deaths and policy
lapses within these intervals (note that all spreadsheets used in this thesis were
constructed assuming a one year time interval between observations). Assuming
that the number of policies in force at the valuation date, time 0 (the beginning
of year 1), Ex,1, is known, these quantities can be calculated using the following
4Microsoft Office Excel 2003. Copyright c©1985–2003 Microsoft Corporation
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iterative series of equations.
Deaths During Year t
The Poisson GLM and NB1 models fitted to the mortality data in Section 7.3 are
used to determine the expected number of deaths during each future year. This is
done using Equation (4.11), that is:






where η is the linear predictor for the model under consideration. In order to esti-
mate the expected number of deaths using this formula, it is necessary to estimate
Ecx,t for the year in question. Under the assumption that there is a uniform distri-
bution of deaths over the policy year, and that all policy lapses occur at the end of
the policy year (this second assumption is often made by actuaries and is reasonable
because withdrawals are most likely to occur at policy anniversaries, when premiums
fall due), then we can write:
Ecx,t = Ex,t − 0.5Dx,t. (8.10)
Replacing Dx,t with E (Dx,t) in this equation, substituting the result into Equation









where Ex,1 is assumed to be known, as are the m
s
x,t, and Ex,t is determined for values
of t greater than 1 by the relationship:
Ex+1,t+1 = Ex,t −E (Dx,t)−E (Wx,t) . (8.12)
In the case of Type 1 Male policies, it is necessary to know the short-term interest
rate in year t in order to evaluate η (for all other policy types, it is only necessary to
know the policy type, the age of the policyholder and policy duration, all of which
are assumed to be known, in order to evaluate η). This is done by determining the
expected value of the short-term interest rate in year t using the models described
in Section 7.2. This is discussed in more detail in Section 8.4.4.
Lapses During Year t
Analogous to determining the expected number of deaths in each year, the expected
number of lapses in each year can be determined using the normal-Poisson mixture
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model fitted to the lapse data in Section 7.4. Thus, the expected number of lapses
in year t is:






where η is the linear predictor for the model under consideration and σ2 is the
(fitted) variance of the Poisson parameter.
Equation (8.10) is, once again, used to determine Ecx,t, but with Dx,t replaced by
its expected value in the equation. That is,
Ecx,t = Ex,t − 0.5E (Dx,t) ; (8.14)
where E (Dx,t) is given by Equation (8.11).
In order to evaluate η, it is first necessary to calculate the expected values of the
short-term interest rate and unemployment rate in year t. Again, this is discussed
in Section 8.4.4.
Policies In Force at the End of Year t
Once the expected number of deaths and lapses during year t have been determined,
the (expected) number of policies in force at the end of year t (which is the same as
the number in force at the beginning of year t+1) can be determined. This is done
using Equation (8.12). In the final year of a policy’s term, it is assumed that no
lapses occur and that all remaining policies mature at the policy anniversary. Thus,
the exposure at the end of the final year of the policy term is assumed to be zero.
8.4.3 The Payment Model
The payment model gives the projected expected cashflows, allowing for decrements,
in each remaining year of the term of the policy. From these, the policy liability of
the portfolio can be calculated at discrete points in time. Assuming that premiums
and expense (including commission) cashflows all occur at the beginning of the policy
year, and that death, surrender and maturity benefit cashflows are all paid at the
end of policy year, the following equations can be used to project these cashflows:
Beginning of Year t Cashflows
Premiums:
Premiums (t) = Px,t × Ex,t; (8.15)
where Px,t denotes the premium rate for lives aged x in year t. Premium rates are
determined at policy commencement using discounted cashflow techniques (similar
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to those used in determining the policy liabilities) and the equation of value,
EPV (Premiums) = EPV (Benefits) + EPV (Expenses) + EPV (Profits) . (8.16)
Depending on the conditions of the policy, premiums may be constant for the entire
term of the policy, or increase with age and/or due to inflation.
For Type 2 investment-linked policies, the premiums paid by the insurer are
invested in a managed fund and returned to the policyholder, with interest, upon
death or surrender. To cover their expenses and an allowance for profits, the insurer
deducts fees from the accumulated premium amount at various points throughout
the life of the policy (most commonly, on policy entry, on policy anniversaries,
and at policy termination). The premium amount is generally determined by the
policyholder, while the policy fees are determined based on the equation of value,
EPV (Fees) = EPV (Expenses) + EPV (Profits) . (8.17)
Thus,
EPV (Premiums less Fees) + EPV (Fees)
= EPV (Benefits) + EPV (Expenses) + EPV (Profits) . (8.18)
Fees may be charged at the beginning of the year or at the end of the year, so
may constitute beginning of year or end of year cashflows. For fees charged at the
beginning of the year:
Feesboy (t) = Fboy (t)× Ex,t; (8.19)
and for fees charged at the end of the year:
Feeseoy (t) = Feoy (t)×Ex,t+1; (8.20)
where Fboy (t) and Feoy (t) denote the fees charged per policy at the beginning and
end of year t respectively, which may be expressed as a dollar amount per policy or
as a percentage of the accumulated premiums received to date.
Expenses (including commission):
Expenses (t) = Expt × Ex,t; (8.21)
where Expt denotes the expenses, including commission, in year t. Policy expenses
usually comprise a “dollars per policy” component, which is the same for all poli-
cies of the same type, regardless of the size of the policy or characteristics of the
policyholder, and a “percentage of premiums” component. The “dollars per policy”
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expenses are usually assumed to increase with inflation.
Net Cashflows:
CFboy (t− 1, t) = Premiums (t)− Expenses (t) . (8.22)
End of Year t Cashflows
Death Benefits:
DB (t) = (SIt +Bonust)×Dx,t; (8.23)
where SIt denotes the policy sum insured in year t and Bonust denotes the amount
of bonuses declared up to the end of year t. Depending on the policy conditions,
the sum insured may be constant for the entire duration of the policy or increase in
line with inflation, or investment earnings, in the case of investment-linked policies
(other possibilities also exist, but are not considered in this thesis).
The declared bonuses component of the death benefits is only relevant in the case
of participating or “with profits” policies (for non-participating policies, Bonust = 0,
for all t), and only traditional (Type 1) policies have ever been sold (in Australia)
on a “with profits” basis. Bonus distribution rates are determined at the discre-
tion of the insurer, based on a number of factors, including equity between different
cohorts of policyholders, the reasonable expectations of policyholders and admin-
istrative simplicity. As a result, it is very difficult to model a “typical” insurer’s
bonus distribution policy, and consequently, all policies considered in this thesis are
assumed to be non-participating.
Surrender Benefits:
SB (t) = SVt ×Wx,t; (8.24)
where SVt denotes the policy surrender value at time t. Surrender values are deter-
mined at the discretion of the insurer, subject to the minimum surrender amounts
prescribed in LPS4.02, the Minimum Surrender Values and Paid-Up Values Stan-
dard.
Maturity Benefits:
Maturity benefits are only paid if the policyholder survives to the end of the
policy term. Thus, they are only paid once during the term of an insurance contract,
if at all. Assuming the insurance contract matures at the end of year n, then
MB (n) = (MSIn)× Ex,n+1; (8.25)
whereMSIn denotes the maturity sum insured. This may be different from the sum
insured that is paid on the death of the policyholder.
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Net Cashflows:
CFeoy (t− 1, t) = − (DB (t) + SB (t) +MB (t)) . (8.26)
BEL at the End of Year t
Again, assuming that the policy term expires at the end of year n,
BEL (t) = −
n−1∑
k=t
(PVt (CFboy (k, k + 1)) + PVt (CFeoy (k, k + 1))) ; (8.27)
where PVt denotes the present value at time t, and the discount rate used is the
after-tax expected future investment earnings rate for Type 2 policies (where tax
is assumed to be calculated at the current Australian corporate tax rate of 30%)
and a “risk free” discount rate for all other policy types, as prescribed by LPS1.045.
The determination of the expected future investment earnings rate is discussed in
Section 8.4.4.
Policy Liability at the End of Year t
Under LPS1.04, the policy liability at the end of year t is equal to the best esti-
mate liability at the end of year t plus the expected present value of future best
estimate bonuses (for participating business), plus the expected present value of fu-
ture shareholder profits. However, for solvency testing purposes, it is usual to make
no allowance for future shareholder profits (as was done in LPS2.04 and LPS3.04).
Thus, for non-participating business, we set the policy liability at the end of year
t equal to the best estimate liability at that time. Participating policies are not
considered in this thesis.
Taxation is not allowed for in the policy liabilities, with the exception of tax on
investment earnings for Type 2 policies, because if an insurer is making no profits,
it cannot be paying tax on them. For Type 2 policies, tax on investment earnings
is allowed for by using an after-tax investment earnings rate throughout. That is, if
ig is the before-tax investment earnings rate, then the after-tax investment earnings
rate, in is determined by:
in = ig (1− tax rate) . (8.28)
A tax rate of 30% is assumed throughout this thesis.
5Under LPS1.04, “the gross rate used to discount expected future cashflows must, to the ex-
tent the benefits under the policy are contractually linked to the performance of the assets held,
reflect the expected investment earnings applicable to the assets backing the benefit being valued.
Otherwise a risk free discount rate is to be used”.
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8.4.4 The Asset Model
The purpose of the asset spreadsheet model is to determine the expected values of
each of the economic variables in each year and the expected rate of return on the
insurer’s asset portfolio in each year. For the sake of simplicity, in this section, and
for the remainder of this thesis, it is assumed that the percentage allocation of the
insurer’s assets to each of the major asset classes (that is, shares, property, etc.)
remains constant for the entire term of the portfolio of business that the assets are
backing.
Values of the Economic Variables in Year t
The expected values, in quarter m, of each of the economic variables are determined
using the stochastic economic sub-models derived in Section 7.2 (all of which were
fitted to quarterly data). For example, the expected rate of price inflation in quarter




Q (m− 1) − 1
)
= eµQ . (8.29)
As the other spreadsheet models are based on annual data, it is necessary to
convert these values to annual expected values. For economic variables that are
expressed as per annum rates (for example, the long-term and short-term interest
rates), this is done by taking the average of the four, quarterly, values for the year
under consideration, while for economic variables that are expressed as per quarter
rates, this is done using the formula:
ra = (1 + rq,1) (1 + rq,2) (1 + rq,3) (1 + rq,4)− 1 (8.30)
where ra denotes the annualised rate and rq,1, rq,2, rq,3 and rq,4 denote the four
quarterly rates for the year under consideration.
Return on Assets in Year t
Once the expected values of the economic variables have been determined, it is
possible to determine the rate of return on the insurer’s assets in year t as the
weighted average of the returns on each of the asset classes that the insurer has
invested in, with weights equal to the proportion of the insurer’s assets invested in
each asset class.
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8.4.5 The Capital Model
The capital spreadsheet model is used to determine the change in the insurer’s
capital position over time using Equations (8.1), (8.3) and (8.4).
8.5 Model Assumptions
8.5.1 Introduction
In implementing the spreadsheet models described in Section 8.4, it is necessary to
make a number of deterministic input assumptions. These assumptions are set out
below and values are chosen to represent a typical Australian Life Insurer.
8.5.2 Portfolio Specifications
The answers to the various research questions posed in Section 3.3 may vary de-
pending on the composition of the insurance portfolio under consideration. That is,
the policy type represented in the portfolio; the durations and sums insured of the
policies; and the age and sex distribution of the policyholders. We do not attempt
to consider every possible age/sex/type/sum insured/duration combination in this
thesis. Instead, a small number of model portfolios have been constructed, each
containing policies that fit into one of a relatively small number of groups defined
by age, sex, type, sum insured and duration.
Four model portfolios were constructed, each containing policies of only a single
type, with the age and sex composition of each portfolio determined by reference to
what was observed in the IAAust data set. Table 8.1 gives the composition of each
portfolio.
It is assumed that within each age band all policies are held by policyholders of
an age equal to the mid-point of the age band under consideration, rounded to the
nearest integer. For example, all lives in the 15–24 year age band are assumed to be
exactly 20 years of age (for the 75+ years age band, all policyholders are assumed
to be exactly 80 years old).
All Type 1 policies are assumed to be (non-participating) endowment insurance
policies with terms of length such that the policies mature on the policyholder’s
100th birthday, if the policy is still in force at that date (this is effectively the same
as a whole of life insurance policy, but ignores ages greater than 100, for which
mortality rates are not tabulated); Type 2 policies are assumed to be investment-
linked policies, all surrendered at age 65 exact, provided prior surrender or death
has not already occurred; and all Type 3 and 4 policies (level term insurance and
yearly renewable term insurance respectively) are also assumed to expire on the
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Table 8.1: Model Portfolio Compositions
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
Males 15–24 3.00% 2.72% 0.55% 0.62%
25–34 9.00% 17.00% 7.70% 10.54%
35–44 16.50% 25.84% 17.60% 22.94%
45–54 22.50% 18.36% 21.45% 21.70%
55–64 15.00% 4.08% 7.70% 6.20%
65–74 5.25% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
75+ 3.75% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Females 15–24 2.00% 1.60% 0.45% 0.76%
25–34 4.25% 8.00% 8.10% 9.12%
35–44 6.75% 12.48% 21.15% 16.72%
45–54 6.75% 8.64% 13.05% 9.88%
55–64 3.00% 1.28% 2.25% 1.52%
65–74 1.25% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
75+ 1.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
policyholder’s 65th birthday. A policy expiry age of 65 was selected for Type 2,
3 and 4 policies because in Tables 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6, it can be seen that there is a
marked decrease in the exposures for these policy types at ages greater than 65.
These tables show that, for each of these policy types, less than 1% of all policies
are held by lives aged 65 or above.
APRA (2007) shows that most Type 1, 3 and 4 policies are paid for by regular
premiums (that is, premiums that are payable at regular intervals throughout the
life of the policy), while, for investment-linked business, the majority of policies
are single premium policies. Thus, in this thesis, Type 1, 3 and 4 policies are all
assumed to be regular premium policies, while Type 2 policies are assumed to be
single premium policies.
The policy duration for each age/sex/policy type combination is assumed to be
equal to the average duration (rounded to the nearest integer) for the age band,
sex and policy type under consideration, based on the Single Insurer Mortality data
set (this is the only data set for which sufficient information is given to make such
assumptions). As the Single Insurer data does not include Type 2 or 3 policies, the
same duration assumptions were made for Type 1 and 3 policies (both of which are
“traditional” policy types) and for Type 2 and 4 policies (both of which are “modern”
policy types). These duration assumptions are given in Table 8.2. For all policy
types, policyholders’ birthdays are assumed to coincide with the policy anniversaries,
which are assumed to coincide with the solvency testing date. Note that no allowance
is made for new policies that the insurer might sell during the solvency testing time
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period, since no such allowance is made in LPS2.04 and new business is only allowed
for in LPS3.04 via the new business reserve (which is discussed further in Section
8.6.3). New business is also ignored in the Swiss Solvency Test, upon which the
stochastic solvency testing model developed in this thesis is largely based.
Table 8.2: Duration Assumptions (Years) by Age Band, Sex and Policy Type
Males Females
Types 1 & 3 Types 2 & 4 Types 1 & 3 Types 2 & 4
15–24 17 4 17 4
25–34 22 3 22 3
35–44 22 5 20 5
45–54 26 7 22 7
55–64 30 8 25 8
65–74 36 - 29 -
75+ 43 - 35 -
For consistency, all Type 1, 3 and 4 policies are assumed to have the same sum
insured. The average sum insured of policies in the Single Insurer Mortality data
set is $116,217.32. This value was rounded to the nearest $10,000 to get the sum
insured assumption of $120,000. For investment-linked (Type 2) policies, premiums
are used to purchase units in a managed fund and death benefits depend on the
value of these units at the time of the policyholder’s death (that is, the accumulated
value of premiums received to date at the investment earnings rate, less fees and tax
on investment earnings).
8.5.3 Expenses
Expense assumptions vary between insurers, particularly with respect to structure.
The expense assumptions presented in Table 8.3 were set after consultation with an
actuary familiar with the Australian Life Insurance industry (Howes (2008)). These
expense assumptions are believed to be representative of the expense assumptions
of a “typical” Australian Life Insurer. Note that acquisition expenses are assumed
to be payable only in the first year of the policy, while maintenance expenses are
payable from year 2 onwards, and all dollar expenses are assumed to be subject to
inflation at the CPI growth rate.
8.5.4 Asset Mix
The composition of the portfolio of assets backing an insurer’s liabilities depends
on a number of factors including, among other things, the insurer’s attitude to risk,
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Table 8.3: Expense Assumptions per Policy
Policy Type Acquisition Exps Maintenance Exps Investment Exps
1, 3 and 4 $200 + 30% of regular prem. $75 p.a. -
2 $200 + 1% of single prem. $150 p.a. 0.25% p.a. of FUM
Note: FUM denotes funds under management.
solvency considerations, the nature of the liabilities and any promises made in the
policy documentation. Typically, however, risk-based insurance policies (including
Type 3 and 4 policies) will be backed by cash6 and (long-term) fixed interest secu-
rities7, while traditional savings-based insurance policies (Type 1 policies) will be
backed by a mixture of long-term growth assets and fixed interest securities (and
some cash, for liquidity purposes). For Type 2 policies, policyholders will generally
be given a choice of investment options at policy inception and the assets backing a
portfolio of Type 2 policies will reflect this choice.
For the purposes of this thesis, four model asset portfolios (which are subse-
quently referred to as Portfolios 1, 2, 3 and 4) were constructed based on the
“typical” investment fund mixes suggested in Choice (2007) and with reference to
the investment options offered by Australia’s five largest Life Insurers8 for their
investment-linked business (as stated on their respective internet sites). Portfolio 1
is an example of a very low risk, bond, portfolio; Portfolio 2 is an example of a low
risk, “capital stable”, portfolio; Portfolio 3 is an example of a medium risk, “bal-
anced”, portfolio; and Portfolio 4 is an example of a high risk, “growth”, portfolio.
Table 8.4 gives the percentage weightings for each of the four main asset classes (eq-
uities, property, fixed interest securities and cash) in each of these portfolios. In this
thesis, it is assumed that Type 3 and 4 policies are backed by a Portfolio 1 asset mix
and Type 1 policies are backed by a Portfolio 3 asset mix. Type 2 policyholders are
assumed to have been given a choice between the four different investment options
proposed in Table 8.4, and all Type 2 policy calculations were repeated four times,
once for each of these asset mixes.
Note that, for the purposes of this thesis, it is assumed that the value of assets
held in fixed interest securities increases at the long-term interest rate and the value
of assets held in cash increases at the short-term interest rate.
6In this thesis, cash refers to short-term (less than one year) fixed interest investments, such as
90 day Commonwealth Government bills.
7That is, bonds with an initial term to maturity of one year or more.
8According to APRA (2007), Australia’s five largest Life Insurers by statutory fund assets are:
AMP, National Australia Bank/MLC, ING/ANZ, Colonial/Commonwealth Bank of Australia, and
National Mutual/AXA.
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Table 8.4: Composition of each of the Model Asset Portfolios
Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Portfolio 3 Portfolio 4
Equity 0% 25% 55% 75%
Property 0% 5% 5% 5%
Fixed Interest 70% 45% 30% 15%
Cash 30% 25% 10% 5%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
8.5.5 Surrender Values
Surrender values are determined at the discretion of the insurer, subject to the min-
imum surrender amount prescribed in LPS4.02. Insurers typically consider factors
such as stability, consistency, solvency, equality between different cohorts of pol-
icyholders and ease of calculation in determining surrender values. However, for
simplicity, in this thesis all surrender values are assumed to equal the minimum
prescribed by LPS4.02, with the exception of those for Type 2 policies, where the
surrender value is taken to be the value of the units in the investment fund at the sur-
render date (this value is always greater than or equal to the value prescribed under
LPS4.02 and is equal to the surrender value under a “no exit fee” investment-linked
policy).
In the case of risk business9, there is no prescribed minimum surrender value.
Thus, for Type 3 and 4 policies (which are both examples of risk business), the
surrender value is assumed to equal 0 at all times.
For traditional, long-term risk products (Type 1 policies), the minimum surren-
der value is determined using the formula:
Factor × {([SI +B]× A)− (NP × a)} (8.31)
where the Factor is 90% for non-participating policies, SI denotes the policy sum
insured, and B denotes the bonus addition, which is 0 for non-participating policies.
A denotes “the present value, as at the attained age, of $1 of sum insured according
to the contingencies upon which it is payable”, a denotes “the present value, at the
attained age, of $1 p.a. of future net premiums according to the contingencies upon
which they are payable” and NP denotes the net premium calculated using a one
year Sprague adjustment10.
LPS4.02 does not specify the risk discount rate at which the minimum surren-
9Risk business is defined under LPS4.02 as being insurance business that “does not include a
significant investment component”.
10Under a one year Sprague adjustment, the premium is calculated at an age one year older than
the actual age of the policyholder at issue and for a term one year shorter than the actual term.
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der values for long-term risk products should be calculated. For the purposes of
comparison, it is undesirable to have surrender values which vary depending on the
economic model assumed. Consequently, all Type 1 policy surrender values used in
this thesis were calculated at a risk discount rate equal to 5.866%, the expected long-
term interest rate currently estimated under the Kemp model. The Kemp model
is used here, rather than any of the other, superior, asset models because it is the
simplest of the four economic models under consideration. Its mean economic vari-
able values do not vary over time and these values are not affected by the “starting
values” of the economic variables. Although it is likely that the investment earn-
ing rate on the assets backing a portfolio of Type 1 policies will be greater than
the long-term interest rate, the consequence of using a lower interest rate is higher
surrender values, which does not contravene LPS4.02.
8.5.6 Premiums
In Australia, there are no statutory requirements regarding the assumptions that
are used when calculating premiums and these assumptions often differ from the
best estimate assumptions used in policy valuation. For the purposes of this thesis,
a set of assumptions based on the (deterministic) best estimate assumptions have
been used to calculate premiums11, although some minor adjustments have been
made to ensure consistency between policies taken out at different points in time
and to remove the differences caused by the use of different economic models. These
assumptions are set out below:
• Mortality rates: based on Equations (4.12) and (8.11), we estimate qx,t from
the equation:
qx,t =
− ln (1− qsx,t) eη
1− 0.5 ln (1− qsx,t) eη ; (8.32)
where η is the linear predictor for the mortality model for the policy type
under consideration, and the qsx,t are as set out in IA95-97 (with ALT95-97
rates used for ages 0 to 14). Mortality improvement factors are ignored in the
premium setting process. This has the effect of adding an additional margin
for conservatism to the premiums. In evaluating the linear predictor for Type
1 Males (which includes the short-term interest rate at time t as a covariate),
it is assumed that the short-term interest rate equals 5.44% p.a. at all times.
This value is the expected short-term interest rate calculated using the current
values estimated under the Kemp model.
11Actual insurer premium scales were not available for the purposes of this thesis.
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where η is the linear predictor for the lapsation model for the policy under
consideration, σ2 is the variance of the Poisson parameter for the policy type
under consideration and wsx,t are as set out in Table A.4. When values of
the short-term interest rate and unemployment rate at time t are required in
calculating the linear predictor, it is assumed that the short-term interest rate
equals 5.44% p.a. and the unemployment rate equals 6.40% (the expected
values of these quantities, calculated using the Kemp model) at all times.
• Expenses : as set out in Table 8.3.
• Surrender values: as set out in Section 8.5.5.
• Expense inflation rate: 2.43% p.a. (the expected price inflation rate calculated
using the Kemp model).
• Risk discount rate: In keeping with the requirements of LPS1.04, for Type 1,
3 and 4 policies, the risk discount rate is set equal to 5.87% p.a., the expected
long-term interest rate, calculated using the Kemp model. For Type 2 policies,
the risk discount rate is set equal to the expected after-tax investment earnings
rate (calculated using the Kemp model) for the portfolio of assets backing the
liabilities. These rates are: 4.02% p.a. for Portfolio 1, 5.79% p.a. for Portfolio
2, 7.39% p.a. for Portfolio 3, and 8.45% p.a. for Portfolio 4.
• Profit margin: based on figures given in APRA (2008), over the seven year
period from 2001 to 2007, the average ratio of profits (net growth) to policy
payments for Australian Life Insurers was 25.20%. Consequently, for Type 1
and 3 policies, a profit margin of 25% of claim payments was assumed. Profit
margins for Type 2 and 4 policies are discussed below. Note that profits are
allowed for in premium calculations, even though they are not allowed for in
the policy liability calculations, since the premiums actually charged by an
insurer always include a profit loading.
For all product types, regular premiums are assumed to be level (or constant), with
the exception of those for Type 4 policies, which are assumed to be stepped (that
is, increasing with age).
For Type 1 and 3 policies, the premiums used as calculation inputs were deter-
mined for each age/sex/sum insured/policy type combination using the equation of
value (Equation (8.16)). Table 8.5 gives the regular annual premiums under each of
the Type 1 and 3 policies, calculated using this method.
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Table 8.5: Regular Annual Premiums Assumed for Type 1 and 3 Policies by Age
Band
Type 1 M Type 1 F Type 3 M Type 3 F
15–24 $246.07 $207.92 $160.28 $139.59
25–34 $281.95 $231.92 $174.87 $142.56
35–44 $404.04 $340.30 $252.05 $169.57
45–54 $489.65 $465.99 $257.78 $202.68
55–64 $613.27 $652.48 $273.01 $267.55
65–74 $735.38 $897.84 - -
75+ $855.34 $1190.07 - -
In the case of investment-linked (Type 2) policies, the amount of premiums
paid is determined by the policyholder, not the insurer. This premium amount is
invested by the insurer and is returned to the policyholder, with interest, on death
or surrender. The insurer covers its expenses by deducting fees from the funds
invested over the life of the policy. Based on the policy documentation produced by
Australian Life Insurers and Choice (2007), a typical fee structure for an investment-
linked policy is an up-front entry fee of 0–5% of any policyholder contributions, plus
an annual management fee of approximately 1.8% of funds under management. In
this thesis, a 2.5% entry fee and management fees of 1.8% p.a. are assumed. The
amount invested by the policyholder at policy inception is taken to be:
Premium =
$120, 000
0.975× (1 + i− 0.018)n (8.34)
where i is the after-tax investment earnings rate for the asset mix backing the
portfolio and n is the number of years from policy inception to age 65. That is, the
premium is the present value at inception of the desired final sum insured, allowing
for policy fees. Table 8.6 presents the single premiums under each of the Type 2
policies, for each investment option (both males and females are assumed to pay the
same premium). All premiums are rounded to the nearest dollar.
The profit margin incorporated into the policy fees stated above will vary de-
pending on the sex of the policyholder, the age of the policyholder at entry and the
composition of the asset portfolio backing the liabilities. The implicit profit mar-
gins for each portfolio/age band combination (expressed as a percentage of after-tax
investment earnings) are given in Table 8.7. Note that, in this table, the profit
margins for 15–24 year olds holding Type 2 policies under the Portfolio 4 invest-
ment option are negative, which implies that this business is expected to generate
a loss for the insurer. In practice, an insurer may be prepared to take a loss on one
segment of a portfolio of business, if it believes that it can more than offset that
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Table 8.6: Single Premiums Assumed for the Type 2 (M and F) Policies Under Each
Investment Option by Age Band
Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Portfolio 3 Portfolio 4
15–24 $42,021 $18,139 $8,560 $5,257
25–34 $53,486 $27,879 $15,572 $10,670
35–44 $63,743 $38,111 $24,064 $17,854
45–54 $75,968 $52,098 $37,186 $29,876
55–64 $92,546 $74,055 $60,677 $53,315
loss with profits earned on other segments of the portfolio. In this case, lives aged
15–24 only comprise a small proportion (4.32%) of this portfolio of business, so this
loss would likely be offset by the profits earned on Type 2, Portfolio 4 policies held
by lives aged 25 or above.
Table 8.7: Implicit Profit Margins (% of After-Tax Investment Earnings) for Type
2 Policies Under Each Investment Option
Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Portfolio 3 Portfolio 4
M F M F M F M F
15–24 34% 34% 16% 16% 1% 1% -10% -10%
25–34 36% 36% 21% 21% 11% 11% 6% 6%
35–44 38% 37% 24% 24% 16% 16% 12% 12%
45–54 39% 39% 26% 25% 19% 19% 16% 15%
55–64 41% 40% 28% 27% 21% 21% 18% 18%
For Type 4 policies, the premium charged to a life aged x is determined as the
net premium12 for a 1 year term insurance taken out by that life, plus a loading for





qx + Expense Loading
)
(1 + pi) ; (8.35)
where i is the investment earnings rate and pi is the profit loading factor. The
expense loading is a level amount, calculated at policy inception, such that:
EPV (Expense Loading) = EPV (Expenses) (8.36)
over the entire life of the policy, while the profit loading factor is determined at the
discretion of the insurer.
12A net premium is a premium calculated with no allowance for expenses or profits.
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Clearly, the expense loading will vary, depending on the age at which the policy
is taken out. However, there is very little variation in these loadings for the policies
under consideration in this thesis. For males, the total EPV of the expense loadings
ranges from $110.34 to $110.60, while for females, the total EPV of the expense
loadings ranges from $108.72 to $110.32. It is common for Life Insurers to publish
a single set of stepped premium rates, which depend only on age (and sex and sum
insured) and not on policy duration, and this approach is taken in this thesis. Thus,
for the premiums calculated in this section, it is assumed that the expense loadings
do not depend on the age of policy entry and an expense loading of $110 is assumed
for both males and females.
Similarly, the profit loading factor will vary depending on the profit margin
required by the insurer, the policyholder sex and the policyholder age at entry. If
a profit margin of 25% of claims is assumed (as was assumed for Type 1 and 3
policies), then the required profit loading factor (as determined using Excel’s Goal
Seek function) varies from 17.05% to 37.27% for males and 8.26% to 33.70% for
females. For the 35-44 years age band (that is, the age band which comprises the
highest proportion of the Type 4 policy portfolio), the implied profit loading factors
are 23.11% for males and 20.03% for females. As we wish to construct a single set
of premiums for all Type 4 policies, a single profit loading factor is required for each
sex. The profit loading factors chosen were 23% for males and 20% for females.
Table 8.8 gives the calculated premium scale for Type 4 policies. The profit
margins (expressed as a percentage of claims) implied by this premium scale for
each age band/sex combination are given in Table 8.9.
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Table 8.8: Premium Rate Scale for Type 4 Policies ($)
Age Males Females Age Males Females
15 178.60 151.11 40 225.00 200.40
16 189.94 153.12 41 230.16 206.44
17 200.26 155.13 42 236.35 214.49
18 208.50 158.15 43 243.56 221.53
19 214.69 161.17 44 251.81 229.58
20 219.85 161.17 45 262.13 238.63
21 221.91 159.16 46 273.47 247.69
22 222.94 158.15 47 285.85 257.75
23 222.94 157.15 48 301.32 267.81
24 221.91 156.14 49 319.88 278.88
25 219.85 156.14 50 340.51 289.94
26 216.75 157.15 51 364.24 302.02
27 214.69 158.15 52 391.06 315.10
28 212.63 159.16 53 422.01 330.19
29 209.54 161.17 54 457.09 348.31
30 208.50 162.18 55 495.27 369.44
31 206.44 164.19 56 537.58 394.61
32 206.44 166.20 57 586.08 423.79
33 205.41 168.21 58 639.76 457.01
34 206.44 171.23 59 701.70 495.27
35 207.47 175.25 60 775.01 538.56
36 209.54 179.28 61 858.66 586.89
37 212.63 183.30 62 954.73 641.28
38 215.72 188.33 63 1065.29 701.71
39 219.85 194.37 64 1190.35 767.19
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8.5.7 Starting Values
To implement the Wilkie, CAS/SOA and modified CAS/SOA economic sub-models,
it is necessary to have values of the economic variables at the solvency testing date
(that is, at time t = 0), and often earlier, as inputs into these models. As the quarter
ending 31st March, 2007, was the most recent quarter for which data was available
for all of the economic variables under consideration (at the time of model fitting),
it is assumed that all solvency tests are performed at 31st March, 2007. The values
of the economic variables for the five quarters prior to this date are reproduced in
Table 8.10.
Table 8.10: Economic Variable Starting Values
Quarter Ending
Variable
Mar ’07 Dec ’06 Sep ’06 Jul ’06 Mar ’06
Q (t) 155.6 155.5 155.7 154.3 151.9
P (t) 5995.0 5669.9 5154.1 5073.9 5129.7
Y (t) 0.0371 0.0379 0.0388 0.0371 0.0367
C (t) 0.0583 0.0571 0.0567 0.0573 0.0535
B (t) 0.0641 0.0635 0.0615 0.0584 0.0562
Z (t) 962.2 938.9 894.4 865.6 823.2
Z∗ (t) 138.9 139.9 123.9 113.6 99.2
U (t) 0.0451 0.0456 0.0468 0.0486 0.0503
For the stochastic mortality models, it is assumed that in the year following the
solvency test date, the qsx,t values are the mortality rates given in IA95-97 (denoted




x,0 × (RFx)t, where RFx is the 25 year reduction
factor for a life aged x given in ALT95-97.
8.6 Solvency and Capital Adequacy Assumptions
8.6.1 Introduction
As a basis for comparison, it is necessary to calculate the deterministic solvency
and capital adequacy requirements for each of the model liability portfolios. This is
done using the methodologies set out in LPS2.04 and LPS3.04, and summarised in
Appendix B. To implement these methodologies, it is necessary to make a number
of assumptions, which are discussed in this section.
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8.6.2 Solvency Assumptions
As is stated in LPS2.04, “the solvency requirement broadly comprises the following
components:
• the solvency liability;
• the other liabilities;
• the expense reserve;
• the inadmissible assets reserve; and
• the resilience reserve.”
For the purposes of this thesis, all assets are assumed to be admissible13, and as
has been previously stated, other liabilities are assumed to be zero, so the other
liabilities and inadmissible assets reserve components of the solvency requirement
are equal to zero, and it is only necessary to calculate the solvency liability, the
expense reserve and the resilience reserve.
The solvency liability is calculated using the LPS1.04 best estimate liability cal-
culation methodology (outlined in Section 8.4) but using the prescribed solvency
assumptions. These assumptions are, for the most part, the same as the best es-
timate assumptions. However, mortality rates are assumed to be those set out in
IA95-97 (with no allowance for mortality improvements); withdrawal rates are as-
sumed to be 125% of the best estimate rates; maintenance and investment expenses
are assumed to be 102.5% of the best estimate assumptions; and a 0.25% risk margin
is added to the solvency liability for investment-linked (Type 2) policies.
The LPS2.04 expense reserve is calculated as:
(1− tax rate)× Fixed Acquisition Expenses. (8.37)
This amount may be reduced if the insurer holds additional management capital14.
The amount of this reduction is referred to as “offset statutory capital”. In this
thesis, however, offset statutory capital is assumed to be zero. Fixed acquisition
13Inadmissible assets, as defined under LPS2.04, include items such as assets used for the conduct
of business; holdings in associated and subsidiary financial services entities; and non-realisable
intangible assets. Any assets that are not deemed to be inadmissible, are, therefore, admissible
assets.
14Management Capital, as defined in APRA’s Management Capital Standard, LPS6.03, is “cap-
ital (held) outside the statutory funds of the company in relation to the risks associated with
business activities undertaken outside the statutory funds but within the legal entity”. That is,
capital that does not specifically back the insurance business of the insurer.
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expenses are “determined as the total acquisition expenses for the statutory fund15
for the 12 months prior to the valuation date less the variable expenses included in
that amount”, where variable expenses are items such as commission, advertising
costs and direct marketing expenses. Thus, to estimate the expense reserve, it is
necessary to estimate the number of new policies issued in the year prior to the
valuation date and the proportion of the total acquisition expenses for each policy
that are fixed in nature.
The most recent AMP and National Australia Bank (NAB) Annual Reports
(2006 and 2007 respectively) give the total Life Insurance policy acquisition ex-
penses, divided into commission and other expenses. Assuming that the only vari-
able expense for each company is commission, then 63.84% of AMP’s acquisition
expenses in 2006 were “fixed” (60.18% in 2005), while 35.68% of NAB’s 2006 acqui-
sition expenses were “fixed” (and 36.53% of the 2007 expenses). Taking the average
of the 2006 amounts for the two companies gives 49.76%. Based on this, it is as-
sumed that, for a “typical” Australian Life Insurer, 50% of all acquisition expenses
are fixed.
Tables 8.1 and 8.2 give the proportion of policies assumed to be within each age
band, for each of the model portfolios, and the assumed average duration for each
age band/sex/policy type combination. However, no assumptions have been made,
as yet, as to the number of new (duration 0) policies within each age band/sex/policy
type combination. Using the Single Insurer Mortality Data (as this was used to set
the average duration assumptions), the proportion of new policies within each age
band/sex/policy type combination was calculated, and these values were used as
the assumed proportion of new policies for each of these combinations (once again,
the same assumptions are made for Type 1 and 3 policies, and for Type 2 and 4
policies). These assumed proportions are given in Table 8.11. The premiums for a
new Type 1, 2 or 3 policy taken out by a life at the mid-point age of each of the age
bands, calculated using the assumptions made in Section 8.5.6, are given in Tables
8.12 and 8.13 (premiums for Type 4 policies are as given in Table 8.8).
Based on these assumptions and those previously made, the expense reserve per
policy for each of the model portfolios can then be calculated as:∑
∀i
nipi (1− 0.3) (0.5) (e$ + e%Pi) ; (8.38)
15Under the Life Insurance Act 1995, a statutory fund is defined as “a fund that is established
in the records of a life company and relates solely to the Life Insurance business of the company or
a particular part of that business. . . A life company must at all times have at least one statutory
fund in respect of its Life Insurance business but may have more statutory funds if it chooses to do
so”. However, it is required that an insurer maintain a separate statutory fund exclusively for its
investment-linked business, and another separate statutory fund exclusively for any life insurance
business carried outside Australia (if either of these is applicable).
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Table 8.11: Proportion of New Policies in Each Age Band by Policy Type and Sex
Type 1 & 3 M Type 1 & 3 F Type 2 & 4 M Type 2 & 4 F
15–24 0.05% 0.04% 30.45% 31.05%
25–34 0.02% 0.03% 23.49% 22.48%
35–44 0.02% 0.02% 12.49% 11.59%
45–54 0.01% 0.02% 8.37% 7.53%
55–64 0.01% 0.04% 6.01% 5.93%
65–74 0.01% 0.02% - -
75+ 0.00% 0.00% - -
Table 8.12: Regular Annual Premiums Assumed for New Type 1 and 3 Policies
Type 1 M Type 1 F Type 3 M Type 3 F
15–24 $431.03 $340.30 $256.40 $169.57
25–34 $613.27 $510.49 $273.01 $217.31
35–44 $1005.78 $850.14 $398.40 $338.76
45–54 $1869.97 $1510.38 $753.67 $563.07
55–64 $3976.72 $2964.16 $1426.08 $945.27
65–74 $9794.10 $6392.56 - -
Table 8.13: Single Premiums Assumed for New Type 2 (M and F) Policies Under
Each Investment Option
Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Portfolio 3 Portfolio 4
15–24 $45,874 $21,207 $10,641 $6,800
25–34 $57,123 $31,347 $18,333 $12,942
35–44 $71,131 $46,335 $31,587 $24,631
45–54 $88,574 $68,488 $54,422 $46,877
55–64 $110,294 $101,233 $93,765 $89,215
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where i is a dummy variable for the age band/sex combination, ni denotes the
proportion of the total policies in age band/sex combination i (as set out in Table
8.1), and pi is the proportion of new policies in age band/sex combination i (given
in Table 8.11). e$ denotes the dollar acquisition expenses for the policy type under
consideration and e% denotes the percentage of premium acquisition expenses for
the policy type under consideration (given in Table 8.3); and Pi is the new-policy
premium for age band/sex combination i (given in Tables 8.12, 8.13 and 8.8).
“The resilience reserve is determined as the additional amount that needs to be
held before the happening of a prescribed set of changes in the economic environ-
ment, such that after the changes the admissible assets of the company are able
to meet the policy owner and other liabilities of the statutory fund” (LPS2.04 pp.
32-33). The resilience reserve (RR), is calculated using the formula:
RR = L′ × A/A′ − L; (8.39)
where L is the solvency liability prior to the prescribed change, L′ is the solvency
liability after the prescribed change, A is the value of (admissible) assets backing
the liabilities prior to the prescribed change, and A′ is the value of these assets after
the prescribed change. The “prescribed change” takes the form of changes to the
equity dividend yield, property rental yield and redemption yields of interest bearing
securities (including cash). Exact details of these prescribed yield changes are given
in Section 11 of LPS2.04. For investment-linked, Type 2, policies, the resilience
reserve is 0.
Property rental yields have not been considered so far in this thesis, because
commercial property rental yield time series data was not available. However, to
calculate the resilience reserve, it is necessary to have an estimate of this. There are
three main classes of commercial property: industrial, retail and office. According
to Braddick et al. (2007), over the 21 year period from 1985 to 2006, the property
risk premium16 averaged approximately 3% for office property, 4% for retail property
and 5% for industrial property. Based on this, it is assumed that at any particular
point in time, the property rental yield equals the long-term interest rate minus the
price inflation rate plus 4%.
To calculate the change in the value of fixed interest securities and cash, it
is necessary to know the coupon rate and the remaining term to maturity of the
securities. So far we have used the 10 year Commonwealth Government bond rate
as the long-term interest rate and the 90 day Government bill rate as the short-term
interest rate. Assuming that the fixed interest securities asset class comprises bonds
16The property risk premium is defined as the property rental yield minus the real ten year
Commonwealth bond rate, and the real ten year Commonwealth bond rate is defined as the nominal
ten year Commonwealth bond rate minus the price inflation rate.
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with term to maturity uniformly distributed over the range from 0 to 10 years, and
that the cash asset class comprises bills with terms to maturity uniformly distributed
over the range from 0 to 90 days, on average fixed interest securities have remaining
terms to maturity of 5 years and cash assets have a remaining term to maturity of
45 days. For calculation purposes, it is assumed that all assets in these classes have
a remaining term to maturity equal to the average term for the respective classes.
Commonwealth Government bills do not pay coupons, so it is not necessary to
make an assumption regarding the coupon rate for these securities. Government
bonds, however, do pay coupons, with the coupon rate varying between tenders.
Based on data obtained from the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) website17, the
average coupon rate for bonds issued by the RBA in the 10 year period from July
1997 to June 2007 is 6.38% p.a. This coupon rate is assumed for all long-term fixed
interest securities.
It is also assumed, when calculating the resilience reserve, that all fixed interest
securities are of counterparty grade 1 (OECD government) and that all assets are
denominated in Australian dollars. Thus, it is not necessary to make any allowance
in the reserve for default risk or adverse exchange movements.
8.6.3 Capital Adequacy Assumptions
As is stated in LPS3.04, “the capital adequacy requirement broadly comprises the
following components:
• the capital adequacy liability;
• the other liabilities;
• the inadmissible assets reserve;
• the resilience reserve; and
• the new business reserve.”
As was the case for the solvency requirement, for the purposes of this thesis, both
the other liabilities and the inadmissible assets reserve are assumed to be zero, so
it is only necessary to calculate the capital adequacy liability, the resilience reserve
and the new business reserve.
The capital adequacy liability is calculated using the LPS1.04 best estimate lia-
bility calculation methodology, but using the prescribed capital adequacy assump-
tions. These prescribed assumptions require that risk margins be added to the best
17Downloaded on 25th April, 2008.
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estimate mortality and withdrawal rate assumptions and the maintenance and in-
vestment expense (collectively referred to as servicing expenses) assumptions. It
is also required that an additional risk margin be added to the capital adequacy
liability in the case of investment-linked policies. LPS3.04 prescribes quantitative
ranges for each of these margins, from which the actuary performing the capital
adequacy calculations must select appropriate values at his or her discretion. The
margins adopted by a particular insurer, within the prescribed ranges, must reflect
the circumstances of the insurer and the level of risk associated with the policy
group under consideration.
For the purposes of this thesis, the mid-point of each capital adequacy margin
range was selected. This set of risk margins is intended to reflect an insurer with a
moderate risk exposure and is presented in Table 8.14.






The LPS3.04 resilience reserve is calculated using a methodology almost identi-
cal to that used in calculating the LPS2.04 resilience reserve, except that different
yield changes are prescribed under each standard. Consequently, the same set of
assumptions used in calculating the LPS2.04 resilience reserve (discussed in Section
8.6.2) are used in calculating the LPS3.04 equivalent.
“A new business reserve is required where a projection with provision for planned
new business shows that profits generated in the (statutory) fund (for all business,
both existing and new) will be insufficient to secure solvency over the next three
years” (Carr (2004, Chapter 27, p.10)). It is determined as:
• “the additional amount required to ensure that the solvency requirement of
the statutory fund will continue to be met over the next three years, allowing
for capital and profits emerging over that period from the existing business of
the fund;
• less new business capital18;
18New business capital is defined in LPS3.04 as “the aggregate of existing, binding arrangements
for the external raising of capital specific to the financing of new business within the statutory
fund; and capital in any other statutory fund, to the extent it is available to be transferred to the
shareholders’ fund at that time.”
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• less offset statutory capital;
subject to a minimum of zero. In this thesis, for all policy types, the additional
amount required to ensure that the solvency requirement is met into the future is
assumed to be exactly offset by new business capital, and the new business reserves
are thus assumed to be zero. This approach is justified because Type 2 and 4
policies are not capital intensive classes of business and there is negligible growth
among the Type 1 and 3 policy types (as was illustrated by Table 8.11, which showed
trivially small proportions of new policies in the Type 1 and 3 policy portfolios),
thus requiring very little capital to back them.
8.7 Cost of Capital Risk Margin Calculations
The methodology for determining Cost of Capital risk margins is discussed in CEA
(2006) and FOPI (2006) and was briefly discussed, previously, in Section 2.6. In





k=1 (1 + rk)
, (8.40)
where SCR (t) is the solvency capital requirement at time t (for example, the 99.5%
VaR capital requirement), rk is the discrete per period risk discount rate for the
period from time k− 1 to time k, and CoCt is the cost of capital factor for period t.
CEA (2006) and FOPI (2006) both list two possible ways of determining SCR (t)
at each point in time:
• Calculate the solvency capital requirement (SCR) in each future year using
simulation methods, such as those described in Section 8.2; or
• Calculate the best estimate liability at the end of each future year, then make
the assumption that the risks allowed for by the SCR are proportional to
the best estimate liabilities and project the SCR for each future year given
SCR (0) and the best estimate liability at t = 0.
The first approach is considerably more computationally intensive than the second,
and in some cases would involve repeating the simulation process described in Section
8.2 more than 80 times. For the simplified example used in this thesis, it is estimated
that such computations would take 1 to 10 days to complete, while for an insurer
with a more diverse portfolio than that assumed here, this calculation time would
increase. For this reason, it is believed that, for practical purposes, most insurers
would favour the second approach over the first, and so the second approach is
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adopted in this thesis. Thus,
SCR (t) = BEL (t)× SCR (0)
BEL (0)
. (8.41)
The cost of capital (CoC) factor is the margin over the “risk free” interest rate
that is meant to reflect the cost of future capital, to an unknown insurer, of taking
over the policy liability portfolio under consideration, in the event that the insurer
calculating the risk margin becomes insolvent. In this thesis, the CoC factor is
set equal to a constant for all periods under consideration (as was done in CEA
(2006) and FOPI (2006)) and is determined using the Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM):
CoC = β (E (Rm)− Rf ) ; (8.42)
where β is the equity beta coefficient of an average Australian Life Insurer19, E (Rm)
is the expected rate of return on the equity market; and Rf is the “risk free” interest
rate. Setting β equal to 1.1743, determined by taking the average of the equity β’s
for the five largest Australian Life Insurers20, with weights set equal to the relative
proportion of the statutory fund assets of all Australian Life Insurers held by each of
these insurers21; E (Rm) equal to 9.636% (the expected rate of growth of the share
price index under the Kemp asset model) and Rf equal to 5.866% (the expected
long-term interest rate under the Kemp model), we obtain CoC = 4.427%. This
value lies between the cost of capital factor used in CEA (2006) (4%) and the cost
of capital factor used in FOPI (2006) (6%).
For consistency, the discount rate used in calculating the CoC risk margin is the
same as that used in determining the best estimate liabilities, that is, the long-term
interest rate for Type 1, 3 and 4 policies, and the after-tax investment earnings rate
for Type 2 policies.
8.8 Sensitivity Analysis
Throughout this thesis, every effort has been made to use the most realistic sub-
models and assumptions possible. However, determining these is a time consuming
process, and in practice, an insurer might not have the time or expertise necessary
to make such decisions. Sensitivity testing is, therefore, conducted to investigate
the impact on the overall results of using different stochastic sub-models, being
simplified versions of those previously described. Thus, in addition to comparing
19The beta coefficient of an asset, i, is the relative volatility of that asset, compared to the
market, calculated as β = Cov (Ri, Rm) /V ar (Rm), where Ri is the return on asset i and Rm is
the return on the equity market.
20Obtained from www.comsec.com.au on 10th May, 2008.
21Obtained from APRA (2007).
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the impact of using different economic sub-models, the impact on the results of each
of the following model variants is also investigated:
1. Assume that deaths follow a Poisson distribution, instead of a negative bino-
mial distribution, for Type 1 policies, with the mean of the Poisson distribution
set equal to the mean of the negative binomial distribution in each case.
2. Assume that lapses follow a Poisson distribution, instead of modelling them
using the normal-Poisson model, with the mean of the Poisson distribution set
equal to the mean under the normal-Poisson model.
3. Assume both Variants 1 and 2 at the same time, in the case of Type 1 policies.
4. Assume that deaths and lapses are both Poisson distributed and that the
means of these distributions do not vary with fluctuations in the economic
variables. In this case, the latter is achieved by calculating those means from
the formulae used to calculate them under the best-fitting model scenarios, but
replacing the values of the economic variables at time t with the averages of
the forecast values of those quantities for the first 10 years after the solvency
testing date, forecast using the economic sub-model under consideration in
each case. This is done to keep the functional relationships used to relate the
means of the mortality rates and lapsation rates with the economic variables
similar to those used in Variants 1 to 3.
5. Assume that, for each policy type/sex combination, deaths and lapses can be
modelled, respectively, as:
Dx,t ∼ Pois









where αd and αw are constants that vary only by policy type and sex, but not
by age, duration or with fluctuations in the economy.
All five of these variants are considered in order to investigate the impact on the
results of ignoring the existence of over-dispersion in the mortality and/or lapsation
sub-models, and Variants 4 and 5 are considered in order to investigate the impact
of ignoring dependencies between the three stochastic sub-models. Variant 5 is con-
sidered because many insurers simply assume that the mean mortality rates used
in insurance calculations are a constant multiple of the rates given in a standard
mortality table (such as IA95-97 M and F), where the constant varies only by policy
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type and sex, and that lapsation rates vary only by policy type and duration (lap-
sation rates are, here, also allowed to vary by sex for consistency with the mortality
model). Variant 5 allows the impact of making such simple mean assumptions to
be investigated. Note that, because αd and αw do not depend on any of the eco-
nomic variables, no allowance is made for the previously observed (and allowed for)
dependencies between the mortality rates and economic variables, and between the
lapse rates and economic variables.
Suitable values of αd and αw were estimated by fitting Poisson GLMs of the
forms given in Equations (6.17) and (6.24) to the IAAust Mortality Data (for αd)
and the Single Insurer Mortality Data (for αw) respectively, in each case with a
linear predictor of the form:
η = β0 + β1Type+ β2Sex+ β3Type× Sex; (8.45)
where (policy) type and sex are treated as categorical covariates and the β’s are
model parameters to be estimated. The values of αd and αw are then set equal to e
ηˆ,
where ηˆ is the fitted value of the linear predictor for the model under consideration.
As usual, in fitting the above-described GLMs, any covariates that were found
to be insignificant in the model were removed from it (one at a time) and the model
refitted without them. The final fitted values of αd and αw are given in Table 8.15.
Table 8.15: Fitted Values of αd and αw by Policy Type and Sex
Policy Type Sex αˆd αˆw
1 M 1.0000 1.3080
1 F 1.0234 1.2648
2 M 0.9327 -
2 F 0.9545 -
3 M 1.2815 -
3 F 1.3115 -
4 M 0.8664 1.0861
4 F 0.8866 1.0044
No values are given for αˆw for Type 2 and 3 policies, because the Single Insurer
Mortality Data Set does not contain information about these policy types. Instead,
in this thesis, the Type 1 policy αˆw values are used as proxies for the Type 3 values
and the Type 4 policy αˆw values are used as proxies for the Type 2 values.
In addition to comparing the VaRs and TVaRs determined under the sensitivity
scenarios with those determined under the base scenarios (for the same portfolio),
a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is conducted in each case to test the null
hypothesis that the sensitivity scenario outputs and the base case outputs are drawn
from the same distribution. Thus, we test whether the situations studied in the sen-
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sitivity scenarios alter the distributions of −∆C (1) and −∆Cmin (0, 3) significantly,
from the base case set-up. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic for comparing two




∣∣∣F̂1 (x)− F̂2 (x)∣∣∣ ; (8.46)
where F̂1 (.) and F̂2 (.) are the empirical cdfs of the two samples. The null hypothesis




D is greater than the 5% quantile of




The purpose of this thesis is to provide answers to the research questions posed in
Chapter 3. In Chapter 8, we described a simulation-based solvency testing method-
ology. This methodology was implemented using the assumptions specified in Chap-
ter 8 and using the modified CAS/SOA economic sub-model (which was found in
Chapter 7 to provide the best fit to the economic data). This process was then
repeated, assuming each of the other economic sub-models previously considered
and using different mortality and lapsation sub-models, as outlined in Section 8.8,
in order to perform sensitivity analyses of the results. The results of these analyses
are presented and discussed in this chapter.
9.2 Base Case Simulation Results
9.2.1 Capital Adequacy
The variables we focus on are the change in capital over a one year time hori-
zon, ∆C (1), and ∆Cmin (0, 3) = min (∆C (1) ,∆C (0, 2) ,∆C (0, 3)), the smallest
increase in capital over a three year time horizon. See Appendix C for their detailed
definitions, the underlying assumptions and some properties of these variables. In
particular, it is shown in Section C.2 that, if an insurer holds capital at time 0,
C (0), equal to the 99.5% VaR of the distribution of −∆C (1), then there is a 99.5%
probability that the insurer’s assets will exceed its liabilities at time 1, and in Sec-
tion C.4, it is similarly shown that if an insurer holds capital at time 0 equal to the
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95% VaR of the distribution of −∆Cmin (0, 3), then there is a 95% probability that
the insurer’s assets will exceed its liabilities at times 1, 2 and 3. In the stochastic
solvency model, these variables are assumed random with the distributions and pa-
rameters found for the stochastic sub-models that were, in Chapter 7, shown to best
describe the mortality, lapsation and economic data (that is, the NB1 or Poisson
mortality models for mortality, the normal-Poisson lapsation model for lapsation
and the modified CAS/SOA economic model for economic variables such as interest
rates, inflation, etc). Values of ∆C (1) and ∆Cmin (0, 3) were simulated for each lia-
bility portfolio/asset portfolio combination as described in Chapter 8. This scenario
is subsequently referred to as the “Base Case”.
Based on the simulation outputs, the 99.5% VaR and TVaR per policy of−∆C (1),
and the 95% VaR and TVaR per policy of −∆Cmin (0, 3) were calculated empiri-
cally for each of the portfolios under consideration. The calculated values are given
in Table 9.1. As was described in Section 8.3.2, for each portfolio, the number of
simulation iterations performed was set sufficiently high to ensure that the mean,
standard deviation and percentile values (5% to 95%, inclusive, in 5% increments) of
the outputs had converged; that is, additional iterations did not cause any of these
statistics to change by more than ±1%, and the sample 99.5% quantile of the distri-
bution of −∆C (1) and the sample 95% quantile of the distribution of −∆Cmin (0, 3)
were both within ±5% of their respective “true” values with confidence of at least
95%. Thus, the VaR estimates given in this Table 9.1 are within ±5% of their “true”
values with a confidence level greater than or equal to 95%1.
As a basis for comparison, the best estimate liability per policy, LPS2.04 solvency
capital requirement per policy and LPS3.04 capital adequacy capital requirement per
policy2, for each portfolio, are given in Table 9.2. Note that, in all but one case, there
is no difference between the LPS2.04 solvency capital requirement and the LPS3.04
capital adequacy capital requirement. This is because the LPS3.04 capital adequacy
requirement is equal to the maximum of the LPS2.04 solvency requirement and the
1An exception to the accuracy criteria was made here, and throughout this chapter, in the
case of portfolios where either the theoretical 99.5% quantile of the distribution of −∆C (1) or the
theoretical 95% quantile of the distribution of −∆Cmin (0, 3), that is x0.995 and y0.95, respectively,
in Equations (8.7) and (8.7), was very low (less than $200). In such cases the number of iterations
required to ensure the desired level of accuracy was found to be impractically high (for example,
over 21 billion iterations, in the case of the Type 2 liability portfolio backed by a Type 1 asset
portfolio, which would take over a month to complete), and only the convergence criterion was
applied. The portfolios for which this is the case, however, are considered to be “low risk”, and in
these cases accuracy is not as important as in the case of a more risky portfolio.
2Recall that the best estimate liability was defined in Equation (2.11) as the expected present
value (EPV) of future benefit payments plus the EPV of future expenses minus the EPV of future
premiums; the solvency capital requirement was defined in Equation (2.12) as the difference between
the LPS2.04 solvency requirement and the best estimate liability; and the capital adequacy capital
requirement was defined in Equation (2.13) as the difference between the LPS3.04 capital adequacy
requirement and the best estimate liability.
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amount calculated in Item 6 of the LPS3.04 methodology (given in Appendix B),
plus the new business reserve. Under the assumptions made in Chapter 8, in all cases
the new business reserve in zero, and in most cases the LPS2.04 solvency requirement
is greater than the amount calculated in Item 6 of the LPS3.04 methodology. Thus,
in each of these cases, the LPS3.04 capital adequacy requirement is equal to the
LPS2.04 solvency requirement and the capital adequacy capital requirement is equal
to the solvency capital requirement.
Table 9.1: VaR and TVaR Per Policy for the Base Case Scenarios ($)
Liability Asset −∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
Portfolio Portfolio 99.5% VaR 99.5% TVaR 95% VaR 95% TVaR
1 3 1796.38 2138.75 1237.21 1778.12
2 1 -38.57 52.43 -389.53 -234.55
2 2 46.26 65.50 -385.43 -192.53
2 3 597.65 823.10 -18.73 258.36
2 4 878.60 1125.30 176.51 499.37
3 1 295.73 327.62 646.69 691.92
4 1 75.57 84.95 792.56 802.41
This table gives the 99.5% or 95% VaR and TVaR of the empirical distributions of
−∆C (1) and −∆Cmin (0, 3). The 99.5% VaR of the distribution of −∆C (1) is the
amount of capital an insurer must hold at time 0, to ensure with 99.5% probability
that its assets will exceed its liabilities at time 1, while the 99.5% TVaR of the
distribution of −∆C (1) is the amount of capital that an insurer must hold at time
0 so that if even one of the worst 99.5% of possible scenarios occurs, then there is a
99.5% chance that the insurer’s assets will exceed its liabilities at time 1. Similarly,
for the 95% VaR and the 95% TVaR of the distribution of −∆Cmin (0, 3).
From Table 9.1, it can be seen that, in all cases, as expected, the 100 (1− α)%
TVaR is greater than the corresponding 100 (1− α)% VaR. However, for all port-
folios containing Type 1 or Type 2 policies, the 99.5% VaR of the distribution of
−∆C (1) is greater than the 95% VaR of the distribution of −∆Cmin (0, 3), and the
the 99.5% TVaR of the distribution of −∆C (1) is greater than the 95% TVaR
of the distribution of −∆Cmin (0, 3), which is a more surprising result. In the
Type 2 policy cases, this arises from the fact that, for each asset portfolio scenario,
∆C (1) = ∆Cmin (0, 3) at every iteration, resulting in the empirical distributions of
−∆C (1) and −∆Cmin (0, 3) being identical. For any given probability distribution,
the 95th percentile will always be less than the 99.5th percentile. For the Type 3
and 4 policy portfolios, however, the 99.5% VaR of the distribution of −∆C (1) is
much less than the 95% VaR of the distribution of −∆Cmin (0, 3) and similarly for
the TVaRs.
For several of the Type 2 policy cases, the VaR and/or the TVaR capital amounts
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Table 9.2: Best Estimate Liabilities, and Solvency and Capital Adequacy Capital
Requirements Per Policy for the Base Case Scenarios ($)
Liability Asset Best Est. Solvency Cap. Ad.
Portfolio Portfolio Liability Capital Req. Capital Req.
1 3 15,478.73 6935.23 6935.23
2 1 62,992.44 7584.02 7584.02
2 2 43,909.86 9139.01 9139.01
2 3 32,534.05 9618.99 9618.99
2 4 27,080.55 9645.32 9645.32
3 1 1084.66 -291.05 67.91
4 1 -505.85 540.01 540.01
This table gives the best estimate liabilities, solvency and capital adequacy capital
requirements per policy for the base case scenarios. The best estimate liability, as
defined in LPS1.04 and restated in Equation (2.11), is calculated as the expected
present value (EPV) of future benefit payments plus the EPV of future expenses
minus the EPV of future premiums. The solvency capital requirement (defined in
Equation (2.12)) is equal to the LPS2.04 solvency requirement minus the best es-
timate liability, and similarly, the capital adequacy capital requirement (defined in
Equation (2.13)) is equal to the LPS3.04 capital adequacy requirement minus the
best estimate liability.
in Table 9.2 are negative, particularly when a more conservative asset allocation is
employed. This implies that, even if an insurer held no capital at time 0, it is
almost certain that the insurer will remain solvent into the future, in these cases.
This reflects the extremely low risk to the insurer associated with investment-linked
insurance policies.
Comparing the VaR and TVaR capital amounts given in Table 9.1 with the
LPS2.04 and LPS3.04 capital amounts in Table 9.2 (the Solvency Capital Require-
ment and the Capital Adequacy Capital Requirement respectively), it can be seen
that for Type 1 and 2 policies, the LPS2.04 and LPS3.04 amounts are much greater
than the corresponding VaR and TVaR amounts, while for Type 3 policies, the
LPS2.04 and LPS3.04 amounts are less than the VaR and TVaR amounts. For
Type 4 policies, the LPS2.04 and LPS3.04 amounts are greater than the 99.5% VaR
and TVaR amounts, but less than the 95% values. The levels of sufficiency (on a
VaR basis) of each of the LPS2.04 and LPS3.04 capital amounts are given in Table
9.3. For portfolios containing Type 1 or 2 policies, this level is greater than 99.99%,
when compared to either the empirical distribution of −∆C (1) or −∆Cmin (0, 3).
In the cases of portfolios containing Type 3 or 4 policies, however, the levels of
sufficiency (on a VaR basis) are often much lower, and are less than 5% in all cases
when solvency is considered over a three year time horizon. Note that, if calculated
on a TVaR basis, the sufficiency levels would be slightly lower than those calculated
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on a VaR basis.
Table 9.3: Levels of Sufficiency (on a VaR Basis) of the LPS2.04 and LPS3.04 Capital
Requirements for the Base Case Scenarios
Liability Asset −∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
Portfolio Portfolio LPS2.04 LPS3.04 LPS2.04 LPS3.04
1 3 > 99.99% > 99.99% > 99.99% > 99.99%
2 1 > 99.99% > 99.99% > 99.99% > 99.99%
2 2 > 99.99% > 99.99% > 99.99% > 99.99%
2 3 > 99.99% > 99.99% > 99.99% > 99.99%
2 4 > 99.99% > 99.99% > 99.99% > 99.99%
3 1 1.36% 72.45% 0.00% 1.19%
4 1 > 99.99% > 99.99% 0.00% 0.00%
Table 9.4 presents the means, standard deviations and skewnesses of the simu-
lated −∆C (1) and −∆Cmin (0, 3) values. Even though the means of the simulated
values are much higher for Type 3 and 4 policies than for Type 1 and 2 policies
(which would suggest that greater amounts of capital should be held for Type 3 and
4 policies than for Type 1 and 2 policies, if no other information was available),
the greatest VaR and TVaR capital requirements are in fact required for Type 1
policies. This result arises primarily because the standard deviations of the Type
1 output distributions are greater than the standard deviations of the other output
distributions. This highlights the importance of considering the higher moments of
the change in capital distributions, as well as the means.
Table 9.4: Summary Statistics for the Base Case Simulations
Liability Asset −∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
Portfolio Portfolio Mean Std. Dev. Skew. Mean Std. Dev. Skew.
1 3 -862.86 979.78 0.0972 -639.57 1096.11 0.2400
2 1 -1061.14 405.42 -0.0200 -1061.14 405.42 -0.0200
2 2 -1088.86 438.16 -0.0095 -1088.86 438.16 -0.0095
2 3 -1035.36 607.26 0.1260 -1035.36 607.26 0.1260
2 4 -971.86 665.46 0.2486 -971.86 665.46 0.2486
3 1 7.55 123.04 -0.1233 415.80 143.79 -0.2311
4 1 0.45 28.69 -0.0277 752.69 24.06 -0.0187
The implication of these results is that the current Australian solvency and
capital adequacy requirements do not provide the same level of protection against
insolvency for all types of life insurance business, and for some classes of business,
provide very little long term protection against insolvency at all.
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The number of iterations performed for each simulation (which is the number of
iterations required for both convergence and to satisfy the accuracy criteria, except
in those cases previously mentioned3), as well as the (approximate) time taken to
complete these iterations and the number of iterations required simply for conver-
gence in each case, are given in Table 9.5. In several cases, the number of iterations
actually performed is considerably greater than the number required simply for con-
vergence. From the point of view of an insurer, it is desirable to minimize the number
of iterations needed to determine its capital requirements, as the greater the number
of iterations required, the greater the time taken to perform the simulation and the
greater the associated computation costs.
Table 9.5: Number of Iterations Performed, the Time Required and the Number of
Iterations Needed for Convergence for the Base Case Scenarios
Liability Asset Iterations Time4 Iters. for
Portfolio Portfolio Performed (minutes) Convergence
1 3 15,300 31 2,700
2 1 1,000 2 1,000
2 2 800 2 800
2 3 43,500 95 900
2 4 30,500 51 1,100
3 1 5,100 6 3,300
4 1 8,200 11 7,100
It is of interest to determine whether −∆C (1) and −∆Cmin (0, 3) are normally
distributed. If this were the case, then it would only be necessary for an insurer
to estimate the mean and standard deviation of these quantities with a reasonable
degree of accuracy, which would require many fewer iterations than estimating the
99.5% and 95% quantiles with accuracy. Then the VaR and TVaR values required
could be calculated theoretically based on a normal distribution with mean and
standard deviation equal to those estimated.
As a null hypothesis, we assume that −∆C (1) and −∆Cmin (0, 3) are normally
distributed (with mean and standard deviation equal to the mean and standard
deviation of the simulated values), and in each case conduct both a (one-sample)
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) and an Anderson-Darling (AS) test to determine whether
to reject this hypothesis or not. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Anderson-Darling
tests are both non-parametric tests that compare a sample distribution function
3See Section 8.3.2 for a discussion of the number of iterations required for convergence and
accuracy.
4All simulations were performed using a Dell OptiPlex GX620 computer with a 3.20GHz Intel
Pentium 4 processor and 2.00GB of RAM.
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with a reference probability distribution. However, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
focusses on the middle of the distribution, while the Anderson-Darling test places a
greater emphasis on the tails of the distribution (see Stuart et al. (1999) for more
details). The p-values for these tests are presented in Table 9.6.
Table 9.6: p-values for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Anderson-Darling Tests for the
Base Case Scenarios
Liability Asset −∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
Portfolio Portfolio KS AD KS AD
1 3 0.107 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
2 1 0.971 0.950 0.971 0.950
2 2 0.995 0.974 0.995 0.974
2 3 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
2 4 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
3 1 0.497 0.018* 0.040* 0.000*
4 1 0.853 0.341 0.540 0.117
Note: * indicates significance at the 5% significance level.
From this table it can be seen that, in the case of the distributions of −∆C (1),
in 2 out of 7 cases, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the null hypothesis of nor-
mality, and in 4 out of 7 cases, the Anderson-Darling test rejects the null hypothesis,
while in the case of the distributions of −∆Cmin (0, 3), in 4 out of 7 cases, both the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and the Anderson-Darling test rejects the null hypoth-
esis. Consequently, insurers should not automatically assume that −∆C (1) and
−∆Cmin (0, 3) are normally distributed, and if estimating the VaR and TVaR of the
distributions of these quantities, in many cases it will be essential for an insurer
to follow the procedure we have outlined and perform a sufficient number of itera-
tions so that the estimated quantiles of these distributions satisfy specified accuracy
criteria.
9.2.2 Asset Requirements
We set the (stochastic) minimum asset requirement for an insurer equal to the
100 (1− α)% VaR (or TVaR) plus the corresponding cost of capital (CoC) risk
margin5 plus the best estimate liability. The minimum asset requirements for each
of the Base Case scenarios are then as given in Table 9.7. Table 9.8 gives the ratios of
the LPS2.04 and LPS3.04 solvency and capital adequacy requirements (that is, the
LPS2.04 and LPS3.04 capital requirements plus the best estimate liabilities) to each
of these quantities. From Table 9.8, it can be seen that the existing deterministic
5Described in Section 8.7.
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solvency and capital adequacy legislation requires insurers to hold 12–34% more
assets for Type 1 and 2 policies than would be required under the hypothetical
stochastic scenario, but for Type 3 and 4 policies, the deterministic requirements
are less than 80% of the stochastic requirements (and for the Type 4, three year
time horizon cases, less than 10%). Note that the negative ratios in Table 9.8 arise
from the fact that, for Type 4 policies the LPS2.04 and LPS3.04 requirements are
positive, while the stochastic asset requirements calculated based on the empirical
distribution of −∆C (1) are negative. In each of these cases, the LPS2.04 and
LPS3.04 requirements are, needless to say, more than adequate.
Table 9.7: Stochastic Minimum Asset Requirements for the Base Case Scenarios ($)
Liability Asset −∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
Portfolio Portfolio 99.5% VaR 99.5% TVaR 95% VaR 95% TVaR
1 3 17,841.06 18,291.29 17,105.72 17,817.05
2 1 62,939.51 63,064.39 62,457.85 62,670.54
2 2 43,972.19 43,998.12 43,390.50 43,650.43
2 3 33,327.10 33,626.25 32,509.20 32,876.88
2 4 28,235.72 28,560.08 27,312.62 27,737.12
3 1 1,466.04 1,507.17 1,918.65 1,976.98
4 1 -404.49 -391.90 557.23 570.44
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Table 9.8: Ratios of the LPS2.04 and LPS3.04 Solvency and Capital Adequacy
Requirements to the Stochastic Minimum Asset Requirements for the Base Case
Scenarios
Liability Asset −∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
Portfolio Portfolio 99.5% VaR 99.5% TVaR 95% VaR 95% TVaR
Solvency Requirement (LPS2.04) Ratios
1 3 126% 123% 131% 126%
2 1 112% 112% 113% 113%
2 2 121% 121% 122% 122%
2 3 126% 125% 130% 128%
2 4 130% 129% 134% 132%
3 1 54% 53% 41% 40%
4 1 -8% -9% 6% 6%
Capital Adequacy Requirement (LPS3.04) Ratios
1 3 126% 123% 131% 126%
2 1 112% 112% 113% 113%
2 2 121% 121% 122% 122%
2 3 126% 125% 130% 128%
2 4 130% 129% 134% 132%
3 1 79% 76% 60% 58%
4 1 -8% -9% 6% 6%
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9.3 Sensitivity Analysis
9.3.1 Economic Sub-Model Sensitivities
In Section 7.2, four different economic sub-models were compared: the Kemp model,
the Wilkie model, the CAS/SOA model and the modified CAS/SOA model. Ulti-
mately, it was concluded that the modified CAS/SOA model provided the best fit
to the data, and consequently, this economic model was used in the Base Case tests
described in the previous section. In this section, we consider the impact on the
results of using either the Kemp, Wilkie or CAS/SOA economic models in place of
the modified CAS/SOA model, all other things being equal.
As in the Base Case scenarios, values of −∆C (1) and −∆Cmin (0, 3) were simu-
lated for each economic model/liability portfolio/asset portfolio combination. After
enough iterations had been performed for the summary statistics of these quanti-
ties to converge as per the @Risk algorithm, two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests6
were conducted to test the null hypothesis that these samples were drawn from the
same probability distributions as the Base Case samples for the same liability port-
folio/asset portfolio combination. The p-values of these tests are given in Table 9.9.
In all but four cases, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% significance level for
both the simulated values of −∆C (1) and of −∆Cmin (0, 3). This is strong evidence
that using a different economic sub-model does have a significant impact on the
distribution of the simulation outputs.
Where necessary, additional simulation runs were performed to ensure that the
accuracy criteria for the quantiles were met, and based on these final sets of simulated
outputs, the VaR and TVaR per policy were calculated for each scenario under
consideration. These are given in Table 9.10, along with the ratios of these amounts
to the Base Case amounts, and from this table it can be seen that for a given
portfolio, the VaR and TVaR values can vary by more than plus or minus one
thousand percent if the economic sub-model is changed. However, comparing these
to the LPS2.04 and LPS3.04 solvency and capital adequacy capital requirement
amounts, which are given in Table 9.11, it can be seen that, again, the Type 1 and 2
policy LPS2.04 and LPS3.04 capital requirements are greater than the corresponding
VaR and TVaR amounts; the Type 3 LPS2.04 and LPS3.04 capital requirements are,
in most cases, less than the VaR and TVaR amounts; and the Type 4 LPS2.04 and
LPS3.04 capital requirements are greater than the 99.5% VaR and TVaR amounts,
but less than the 95% quantities. In all cases, the LPS2.04 and LPS3.04 capital
amounts are greater than the 99.99% sufficiency level (on a VaR basis) for Type 1
and 2 policies, but the sufficiency levels are, again, generally much lower for Type 3
6Described in Section 8.8.
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−∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
1 3 Kemp 0.000* 0.000*
1 3 Wilkie 0.000* 0.000*
1 3 CAS/SOA 0.000* 0.000*
2 1 Kemp 0.000* 0.000*
2 1 Wilkie 0.701 0.701
2 1 CAS/SOA 0.000* 0.000*
2 2 Kemp 0.000* 0.000*
2 2 Wilkie 0.007* 0.007*
2 2 CAS/SOA 0.039* 0.039*
2 3 Kemp 0.000* 0.000*
2 3 Wilkie 0.000* 0.000*
2 3 CAS/SOA 0.000* 0.000*
2 4 Kemp 0.000* 0.000*
2 4 Wilkie 0.000* 0.000*
2 4 CAS/SOA 0.000* 0.000*
3 1 Kemp 0.000* 0.000*
3 1 Wilkie 0.000* 0.000*
3 1 CAS/SOA 0.000* 0.000*
4 1 Kemp 0.000* 0.000*
4 1 Wilkie 0.727 0.847
4 1 CAS/SOA 0.000* 0.000*
Note: * indicates significance at the 5% significance level.
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and 4 policies, as is shown in Table 9.12.
The CoC risk margins were calculated for each scenario, using each of the sol-
vency capital requirements under consideration and these risk margins were then
added to the best estimate liabilities and VaR or TVaR values, as was done in Sec-
tion 9.2.2, to get the stochastic asset requirements (given in Table D.1 of Appendix
D). Although, as has been previously mentioned, the use of different economic sub-
models, in most cases, gives rise to simulated values of −∆C (1) and −∆Cmin (0, 3)
that follow significantly different distributions from their Base Case equivalents,
when the best estimate liabilities, CoC risk margins and VaR (or TVaR) values are
combined to give the stochastic asset requirements, for most liability portfolio/asset
portfolio combinations, varying the economic sub-model used has very little impact
on the results. Table 9.13 gives the ratios of the sensitivity analysis asset require-
ments to the Base Case requirements for the same portfolio, and in all but 15 out of
the 84 cases considered, the ratio is between 95% and 105%. All of the scenarios for
which the ratio falls outside the 95–105% range relate to Type 3 or 4 policies, and
mostly to Type 3 policies (12 out of the 15 cases where the ratio falls outside this
range). In 13 of these 15 cases, the ratios are greater than 100%, implying higher
minimum asset requirements than under the Base Case scenarios; and in the two
remaining cases, although the ratios in these cases are less than 100%, because the
minimum asset requirements are negative, the ratios also imply higher minimum
asset requirements than under the Base Case scenarios.
When the LPS2.04 and LPS3.04 solvency and capital adequacy requirements
are compared to the stochastic minimum asset requirements, similar observations
are made to those that were made in Section 9.2.2 (the ratios of the LPS2.04 and
LPS3.04 requirements to the stochastic minimum asset requirements are given in
Tables D.2 and D.3). Thus, regardless of which economic sub-model is used, it
still remains the case that for Type 1 and 2 policies, the LPS2.04 and LPS3.04
requirements are more than adequate and for Type 3 and 4 policies, in many cases,
the LPS2.04 and LPS3.04 requirements are less than adequate.
Summary statistics for the simulated values of −∆C (1) and −∆Cmin (0, 3) are
given in Table 9.14. As in the Base Case scenarios, Kolmogorov-Smirnov and
Anderson-Darling tests were conducted to test the null hypothesis of normality,
the p-values of which are given in Table 9.15. However, again, in most cases this
hypothesis is rejected at the 5% significance level, particularly for the Type 3 and 4





Table 9.10: VaR and TVaR Per Policy for the Economic Sub-Model Sensitivity Analysis Scenarios ($) with Ratios of these Amounts to
the Base Case Capital Requirements Shown in Brackets
Liability Asset Economic −∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
Portfolio Portfolio Model 99.5% VaR 99.5% TVaR 95% VaR 95% TVaR
1 3 Kemp 1659.76 (92%) 1921.88 (90%) 992.98 (80%) 1354.63 (76%)
1 3 Wilkie 1661.56 (92%) 1942.58 (91%) 862.95 (70%) 1256.46 (71%)
1 3 CAS/SOA 1482.00 (82%) 1785.82 (83%) 578.34 (47%) 980.40 (55%)
1 3 Mod. C/S 1796.38 (100%) 2138.75 (100%) 1237.21 (100%) 1778.12 (100%)
2 1 Kemp -559.53 (1451%) -482.97 (-921%) -756.23 (194%) -658.88 (281%)
2 1 Wilkie -46.10 (120%) -33.58 (-64%) -369.48 (95%) -224.14 (96%)
2 1 CAS/SOA 479.26 (-1243%) 657.44 (1254%) -77.01 (20%) 171.58 (-73%)
2 1 Mod. C/S -38.57 (100%) 52.43 (100%) -389.53 (100%) -234.55 (100%)
2 2 Kemp -203.29 (-439%) -134.23 (-205%) -445.88 (116%) -326.29 (169%)
2 2 Wilkie -10.00 (-22%) 154.11 (235%) -359.31 (93%) -189.73 (99%)
2 2 CAS/SOA 56.62 (122%) 64.21 (98%) -341.50 (89%) -163.54 (85%)
2 2 Mod. C/S 46.26 (100%) 65.50 (100%) -385.43 (100%) -192.53 (100%)
2 3 Kemp 497.27 (83%) 665.48 (81%) -18.95 (101%) 246.57 (95%)
2 3 Wilkie 483.05 (81%) 655.54 (80%) -30.32 (162%) 200.52 (78%)
2 3 CAS/SOA 409.60 (69%) 592.41 (72%) -140.38 (749%) 105.59 (41%)
2 3 Mod. C/S 597.65 (100%) 823.10 (100%) -18.73 (100%) 258.36 (100%)
2 4 Kemp 770.56 (88%) 998.41 (89%) 182.67 (103%) 452.20 (91%)
2 4 Wilkie 710.18 (81%) 913.07 (81%) 136.92 (78%) 398.25 (80%)
2 4 CAS/SOA 614.14 (70%) 842.84 (75%) -9.72 (-6%) 287.60 (58%)
2 4 Mod. C/S 878.60 (100%) 1125.30 (100%) 176.51 (100%) 499.37 (100%)
3 1 Kemp 64.09 (22%) 70.53 (22%) 539.75 (83%) 551.88 (80%)
3 1 Wilkie 343.95 (116%) 378.36 (115%) 702.59 (109%) 753.00 (109%)
3 1 CAS/SOA 554.78 (188%) 610.68 (186%) 835.37 (129%) 913.92 (132%)
3 1 Mod. C/S 295.73 (100%) 327.62 (100%) 646.69 (100%) 691.92 (100%)
4 1 Kemp 32.34 (43%) 39.90 (47%) 730.08 (92%) 734.94 (92%)
4 1 Wilkie 73.25 (97%) 83.26 (98%) 791.34 (100%) 801.42 (100%)
4 1 CAS/SOA 105.84 (140%) 117.59 (138%) 814.82 (103%) 828.88 (103%)
4 1 Mod. C/S 75.57 (100%) 84.95 (100%) 792.56 (100%) 802.41 (100%)
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Table 9.11: Best Estimate Liabilities, and Solvency and Capital Adequacy Capital
Requirements Per Policy for the Economic Sub-Model Sensitivity Analysis Scenarios
($)
Liability Asset Economic Best Est. Solvency Cap. Ad.
Portfolio Portfolio Model Liability Capital Req. Capital Req.
1 3 Kemp 15,995.38 8,047.70 8,047.70
1 3 Wilkie 15,995.65 7,342.64 7,342.64
1 3 CAS/SOA 15,822.12 7,316.60 7,316.60
1 3 Mod. C/S 15,478.73 6,935.23 6,935.23
2 1 Kemp 64,904.92 5,671.54 5,671.54
2 1 Wilkie 63,149.02 7,427.44 7,427.44
2 1 CAS/SOA 62,604.34 7,972.12 7,972.12
2 1 Mod. C/S 62,992.44 7,584.02 7,584.02
2 2 Kemp 45,064.95 7,983.92 7,983.92
2 2 Wilkie 44,008.51 9,040.36 9,040.36
2 2 CAS/SOA 43,677.18 9,371.69 9,371.69
2 2 Mod. C/S 43,909.86 9,139.01 9,139.01
2 3 Kemp 33,275.38 8,877.66 8,877.66
2 3 Wilkie 32,607.06 9,545.98 9,545.98
2 3 CAS/SOA 32,374.01 9,779.03 9,779.03
2 3 Mod. C/S 32,534.05 9,618.99 9,618.99
2 4 Kemp 27,637.66 9,088.21 9,088.21
2 4 Wilkie 27,143.88 9,581.99 9,581.99
2 4 CAS/SOA 26,948.45 9,777.42 9,777.42
2 4 Mod. C/S 27,080.55 9,645.32 9,645.32
3 1 Kemp 1,550.87 -217.21 374.09
3 1 Wilkie 1,278.54 -266.84 158.30
3 1 CAS/SOA 1,290.26 -261.53 192.47
3 1 Mod. C/S 1,084.66 -291.05 67.91
4 1 Kemp -385.28 413.67 413.67
4 1 Wilkie -498.19 531.91 531.91
4 1 CAS/SOA -534.05 569.99 569.99
4 1 Mod. C/S -505.85 540.01 540.01
Results 197
Table 9.12: Levels of Sufficiency (on a VaR Basis) of the LPS2.04 and LPS3.04
Capital Amounts for the Economic Sub-Model Sensitivity Analysis Type 3 and 4
Policy Scenarios
Liability Asset Economic Solvency Cap. Ad.
Portfolio Portfolio Model Capital Req. Capital Req.
−∆C (1)
3 1 Kemp 0.14% > 99.99%
3 1 Wilkie 9.12% 84.73%
3 1 CAS/SOA 16.02% 78.69%
3 1 Mod. C/S 1.36% 72.45%
4 1 Kemp > 99.99% > 99.99%
4 1 Wilkie > 99.99% > 99.99%
4 1 CAS/SOA > 99.99% > 99.99%
4 1 Mod. C/S > 99.99% > 99.99%
−∆Cmin (0, 3)
3 1 Kemp 0.00% 8.82%
3 1 Wilkie 0.33% 11.73%
3 1 CAS/SOA 0.71% 19.01%
3 1 Mod. C/S 0.00% 1.19%
4 1 Kemp 0.00% 0.00%
4 1 Wilkie 0.00% 0.00%
4 1 CAS/SOA 0.00% 0.00%








Table 9.13: Ratios of the Economic Sub-Model Sensitivity Analysis Stochastic Minimum Asset Requirements to the Base Case Require-
ments for the Same Portfolio
Liability Asset Economic −∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
Portfolio Portfolio Model 99.5% VaR 99.5% TVaR 95% VaR 95% TVaR
1 3 Kemp 103% 103% 102% 101%
1 3 Wilkie 102% 102% 100% 99%
1 3 CAS/SOA 100% 100% 97% 96%
2 1 Kemp 102% 102% 102% 102%
2 1 Wilkie 100% 100% 100% 100%
2 1 CAS/SOA 101% 101% 100% 100%
2 2 Kemp 102% 102% 103% 102%
2 2 Wilkie 100% 100% 100% 100%
2 2 CAS/SOA 100% 99% 100% 100%
2 3 Kemp 102% 101% 102% 102%
2 3 Wilkie 100% 100% 100% 100%
2 3 CAS/SOA 99% 99% 99% 99%
2 4 Kemp 101% 101% 102% 102%
2 4 Wilkie 99% 99% 100% 100%
2 4 CAS/SOA 98% 98% 99% 99%
3 1 Kemp 112% 109% 119% 116%
3 1 Wilkie 118% 118% 115% 115%
3 1 CAS/SOA 138% 139% 125% 126%
4 1 Kemp 85% 85% 98% 97%
4 1 Wilkie 99% 99% 100% 100%





Table 9.14: Summary Statistics for the −∆C (1) and −∆Cmin (0, 3) Simulations for the Economic Sub-Model Sensitivity Analysis Scenarios
Liability Asset Economic −∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
Portfolio Portfolio Model
Iterations
Mean Std. Dev. Skew. Mean Std. Dev. Skew.
1 3 Kemp 10,800 -683.95 943.04 -0.0270 -574.59 950.46 -0.0265
1 3 Wilkie 11,900 -738.22 925.69 0.0515 -500.68 815.51 0.1090
1 3 CAS/SOA 18,300 -992.98 936.17 0.0566 -967.76 933.57 0.0486
1 3 Mod. C/S 15,300 -862.86 979.78 0.0972 -639.57 1096.11 0.2400
2 1 Kemp 600 -1041.74 153.37 0.6980 -1041.74 153.37 0.6980
2 1 Wilkie 900 -1049.29 402.79 0.0695 -1049.29 402.79 0.0695
2 1 CAS/SOA 52,700 -1067.22 607.52 -0.0239 -1067.22 607.52 -0.0239
2 1 Mod. C/S 1000 -1061.14 405.42 -0.0200 -1061.14 405.42 -0.0200
2 2 Kemp 700 -1019.43 349.04 -0.1442 -1019.43 349.04 -0.1442
2 2 Wilkie 1100 -1031.37 417.09 -0.0568 -1031.37 417.09 -0.0568
2 2 CAS/SOA 1000 -1142.70 484.16 -0.0385 -1142.70 484.16 -0.0385
2 2 Mod. C/S 800 -1088.86 438.16 -0.0095 -1088.86 438.16 -0.0095
2 3 Kemp 45,300 -934.27 549.56 0.0458 -934.27 549.56 0.0458
2 3 Wilkie 50,600 -940.85 547.77 0.0235 -940.85 547.77 0.0235
2 3 CAS/SOA 93,800 -1091.14 573.20 0.0457 -1091.14 573.20 0.0457
2 3 Mod. C/S 43,500 -1035.36 607.26 0.1260 -1035.36 607.26 0.1260
2 4 Kemp 26,800 -862.47 612.87 0.1578 -862.47 612.87 0.1578
2 4 Wilkie 29,400 -870.75 598.81 0.1177 -870.75 598.81 0.1177
2 4 CAS/SOA 51,800 -1033.61 606.25 0.1585 -1033.61 606.25 0.1585
2 4 Mod. C/S 30,500 -971.86 665.46 0.2486 -971.86 665.46 0.2486
3 1 Kemp 3500 -6.23 44.74 -1.4656 461.09 62.19 -1.3182
3 1 Wilkie 4900 -19.41 175.18 -0.4571 409.47 202.49 -0.5966
3 1 CAS/SOA 9800 -10.54 245.20 -0.1746 424.40 261.43 -0.2579
3 1 Mod. C/S 5100 7.55 123.04 -0.1233 415.80 143.79 -0.2311
4 1 Kemp 8200 0.38 10.66 0.5025 709.52 13.52 -0.4053
4 1 Wilkie 10,000 0.40 29.05 -0.0197 752.54 23.86 -0.0109
4 1 CAS/SOA 10,000 0.06 44.90 -0.1475 751.36 39.31 -0.1665
4 1 Mod. C/S 7100 0.45 28.69 -0.0277 752.69 24.06 -0.0187
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Table 9.15: p-values for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Anderson-Darling Tests for
the Economic Sub-Model Sensitivity Analysis Scenarios
Liability Asset Economic −∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
Portfolio Portfolio Model KS AD KS AD
1 3 Kemp 0.750 0.297 0.856 0.326
1 3 Wilkie 0.819 0.314 0.563 0.003*
1 3 CAS/SOA 0.625 0.168 0.648 0.310
1 3 Mod. C/S 0.107 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
2 1 Kemp 0.024* 0.000* 0.024* 0.000*
2 1 Wilkie 0.388 0.093 0.388 0.093
2 1 CAS/SOA 0.034* 0.000* 0.034* 0.000*
2 1 Mod. C/S 0.971 0.950 0.971 0.950
2 2 Kemp 0.405 0.046* 0.405 0.046*
2 2 Wilkie 0.884 0.515 0.884 0.515
2 2 CAS/SOA 0.920 0.701 0.920 0.701
2 2 Mod. C/S 0.995 0.974 0.995 0.974
2 3 Kemp 0.074 0.001* 0.074 0.001*
2 3 Wilkie 0.527 0.040* 0.527 0.040*
2 3 CAS/SOA 0.035* 0.001* 0.035* 0.001*
2 3 Mod. C/S 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
2 4 Kemp 0.001* 0.000* 0.001* 0.000*
2 4 Wilkie 0.001* 0.000* 0.001* 0.000*
2 4 CAS/SOA 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
2 4 Mod. C/S 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
3 1 Kemp 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
3 1 Wilkie 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
3 1 CAS/SOA 0.001* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
3 1 Mod. C/S 0.497 0.018* 0.040* 0.000*
4 1 Kemp 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
4 1 Wilkie 0.950 0.894 0.895 0.680
4 1 CAS/SOA 0.004* 0.000* 0.034* 0.000*
4 1 Mod. C/S 0.853 0.341 0.540 0.117
Note: * indicates significance at the 5% significance level.
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9.3.2 Mortality Sub-Model Sensitivities
In Section 7.3, evidence was found to indicate the presence of over-dispersion in the
Type 1 policy mortality data, and it was concluded that the best way of allowing
for this over-dispersion in the mortality sub-model is by assuming that the number
of deaths follows a negative binomial (NB1) distribution instead of the traditional
Poisson distribution. In this section, we consider the impact of assuming that Type
1 policy mortality does, in fact, follow a Poisson distribution (with mean equal to the
mean of the NB1 distribution), that is, of making no allowance for over-dispersion.
This is done assuming each of the four economic sub-models, not just the Base Case,
modified CAS/SOA, model.
Values of −∆C (1) and −∆Cmin (0, 3) for the Type 1 policy portfolio were once
again simulated for each economic model scenario until enough iterations had been
performed for the summary statistics of these quantities to converge as per the @Risk
algorithm (the simulation summary statistics are given in Table D.4). Two-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were then conducted to test the null hypothesis that
these samples were drawn from the same probability distributions as the samples
simulated in Section 9.3.1 (the scenarios considered in Section 9.3.1 are subsequently
referred to as the “Economic Base Case Scenarios”). The p-values of these tests are
given in Table 9.16.
Table 9.16: p-values for the Two-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests for the Mor-
tality Sub-Model Sensitivity Scenarios
Liability Asset Economic
Portfolio Portfolio Model
−∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
1 3 Kemp 0.973 0.947
1 3 Wilkie 0.985 0.529
1 3 CAS/SOA 0.819 0.879
1 3 Mod. C/S 0.084 0.214
In none of these tests is the null hypothesis that the two samples were drawn from
the same probability distribution rejected at the 5% significance level. Consequently,
it is concluded that ignoring the presence of over-dispersion in the mortality sub-
model does not have a significant effect on the overall results.
9.3.3 Lapsation Sub-Model Sensitivities
Similarly to what was done in Section 9.3.2, in this section we consider the impact
on the results of assuming that lapses follow a Poisson distribution (with mean equal
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to the mean of the normal-Poisson lapsation model), instead of the normal-Poisson
model that was shown, in Section 7.4, to best describe the lapse data.
Values of −∆C (1) and −∆Cmin (0, 3) were simulated for each economic model/
liability portfolio/asset portfolio combination until convergence was achieved with
the @Risk algorithm (summary statistics are given in Table D.5), and two-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were conducted to compare the distributions of these
values with those of the Economic Base Case outputs. p-values of these tests are
given in Table 9.17.
Table 9.17: p-values for the Two-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests for the Lapsa-
tion Sub-Model Sensitivity Scenarios
Liability Asset Economic
Portfolio Portfolio Model
−∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
1 3 Kemp 0.807 0.891
1 3 Wilkie 0.333 0.173
1 3 CAS/SOA 0.990 0.967
1 3 Mod. C/S 0.813 0.956
2 1 Kemp 0.002* 0.002*
2 1 Wilkie 0.939 0.939
2 1 CAS/SOA 0.768 0.768
2 1 Mod. C/S 0.219 0.219
2 2 Kemp 0.436 0.436
2 2 Wilkie 0.983 0.983
2 2 CAS/SOA 0.395 0.395
2 2 Mod. C/S 0.710 0.710
2 3 Kemp 0.185 0.185
2 3 Wilkie 0.955 0.955
2 3 CAS/SOA 0.925 0.925
2 3 Mod. C/S 0.887 0.887
2 4 Kemp 0.891 0.891
2 4 Wilkie 0.568 0.568
2 4 CAS/SOA 0.976 0.976
2 4 Mod. C/S 0.774 0.774
3 1 Kemp 0.080 0.000*
3 1 Wilkie 0.997 0.909
3 1 CAS/SOA 0.968 0.993
3 1 Mod. C/S 0.320 0.541
4 1 Kemp 0.000* 0.000*
4 1 Wilkie 0.693 0.017*
4 1 CAS/SOA 0.640 0.834
4 1 Mod. C/S 0.608 0.128
Note: * indicates significance at the 5% significance level.
From Table 9.17, it can be seen that, in most cases (50 out of the 56 cases
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considered) there is no significant evidence to suggest that the outputs simulated in
this section are drawn from different distributions than their Economic Base Case
counterparts. In 50 independent tests at the 5% significance level, we would expect
2.5 significant results by chance, even if the null hypothesis were correct. The six
cases with p-values less than 0.05 exceed this, however, so we consider them further.
Five out of these six cases assume a Kemp economic sub-model, suggesting that,
if this economic sub-model is used, the results are more sensitive to the choice of
lapsation sub-model than if an alternative sub-model is used. In none of these cases
was it necessary to perform additional simulation trials in order to meet the accuracy
criteria for the quantiles.
For each of these, significantly different, cases, the VaR and TVaR values were
calculated and are presented, along with the ratios of these quantities to their Eco-
nomic Base Case counterparts, in Table 9.18. From this table, it can be seen that, in
some cases, particularly the Type 2 policy cases, the stochastic capital requirements
do change quite substantially, in percentage terms, when the Poisson lapsation sub-
model is used.
Table 9.18: VaR and TVaR Per Policy for the Lapsation Sub-Model Sensitivity
Analysis Scenarios ($) with Ratios of these Amounts to the Economic Base Case
Capital Requirements Shown in Brackets
Liability Asset Economic −∆C (1)
Portfolio Portfolio Model 99.5% VaR 99.5% TVaR
2 1 Kemp -680.59 (122%) -654.30 (135%)
4 1 Kemp 24.02 (74%) 26.40 (66%)
Liability Asset Economic −∆Cmin (0, 3)
Portfolio Portfolio Model 95% VaR 95% TVaR
2 1 Kemp -861.43 (114%) -794.50 (121%)
3 1 Kemp 527.32 (98%) 535.81 (97%)
4 1 Kemp 721.07 (99%) 723.84 (98%)
4 1 Wilkie 789.55 (100%) 798.70 (100%)
As the mean of the Poisson lapse sub-model is assumed to be the same as the
mean of the original normal-Poisson model, the deterministic LPS2.04 and LPS3.04
capital requirements for the lapsation sub-model sensitivity analysis scenarios are
no different from those calculated for the Economic Base Case scenarios (previously
given in Table 9.11). For each of the six cases where the output distribution is
believed to significantly differ from the equivalent Economic Base Case output dis-
tribution, the level of sufficiency of the LPS2.04 and LPS3.04 capital requirements
was calculated (on a VaR basis) (these levels are given in Table D.6). The sufficiency
levels are all within ±2% of their Economic Base Case counterparts.
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The stochastic asset requirements were also calculated for each of the six cases
under consideration (values are given in Table D.7). Comparing these values to
the equivalent Economic Base Case values, in all cases the lapsation sub-model
sensitivity values are within ±5% of the Economic Base Case values.
Thus, even though, under some circumstances, whether or not over-dispersion is
allowed for when modelling lapses does have a significant impact on the simulation
output distributions, it is still the case that the Type 1 and 2 LPS2.04 and LPS3.04
capital requirements are more than adequate and the Type 3 and 4 LPS2.04 and
LPS3.04 capital requirements mostly less than adequate; and in spite of the differ-
ences in the output distributions, there is little difference in the minimum assets
that must be held under these scenarios compared to the Economic Base Case re-
quirements.
9.3.4 Mortality and Lapsation Sub-Model Sensitivities
Combining the sensitivity tests carried out in the previous two sections, in this
section we investigate the impact on the results of assuming that both deaths and
lapses follow Poisson distributions (with means equal to the means of the Base Case
NB1 mortality model and the normal-Poisson lapse model respectively), for Type 1
policies.
Values of −∆C (1) and −∆Cmin (0, 3) were simulated until convergence was
reached with the @Risk algorithm for each economic model under this new scenario
(summary statistics are given in Table D.9), and two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov
tests were conducted to compare the distributions of these ouputs with those of the
Economic Base Case outputs (p-values are given in Table 9.19). This time, none of
the tests lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis, providing strong evidence that,
for Type 1 policies, ignoring the existence of any over-dispersion present in either
the mortality or lapsation data has little effect on capital requirements.
Table 9.19: p-values for the Two-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests for the Mor-
tality and Lapsation Sub-Model Sensitivity Scenarios
Liability Asset Economic
Portfolio Portfolio Model
−∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
1 3 Kemp 0.714 0.721
1 3 Wilkie 0.993 0.655
1 3 CAS/SOA 0.720 0.602
1 3 Mod. C/S 0.907 0.714
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9.3.5 Dependency Sensitivities
In this section, we extend the sensitivity tests carried out in the previous three
sections to investigate the impact of ignoring the existence of any dependency rela-
tionships between the economic variables, mortality and lapsation rates, in addition
to assuming that mortality and lapses follow Poisson distributions. The functional
relationships used to relate the means of the mortality and lapsation Poisson dis-
tributions with the economic variables remain similar in shape to those used to
describe the means of the Base Case mortality and lapsation distributions (which
are the same as those used to describe the means of the distributions used in Sec-
tions 9.3.2 to 9.3.4) but without allowing them to change as the economic variables
change (the methodology used for doing this is described in Section 8.8).
Values of −∆C (1) and −∆Cmin (0, 3) were simulated until convergence was
reached with the @Risk algorithm for each economic model/liability portfolio/asset
portfolio combination, and two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were conducted
to compare the distributions of the outputs to those of the Economic Base Case
Scenarios, with p-values given in Table 9.20. In 21 of the 56 cases presented, the
null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% significance level, with most of these cases re-
flecting Type 1, 3 or 4 policies. This suggests that, for these policy types, allowing
for the existence of dependency relationships between mortality, lapsation and the
economy may have a significant effect on the simulation output distributions.
Six of these 21 cases are identical to those “significantly different” cases iden-
tified in Section 9.3.3. In both this current section and Section 9.3.3, lapsation is
assumed to follow a Poisson distribution, so it is possible that, in some of these
cases, the differences between the distributions of the two samples are due to as-
suming a Poisson lapsation distribution, rather than because we are ignoring the
existence of dependency relationships, which is what we are interested in here. To
determine whether or not this is what is being observed, a second set of two-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were conducted to compare the distributions of the out-
puts simulated in this section with those simulated in Section 9.3.3, for each of these
six cases. In each case, the p-value of the test was less than 0.01, except for the two
Type 2, Asset Portfolio 1, Kemp economic model cases (referred to as the Type 2-1
Kemp cases), where both p-values equalled 0.395. Thus, for the two Type 2-1 Kemp
cases, it was concluded that ignoring the existence of dependency relationships does
not have a significant effect on the distribution of the simulated output values, but
for the remaining 19 of the 21 cases previously identified, the opposite conclusion
is reached. These 19 cases are now considered further. For each of these 19 cases,
additional simulation runs were conducted, where necessary, in order to satisfy the
accuracy criteria for the quantiles (summary statistics for the final simulations are
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−∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
1 3 Kemp 0.637 0.685
1 3 Wilkie 0.003* 0.389
1 3 CAS/SOA 0.000* 0.893
1 3 Mod. C/S 0.000* 0.621
2 1 Kemp 0.016* 0.016*
2 1 Wilkie 0.055 0.055
2 1 CAS/SOA 0.628 0.628
2 1 Mod. C/S 0.003* 0.003*
2 2 Kemp 0.538 0.538
2 2 Wilkie 0.509 0.509
2 2 CAS/SOA 0.793 0.793
2 2 Mod. C/S 0.830 0.830
2 3 Kemp 0.981 0.981
2 3 Wilkie 0.752 0.752
2 3 CAS/SOA 0.461 0.461
2 3 Mod. C/S 0.411 0.411
2 4 Kemp 0.830 0.830
2 4 Wilkie 0.510 0.510
2 4 CAS/SOA 0.442 0.442
2 4 Mod. C/S 0.748 0.748
3 1 Kemp 0.000* 0.000*
3 1 Wilkie 0.000* 0.000*
3 1 CAS/SOA 0.846 0.356
3 1 Mod. C/S 0.000* 0.000*
4 1 Kemp 0.000* 0.000*
4 1 Wilkie 0.000* 0.000*
4 1 CAS/SOA 0.010* 0.000*
4 1 Mod. C/S 0.000* 0.000*
Note: * indicates significance at the 5% significance level.
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given in Table D.10).
Table 9.21 gives the empirically calculated VaR and TVaR values for each of the
19 cases for which the output distributions are believed to be significantly different
from the Economic Base Case (and Section 9.3.3) output distributions, along with
the ratios of these values to the Economic Base Case VaR and TVaR values. As
with the economic sub-model sensitivity analysis, the ratios deviate further from
100% for Type 2 policies than for Type 1, 3 or 4 policies. Values of the LPS2.04
and LPS3.04 capital requirements (tabulated in Table D.11) were compared to the
output distributions to determine their levels of sufficiency (on a VaR basis) and
similar levels were observed to those given in Tables 9.3 and 9.12 (see Table D.12
for sufficiency levels).
Finally, the stochastic asset requirements were calculated, this time for the 19
“different” cases under consideration in this section (see Table D.13 for these values),
along with the ratios of the LPS2.04 solvency requirements and LPS3.04 capital
adequacy requirements to these amounts (given in Table D.14). In this case, all but
one of the stochastic asset requirement values are within ±5% of the corresponding
Economic Base Case asset requirements, and the value that is not within this range
is within ±6% of the corresponding Economic Base Case asset requirement. The
ratios of the LPS2.04 and LPS3.04 requirements to the asset requirements are all
within ±4% of the values given in Tables D.2 and D.3.
Thus, similar to what was concluded in the lapsation sub-model sensitivity anal-
ysis (Section 9.3.3), although ignoring the existence of dependency relationships
between the different stochastic sub-models does, in many cases, have a significant
impact on the simulation output distributions and on the stochastic capital require-
ments calculated empirically from these outputs, it has very little impact on the
(stochastic) minimum assets that should be held by an insurer, as compared to the








Table 9.21: VaR and TVaR Per Policy for the Dependencies Sensitivity Analysis Scenarios ($) with Ratios of these Amounts to the
Economic Base Case Capital Requirements Shown in Brackets
Liability Asset Economic −∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
Portfolio Portfolio Model 99.5% VaR 99.5% TVaR 95% VaR 95% TVaR
1 3 Wilkie 1662.41 (100%) 1987.48 (102%) - -
1 3 CAS/SOA 1485.18 (100%) 1824.06 (102%) - -
1 3 Mod. C/S 1800.56 (100%) 2193.59 (103%) - -
2 1 Mod. C/S 241.86 (-627%) 393.66 (751%) -213.70 (55%) -4.33 (2%)
3 1 Kemp 68.19 (106%) 76.24 (108%) 515.12 (95%) 527.39 (96%)
3 1 Wilkie 356.85 (104%) 393.67 (104%) 687.79 (98%) 743.12 (99%)
3 1 Mod. C/S 269.88 (91%) 309.63 (95%) 621.94 (96%) 670.28 (97%)
4 1 Kemp 21.55 (67%) 23.77 (60%) 719.40 (99%) 721.73 (98%)
4 1 Wilkie 96.89 (132%) 105.96 (127%) 793.96 (100%) 805.51 (101%)
4 1 CAS/SOA 119.78 (113%) 130.90 (111%) 814.24 (100%) 829.57 (100%)
4 1 Mod. C/S 93.80 (124%) 104.44 (123%) 792.08 (100%) 803.66 (100%)
Results 209
9.3.6 Distributional Mean Sensitivities
For the sensitivity tests discussed in Sections 9.3.2 to 9.3.4, the means of the mor-
tality and lapsation sub-models were left unchanged and only the distributional
assumptions were altered, and for the sensitivity tests discussed in Section 9.3.5, no
allowance was made for the means to vary with fluctuations in the economic vari-
ables. The formulae used to calculate the mean numbers of deaths and lapses in this
thesis (determined in Sections 7.3 and 7.4) are quite complex and relate these quan-
tities to a wide range of factors, including age, policy duration, interest rates and
the unemployment rate. In practice, few insurers use formulae as complex as these,
and, in fact, most simply estimate future mortality rates as a constant proportion
of those rates given in a standard mortality table. In this section, we investigate
the impact both of ignoring mortality and lapsation over-dispersion, and of making
simplistic assumptions in describing the means of the mortality and lapsation sub-
models, that is, of assuming that both the mean number of deaths and withdrawals
are constant multiples of the expected numbers of deaths and withdrawals given
in the standard mortality and lapsation tables, with the constants varying only by
policy type and sex (the selection of these constants was discussed in Section 8.8).
The existence of any dependency relationships between mortality rates, lapsation
rates and the economy is also ignored.
Assuming this set-up, values of −∆C (1) and −∆Cmin (0, 3) were simulated until
convergence was reached with the @Risk algorithm, and two-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests were conducted to compare the distributions of these simulated values
with those of the values simulated for the Economic Base Case scenarios. The p-
values of these tests are given in Table 9.22. This time, in 30 of the 56 cases
considered, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% significance level, with most of
these cases corresponding to portfolios containing Type 3 or 4 policies.
For 19 of these 30 cases, the null hypothesis was also rejected in the two-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests conducted in Section 9.3.5 (see Table 9.20). Since lap-
sation is assumed to follow a Poisson distribution and the existence of dependency
relationships are ignored in both this section and in Section 9.3.5, it is possible that
some of the results observed here are again due to making these assumptions, and
do not reflect the impact of simplifying the distributional mean assumptions. To
isolate the impact of using the simplified mean assumptions, from those of ignoring
the dependency relationships and of making no allowance for over-dispersion, ad-
ditional Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were conducted to compare the distributions of
the values simulated in this section with those simulated in Section 9.3.5, for each
of these 19 cases. In all cases, except for the Type 1 policy, CAS/SOA economic
sub-model case (for which the p-value was equal to 0.338), the p-value of the test was
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Table 9.22: p-values for the Two-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests for the Distri-
butional Mean Sensitivity Analysis Scenarios
Liability Asset Economic
Portfolio Portfolio Model
−∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
1 3 Kemp 0.420 0.146
1 3 Wilkie 0.151 0.002*
1 3 CAS/SOA 0.046* 0.082
1 3 Mod. C/S 0.631 0.214
2 1 Kemp 0.000* 0.000*
2 1 Wilkie 0.000* 0.000*
2 1 CAS/SOA 0.000* 0.000*
2 1 Mod. C/S 0.000* 0.000*
2 2 Kemp 0.457 0.457
2 2 Wilkie 0.006* 0.006*
2 2 CAS/SOA 0.000* 0.000*
2 2 Mod. C/S 0.126 0.126
2 3 Kemp 0.735 0.735
2 3 Wilkie 0.699 0.699
2 3 CAS/SOA 0.475 0.475
2 3 Mod. C/S 0.538 0.538
2 4 Kemp 0.494 0.494
2 4 Wilkie 0.860 0.860
2 4 CAS/SOA 0.427 0.427
2 4 Mod. C/S 0.549 0.549
3 1 Kemp 0.000* 0.000*
3 1 Wilkie 0.000* 0.000*
3 1 CAS/SOA 0.000* 0.000*
3 1 Mod. C/S 0.000* 0.000*
4 1 Kemp 0.000* 0.000*
4 1 Wilkie 0.000* 0.000*
4 1 CAS/SOA 0.000* 0.000*
4 1 Mod. C/S 0.000* 0.000*
Note: * indicates significance at the 5% significance level.
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equal to 0 to at least five decimal places. Consequently, for the Type 1 CAS/SOA
portfolio, it was concluded that simplifying the distribution mean assumptions does
not have a significant effect on the distribution of the simulated output values, but
for the remaining 29 of the 30 cases previously identified, it does. These 29 cases
are now considered further. For each of these cases, additional simulation runs were
conducted, where necessary, in order to satisfy the accuracy criteria for the quantiles
(summary statistics for the final simulations are given in Table D.16).
Table 9.23 gives the VaR and TVaR values for each of the 29 cases under consider-
ation, calculated empirically using the values simulated in this section, and the ratios
of these amounts to the equivalent Economic Base Case capital requirements. In
the previous sensitivity analyses, significantly different output distributions tended
to lead to large percentage changes in the VaR and TVaR values for Type 2 policies,
but to smaller changes for Type 3 and 4 policies. For the simulations conducted in
this section, however, significant differences in the output distributions lead to large
percentage changes in the VaR and TVaR values for Type 3 and 4 policies (at least
when −∆C (1) is considered), as well as for Type 2 policies. For the Type 1 case
considered, however, capital requirements differ by only 2%.
When compared to the output distributions, all LPS2.04 and LPS3.04 capital
requirements for the simplified mean scenarios (given in Table D.17) have levels of
sufficiency greater than 99.99% (on a VaR basis), except for those for Type 3 and 4
policies, when the empirical distributions of the simulated values of −∆Cmin (0, 3)
are considered, and for the Type 3 LPS2.04 solvency capital requirements, when
the empirical distributions of the simulated values of −∆C (1) are considered. The
exceptions all have a level of sufficiency of less than 0.005%. This is a broadly
consistent, but more extreme, version of what has already been observed for the
other sensitivity analysis cases.
The stochastic asset requirements were calculated (given in Table D.18) and the
ratios of the stochastic asset requirements for the Distributional Mean sensitivity
scenarios to those for the Economic Base Case scenarios are given in Table 9.24.
Unlike in the previous sensitivity analyses, where the stochastic asset requirements
were generally very close to the Economic Base Case requirements, in this part of
the analysis, for Type 3 policies, the asset requirements are, in all but two cases,
at least 10% less than the corresponding Economic Base Case asset requirements,
and for Type 4 policies, the asset requirements are, in all cases, at least 30% less
than the Economic Base Case requirements. Note that, although the ratios are all
greater than 100% when the capital requirements are based on the distribution of
−∆C (1), in these cases, this is associated with a decrease in the asset requirements
because the Type 4 asset requirements are negative. For Type 1 and 2 policies, the








Table 9.23: VaR and TVaR Per Policy for the Distributional Mean Sensitivity Analysis Scenarios ($) with Ratios of these Amounts to
the Economic Base Case Capital Requirements Shown in Brackets
Liability Asset Economic −∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
Portfolio Portfolio Model 99.5% VaR 99.5% TVaR 95% VaR 95% TVaR
1 3 Wilkie - - 882.79 (102%) 1278.04 (102%)
2 1 Kemp -894.62 (160%) -879.90 (182%) -951.03 (126%) -922.36 (140%)
2 1 Wilkie -851.47 (1847%) -824.88 (2456%) -931.64 (252%) -894.03 (399%)
2 1 CAS/SOA -940.86 (-196%) -914.01 (-139%) -996.85 (1294%) -969.22 (-565%)
2 1 Mod. C/S -942.38 (2443%) -932.20 (-1778%) -988.15 (254%) -966.07 (412%)
2 2 Wilkie -265.87 (2659%) -140.08 (-91%) -519.69 (145%) -392.34 (207%)
2 2 CAS/SOA -322.20 (-569%) -252.21 (-393%) -616.06 (180%) -464.89 (284%)
3 1 Kemp 24.18 (38%) 27.34 (39%) 471.48 (87%) 474.66 (86%)
3 1 Wilkie 63.25 (18%) 69.56 (18%) 496.90 (71%) 508.98 (68%)
3 1 CAS/SOA 44.85 (8%) 51.05 (8%) 477.82 (57%) 485.46 (53%)
3 1 Mod. C/S 47.85 (16%) 53.38 (16%) 484.54 (75%) 491.99 (71%)
4 1 Kemp 15.01 (46%) 16.92 (42%) 735.75 (101%) 737.32 (100%)
4 1 Wilkie 22.84 (31%) 25.60 (31%) 736.22 (93%) 737.85 (92%)
4 1 CAS/SOA 19.89 (19%) 22.17 (19%) 735.02 (90%) 736.65 (89%)





Table 9.24: Ratios of the Distributional Mean Sensitivity Analysis Stochastic Minimum Asset Requirements to the Economic Base Case
Requirements for the Same Portfolio
Liability Asset Economic −∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
Portfolio Portfolio Model 99.5% VaR 99.5% TVaR 95% VaR 95% TVaR
1 3 Wilkie - - 98% 98%
2 1 Kemp 98% 98% 98% 98%
2 1 Wilkie 100% 100% 100% 100%
2 1 CAS/SOA 99% 99% 100% 100%
2 1 Mod. C/S 100% 100% 100% 100%
2 2 Wilkie 100% 100% 101% 101%
2 2 CAS/SOA 101% 101% 101% 101%
3 1 Kemp 78% 78% 82% 82%
3 1 Wilkie 77% 75% 86% 84%
3 1 CAS/SOA 63% 62% 77% 74%
3 1 Mod. C/S 88% 86% 97% 95%
4 1 Kemp 172% 176% 65% 64%
4 1 Wilkie 145% 149% 64% 63%
4 1 CAS/SOA 149% 154% 61% 59%
4 1 Mod. C/S 143% 146% 64% 63%
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The ratios of the LPS2.04 and LPS3.04 requirements to the stochastic asset
requirements were also calculated (these ratios are given in Tables D.19 and D.20).
These ratios show that under this scenario, it is still true that the LPS2.04 and
LPS3.04 requirements are greater than the stochastic requirements for Type 1 and
2 policies and for Type 4 policies when the stochastic capital requirements are based
on the distribution of −∆C (1), and are less than the stochastic requirements for
Type 3 and 4 policies when the stochastic capital requirements are based on the
distribution of −∆Cmin (0, 3). It is also still true that the LPS2.04 requirements are
less than the stochastic asset requirements for Type 3 policies when the stochastic
capital requirements are based on the distribution of −∆C (1). However, unlike
in the other scenarios considered, in this case the LPS3.04 requirements are greater
than the stochastic asset requirements for Type 3 policies when the stochastic capital
requirements are based on the distribution of −∆Cmin (0, 3), by 10–15%.
Therefore, simplifying the formulae used to describe the means of the mortality
and lapsation sub-models has little effect on the stochastic asset requirements for
Type 1 or 2 policies, but leads to a reduction in the calculated requirements for
Type 3 and 4 policies.
If the Distributional Mean sensitivity analysis stochastic asset requirements are
compared with the original Base Case stochastic asset requirements given in Table
9.7 (for all cases, not just those previously identified in this section, and assuming
a modified CAS/SOA economic sub-model in each base case), thus reflecting the
combined impact of all of the sensitivity changes on the stochastic asset require-
ments, including changing the economic sub-model used, then for Type 2 policies,
all of the ratios of these quantities (given in Table 9.25) are between 96% and 103%,
indicating that the combined impact of all of the changes on the asset requirements
is minimal. However, for Type 1 and 3 policies, all of the ratios are between 84%
and 100%, indicating a moderate decrease in the asset requirements in these cases,
and for Type 4 policies, more substantial decreases in the asset requirements are
suggested (note that, again, although some of the ratios are greater than 100%,
these ratios indicate a decrease in the asset requirements, because they correspond
to situations with negative asset requirements). In summary, the overall effect of
all of the model changes made in the sensitivity analyses is either very small, for
Type 2 policies, or for other policy types, the effect is to decrease the requirements,





Table 9.25: Ratios of the Distributional Mean Sensitivity Analysis Stochastic Minimum Asset Requirements to the (Original) Base Case
Requirements for the Same Portfolio
Liability Asset Economic −∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
Portfolio Portfolio Model 99.5% VaR 99.5% TVaR 95% VaR 95% TVaR
1 3 Kemp 88% 86% 92% 88%
1 3 Wilkie 88% 86% 99% 98%
1 3 CAS/SOA 86% 84% 89% 86%
1 3 Mod. C/S 86% 84% 89% 86%
2 1 Kemp 100% 100% 100% 100%
2 1 Wilkie 100% 100% 101% 100%
2 1 CAS/SOA 100% 100% 100% 100%
2 1 Mod. C/S 100% 100% 100% 100%
2 2 Kemp 101% 101% 103% 102%
2 2 Wilkie 100% 101% 101% 101%
2 2 CAS/SOA 100% 100% 101% 101%
2 2 Mod. C/S 101% 101% 103% 102%
2 3 Kemp 99% 98% 101% 100%
2 3 Wilkie 99% 98% 101% 100%
2 3 CAS/SOA 99% 98% 101% 100%
2 3 Mod. C/S 99% 98% 101% 100%
2 4 Kemp 97% 96% 100% 99%
2 4 Wilkie 97% 96% 100% 99%
2 4 CAS/SOA 97% 96% 100% 99%
2 4 Mod. C/S 97% 96% 100% 99%
3 1 Kemp 88% 85% 97% 95%
3 1 Wilkie 91% 89% 99% 97%
3 1 CAS/SOA 88% 86% 96% 94%
3 1 Mod. C/S 88% 86% 97% 95%
4 1 Kemp 146% 150% 64% 63%
4 1 Wilkie 144% 147% 64% 63%
4 1 CAS/SOA 143% 147% 64% 63%
4 1 Mod. C/S 143% 146% 64% 63%
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9.3.7 General Comments Relating to the Sensitivity
Analyses
In addition to the comments made in the previous sections, several other general
observations can be made regarding the sensitivity analysis outputs.
Firstly, although fluctuations in the numbers of iterations required for a simu-
lation to converge as per the @Risk algorithm are inevitable (that is, the number
of iterations required so that additional iterations do not cause the sample mean,
standard deviation or selected percentile values to fluctuate by more than ±1%),
since the time to convergence (in iterations) depends on the combination of random
variates used in a particular simulation, there is, nevertheless, a clear trend in these
numbers, with a greater number of iterations required for Type 4 policy simulations,
followed by Type 3 policy simulations, then Type 1 policy simulations and finally
Type 2 policy simulations (with more simulations required for the higher risk asset
portfolios than for the lower risk portfolios). This can be seen in Figure 9.1, which
plots the average number of iterations required for convergence by liability portfo-
lio for the Base Case simulations (see Section 9.2) and for the economic sub-model
(Section 9.3.1), lapsation sub-model (Section 9.3.3), dependency (Section 9.3.5) and
distributional mean (Section 9.3.6) sensitivity analysis simulations, referred to as
“Base”, “Econ”, “Lapse”, “Dependency” and “Mean”, respectively, in the graph
(these are the analyses in which all liability portfolio/asset portfolio combinations
were considered). An indication of the time (in minutes) taken to perform these
simulations is given by Table 9.5.
As has been previously stated, Type 3 and 4 policies are generally considered
to be risk insurance products, while Type 1 and 2 policies are considered to be
investment products. The above results, thus, suggest that more iterations are
required for risk insurance product simulations to converge than for investment
product simulations to converge. The average numbers of iterations required for
convergence by liability portfolio and asset portfolio, based on the economic sub-
model (of which the Base Case is a subset), lapsation sub-model, dependency and
distributional mean sensitivity analysis simulations, are given in Table 9.26. This
gives an approximate value for the number of iterations required for simulation
conversion by liability portfolio and asset portfolio.
To achieve the level of accuracy of determinition of the quantiles of −∆C (1)
and −∆Cmin (0, 3) specified in Section 8.3.2, as well as convergence of the @Risk
algorithm, in many cases the number of iterations required increases substantially
above the number required simply for convergence. The average number of iterations
required for convergence and to satisfy the accuracy criteria for all of the simulations
that were run until both accuracy and convergence were achieved are also given
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Figure 9.1: Average Numbers of Iterations Required For Simulation Convergence
by Liability Portfolio and Type of Analysis



















Table 9.26: Average Numbers of Iterations Required for Simulation Convergence
and Accuracy
Liability Asset Iters. for Iters. for
Portfolio Portfolio Convergence Conv. and Acc.
1 3 2375 12,825
2 1 850 -
2 2 850 -
2 3 1281 58,225
2 4 1225 34,625
3 1 6188 6425
4 1 8769 8765
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in Table 9.26, by liability and asset portfolio. In this case, the opposite results
are observed to those noted in the previous paragraph. Here, the most iterations
are required for Type 2 policies, then Type 1 policies, with Type 3 and 4 policies
requiring the fewest iterations. So, although convergence is achieved faster for Type
1 and 2 policies, many more iterations are required for accurate estimation using
these simulated values for those policy types than for the other policy types. Note
that, for most of the Type 2, Asset Portfolio 1 or 2, policy cases, the accuracy criteria
were ignored, for the reasons discussed in Section 9.2.1, so the average numbers of
iterations required for convergence and accuracy for these simulations are not given
in this table.
For every set of simulations, as occurred for the Base Case Simulations, there
was no difference between the simulated values of −∆C (1) and of −∆Cmin (0, 3) for
Type 2 policies at each iteration, all other things being equal. This means that in
every case, for Type 2 policies, −∆C (1) = −∆Cmin (0, 3), which means that it is
always the case that C (1) < C (2) and C (1) < C (3). This implies that for Type 2
policies, capital always increases over time. Further implications of this are that, if
an insurer has simulated values of −∆C (1), it is unnecessary for it also to simulate
values of −∆Cmin (0, 3); and that the 99.5% VaR and TVaR of −∆C (1) will always
be greater than the 95% VaR and TVaR respectively of −∆Cmin (0, 3).
Finally, although not mentioned in Sections 9.3.2 to 9.3.6, as in Section 9.3.1,
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Anderson-Darling tests were also conducted to test the
null hypothesis that the output values simulated in these sections were drawn from
normal distributions, for each of the “significantly different” cases (the p-values for
these tests are given in Tables D.8, D.15 and D.21). As was the case in Section 9.3.1
(see Table 9.15), a large number of the distributions tested in Sections 9.3.2 to 9.3.6
are also significantly non-normal, although the cases that do prove to be non-normal
vary somewhat between tests, so it is difficult to draw any general conclusions from
these results. We suggest, however, that it would be inadvisable for an insurer




10.1 Responses to the Research Questions
In Section 3.3, a number of research questions were posed. These questions were
answered through the course of this thesis and the responses are summarised below:
1. Do any significant dependency relationships exist between mortality, lapsation
and the economy, and if any such relationships do exist, what are their natures?
In Chapter 6, evidence was provided to show that dependency relationships
do exist between short-term interest rates and mortality, and between economic
variables and lapsation rates (although no conclusive evidence was found to suggest
a dependency relationship exists between lapsation and mortality, in spite of the fact
that the theory of selective lapsation implies that this is so). These relationships
were included in the stochastic sub-models developed in Chapter 7, and from these
it can be concluded that it is only Type 1 Male mortality rates that are significantly
affected by the economy (specifically, by the short-term interest rates), not those of
any other policy type/sex combinations, and lapsation rates for all policy type/sex
combinations are significantly affected by changes in short-term interest rates and
unemployment rates. The exact nature of these relationships depends on a number
of factors, including the age of the policyholders and the duration of the policies
under consideration.
2. What is the most suitable model for each of the stochastic sub-models and how
does the choice of model affect the overall solvency testing model output?
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In Chapter 7, it was shown that mortality rates are best modelled using an NB1
model, for Type 1 policies, or a Poisson distribution, for all other policy types;
lapsation rates are best modelled using a normal-Poisson model; and the economic
variables are best modelled using the modified CAS/SOA economic model (devel-
oped in Section 7.2). In Chapter 9, a range of sensitivity tests were conducted
to determine the impact on the results of using alternative models to the “best”
models (including ignoring the dependency relationships previously mentioned and
simplifying the formulae used to calculate the model means). These tests show that
using a Poisson distribution in place of the NB1 sub-model has no significant effect
on the overall results; and that, although using a Poisson distribution in place of
the normal-Poisson lapsation sub-model or ignoring the observed dependency rela-
tionships does, in some cases, have a significant effect on the distributions of the
simulation outputs, these changes have virtually no effect on the minimum assets
that the insurer must hold under each of the stochastic solvency criteria.
However, if an alternative economic sub-model is used, or if the simplified mean
structure described in Section 8.8 is used, these changes not only have a significant
impact on the simulation output distributions, but also impact the results of the
(stochastic) minimum asset requirement calculations for some policy types. If either
the Kemp, Wilkie or CAS/SOA economic model is used in place of the modified
CAS/SOA model, this leads to higher total asset requirements for Type 3 policies,
while if the simplified mean structure is used, this leads to lower minimum asset
requirements for Type 3 and 4 policies.
The overall effect on the minimum asset requirements of making all of these
changes together is to lower the requirements for Type 1, 3 and 4 policies, with little
effect on the requirements for Type 2 policies.
3. How do the solvency requirement and capital adequacy requirement calculated
deterministically under LPS2.04 and LPS3.04 respectively compare with:
• the 99.5% VaR of the change in capital distribution over a one year time
horizon;
• the 99.5% TVaR of the change in capital distribution over a one year time
horizon;
• the 95% VaR of the change in capital distribution over a three year time hori-
zon; and
• the 95% TVaR of the change in capital distribution over a three year time
horizon;
where the change in capital is defined as in the Swiss Solvency Test?
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In all of the cases (the Base Case and the sensitivity analysis cases) considered,
for Type 1 and 2 policies, the LPS2.04 solvency capital requirement and the LPS3.04
capital adequacy capital requirement were always much greater than the 99.5% VaR
and TVaR values and 95% VaR and TVaR values. However, for Type 4 policies,
the LPS2.04 and LPS3.04 capital requirements were always greater than the 99.5%
VaR and TVaR values of −∆C (1), and much less than the 95% VaR and TVaR
values of −∆Cmin (0, 3) (with sufficiency levels of less than 0.005% in most of these
cases); while for Type 3 policies, the LPS2.04 capital requirements were always much
less than the stochastic capital requirements, and the LPS3.04 capital requirements
were generally less than the stochastic capital requirements (especially when the
distribution of −∆Cmin (0, 3) was considered).
4. How do the solvency requirement and the capital adequacy requirement cal-
culated deterministically under LPS2.04 and LPS3.04 respectively compare with the
stochastic minimum asset requirement, assuming each of the solvency capital re-
quirements listed in the previous question?
Similar to the results of the previous question, for all of the scenarios considered,
the LPS2.04 and LPS3.04 requirements are generally greater than the stochastic
asset requirements, with the exception of most of the Type 3 policy cases and all of
the Type 4 policy cases when solvency is considered over a three year time horizon,
in which case the opposite is true.
5. Do the answers to the above questions vary by class of business?
From the above, it is clear that the answers to these questions do vary by class
of business.
10.2 Implications
According to Karp (2002), the current Australian Life Insurance solvency require-
ment is set at a 95% sufficiency level over a three year time horizon, while many
other insurance regulators throughout the world set their solvency requirements at
a 99.5% sufficiency level over a one year time horizon. The results of this thesis
demonstrate that, for a typical Australian Life Insurer, although both of these cri-
teria are more than met by the deterministic LPS2.04 and LPS3.04 requirements,
if a portfolio of either Type 1 or Type 2 policies is held, the LPS2.04 and LPS3.04
requirements for a typical portfolio of Type 3 policies do not meet either of the
above criteria, and although the LPS2.04 and LPS3.04 requirements for a typical
portfolio of Type 4 polcies meet the 99.5% sufficiency level over a one year time
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horizon, they do not meet the 95% sufficiency level over a three year time horizon,
claimed by APRA.
The implications of these results are that the current Australian Life Insurance
requirements do not provide the same level of protection against insolvency for all
insurers, and, especially when solvency is considered over a three year time horizon,
provide little protection against insolvency for insurers who primarily write Type 3
and 4 insurance business, that is, “mortality risk” insurance policies. Despite this,
few solvency problems have resulted from the current solvency and capital adequacy
requirements. According to Davis (2004), in the period from 1901 to 20031, only “11
(Australian) Life Insurers entered liquidation, with the majority of these occurring
during the late 1920’s and early 1930’s, and one in 1954. . . . The most recent cases of
(Life Insurer) failure are that of Occidental Life and Regal Life”, which occurred in
1990. This low frequency of problems is probably because most insurers hold diverse
liability portfolios not primarily comprised of Type 3 and 4 policies (so there would
be some offsetting of the capital requirements between the different policy types);
it is common practice for insurers to hold more than the bare minimum amount of
capital; and no catastrophic events (from a Life Insurer’s point of view), such as an
influenza pandemic, have occurred in Australia in recent years.
Given these issues, however, we suggest that it would be advisable for APRA
to amend the existing Life Insurance solvency requirements either to increase the
deterministic requirements for portfolios containing Type 3 or 4 policies, or to move
from a deterministic solvency capital calculation regime to a stochastic regime. The
advantage of the former approach is that it is likely to be the cheaper of the two
to implement, as there are cost implications for APRA of radically rewriting the
existing solvency and capital adequacy standards, and for insurers of implementing
more complex solvency testing models. Nevertheless, we suggest that the latter
approach is preferable, since it would promote the desirable outcome of specifying
consistent capital requirements between insurers, with respect to sufficiency levels,
and furthermore, is in line with the current trends in insurance regulation in the
developed world.
If APRA were to require Life Insurers to calculate the solvency capital require-
ments on a stochastic basis, then some guidance should be provided to insurers as to
which components should be included in their solvency testing model, as differences
in the model can have a significant impact on the calculated capital requirement.
On the basis of our investigation, it appears to be unnecessary for insurers to be
required to allow for either mortality or lapsation over-dispersion, or for dependency
relationships between mortality rates, lapsation rates and the economy, in the model,
1The current Life Insurance solvency and capital adequacy requirements were first introduced
in 1995.
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as, ultimately, these had little effect on the overall asset requirements of the insurer
in our study. However, as the choice of economic sub-model and the level of com-
plexity of the mean mortality rate and lapsation rate assumptions do significantly
impact the calculated asset requirements for some policy types, in order to ensure
consistency between insurers, it is recommended that APRA select a single economic
sub-model for use in all solvency calculations and provide guidelines for setting the
sub-model means.
10.3 Limitations and Further Research
As with any research, the scope of the research conducted in this thesis was limited
by the availability of data. A number of the assumptions made in this thesis, partic-
ularly in Chapter 8, were based on evidence obtained from publicly available data,
such as insurer annual reports, which is not as detailed as the private data that is
available to insurers (for confidentiality reasons, this information could not be ob-
tained, with the exception of the data sets described in Chapter 5). The availability
of more detailed information would lead to an increase in the level of accuracy of
the assumptions underlying the solvency testing model, and hence, an increase in
the accuracy of the results.
In Section 8.5.2, it was pointed out that the answers to the various research
questions may vary depending on the composition of the insurance portfolio under
consideration. Subsequently, seven model portfolios were constructed for investiga-
tion purposes, reflecting a range of different product types and investment strategies.
However, these are not the only possible portfolios. Investigating different business
mixes (for example, porfolios containing more than one policy type) or portfolios con-
taining policies of different sizes would provide additional insight into the adequacy
of the existing solvency requirements. Further, in this thesis only investment (Type
1 and Type 2 policies) and mortality risk (Type 3 and 4 policies) Life Insurance
products were considered, not retirement income products (such as life annuities or
allocated annuities) nor disability/morbidity risk products (such as disability income
insurance or trauma insurance), in spite of the fact that these product types rep-
resent a significant proportion of the total premium income received by Australian
Life Insurers each year. This was, again, due to the fact that data relating to these
products could not be obtained. Consequently, repeating the tests carried out in
this thesis for these Life Insurance product types not considered could form a basis
for useful further research.
Finally, all assumptions made in this thesis are based on the economic and reg-
ulatory conditions that Australia has experienced in recent years and on the recent
experience of Australian Life Insurers. However, the economy, regulations and in-
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surer experience are constantly changing, and if the investigations performed in this
thesis were repeated using data relating to a different period of time, it is possible




Two sets of standard mortality tables were used in this thesis, the Australian in-
sured life mortality tables, IA95-97 M and F, produced by the Institute of Actu-
aries of Australia Mortality Committee (IAAust Mortality Committee (2001)) and
the Australian population mortality tables, ALT95-97, produced by the Australian
Government Actuary (AGA (1999)). These tables are reproduced in this section.
In addition, mortality reduction factors calculated from the (25 year) mortality im-
provement factors given in Appendix E of ALT95-97 were used to adjust the standard
mortality rates for improvements over time. These are also reproduced here.
225
226 Standard Tables
Table A.1: IA95-97 M and F




15 0.00042 0.00019 58 0.00489 0.00323
16 0.00053 0.00021 59 0.00549 0.00361
17 0.00063 0.00023 60 0.00620 0.00404
18 0.00071 0.00026 61 0.00701 0.00452
19 0.00077 0.00029 62 0.00794 0.00506
20 0.00082 0.00029 63 0.00901 0.00566
21 0.00084 0.00027 64 0.01022 0.00631
22 0.00085 0.00026 65 0.01160 0.00703
23 0.00085 0.00025 66 0.01315 0.00780
24 0.00084 0.00024 67 0.01489 0.00863
25 0.00082 0.00024 68 0.01684 0.00953
26 0.00079 0.00025 69 0.01901 0.01049
27 0.00077 0.00026 70 0.02143 0.01154
28 0.00075 0.00027 71 0.02412 0.01271
29 0.00072 0.00029 72 0.02712 0.01407
30 0.00071 0.00030 73 0.03044 0.01569
31 0.00069 0.00032 74 0.03414 0.01763
32 0.00069 0.00034 75 0.03825 0.01993
33 0.00068 0.00036 76 0.04283 0.02264
34 0.00069 0.00039 77 0.04791 0.02581
35 0.00070 0.00043 78 0.05357 0.02948
36 0.00072 0.00047 79 0.05985 0.03370
37 0.00075 0.00051 80 0.06682 0.03852
38 0.00078 0.00056 81 0.07451 0.04398
39 0.00082 0.00062 82 0.08294 0.05012
40 0.00087 0.00068 83 0.09209 0.05698
41 0.00092 0.00074 84 0.10192 0.06459
42 0.00098 0.00082 85 0.11239 0.07297
43 0.00105 0.00089 86 0.12343 0.08213
44 0.00113 0.00097 87 0.13498 0.09208
45 0.00123 0.00106 88 0.14698 0.10283
46 0.00134 0.00115 89 0.15931 0.11439
47 0.00146 0.00125 90 0.17186 0.12673
48 0.00161 0.00135 91 0.18445 0.13985
49 0.00179 0.00146 92 0.19689 0.15369
50 0.00199 0.00157 93 0.20895 0.16821
51 0.00222 0.00169 94 0.22037 0.18333
52 0.00248 0.00182 95 0.23079 0.19900
53 0.00278 0.00197 96 0.23993 0.21518
54 0.00312 0.00215 97 0.24757 0.23184
55 0.00349 0.00236 98 0.25369 0.24897
56 0.00390 0.00261 99 0.25854 0.26658
57 0.00437 0.00290
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Table A.2: ALT95-97 M and F




15 0.00039 0.00022 58 0.00823 0.00482
16 0.00056 0.00026 59 0.00918 0.00527
17 0.00079 0.00032 60 0.01024 0.00577
18 0.00104 0.00037 61 0.01143 0.00632
19 0.00117 0.00041 62 0.01275 0.00694
20 0.00120 0.00042 63 0.01422 0.00764
21 0.00121 0.00040 64 0.01584 0.00842
22 0.00122 0.00037 65 0.01763 0.00929
23 0.00123 0.00037 66 0.01960 0.01028
24 0.00124 0.00037 67 0.02174 0.01139
25 0.00125 0.00038 68 0.02408 0.01262
26 0.00126 0.00039 69 0.02660 0.01400
27 0.00127 0.00041 70 0.02931 0.01553
28 0.00128 0.00043 71 0.03220 0.01722
29 0.00130 0.00046 72 0.03529 0.01909
30 0.00131 0.00049 73 0.03859 0.02122
31 0.00133 0.00052 74 0.04225 0.02367
32 0.00136 0.00056 75 0.04642 0.02654
33 0.00138 0.00059 76 0.05124 0.02990
34 0.00142 0.00062 77 0.05673 0.03382
35 0.00145 0.00065 78 0.06289 0.03834
36 0.00150 0.00069 79 0.06972 0.04341
37 0.00155 0.00073 80 0.07722 0.04890
38 0.00161 0.00078 81 0.08538 0.05479
39 0.00167 0.00083 82 0.09419 0.06120
40 0.00174 0.00089 83 0.10364 0.06835
41 0.00182 0.00096 84 0.11373 0.07640
42 0.00192 0.00105 85 0.12443 0.08553
43 0.00203 0.00114 86 0.13574 0.09591
44 0.00216 0.00124 87 0.14764 0.10760
45 0.00231 0.00137 88 0.16010 0.12037
46 0.00249 0.00150 89 0.17298 0.13388
47 0.00270 0.00166 90 0.18600 0.14786
48 0.00295 0.00183 91 0.19756 0.16185
49 0.00323 0.00202 92 0.20646 0.17537
50 0.00356 0.00223 93 0.21344 0.18832
51 0.00394 0.00246 94 0.22020 0.20099
52 0.00436 0.00272 95 0.22745 0.21371
53 0.00484 0.00300 96 0.23453 0.22639
54 0.00537 0.00331 97 0.24178 0.23890
55 0.00597 0.00364 98 0.24951 0.25124
56 0.00664 0.00401 99 0.25770 0.26340
57 0.00739 0.00440
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Table A.3: Mortality Reduction Factors.




15 0.97264 0.97921 58 0.97025 0.97651
16 0.97368 0.97919 59 0.97079 0.97675
17 0.97478 0.97972 60 0.97135 0.97692
18 0.97614 0.98073 61 0.97195 0.97707
19 0.97793 0.98196 62 0.97258 0.97721
20 0.98019 0.98306 63 0.97325 0.97734
21 0.98287 0.98379 64 0.97393 0.97746
22 0.98582 0.98408 65 0.97462 0.97760
23 0.98880 0.98408 66 0.97529 0.97776
24 0.99159 0.98397 67 0.97594 0.97792
25 0.99399 0.98394 68 0.97656 0.97808
26 0.99590 0.98406 69 0.97711 0.97824
27 0.99725 0.98434 70 0.97760 0.97838
28 0.99806 0.98467 71 0.97805 0.97852
29 0.99836 0.98494 72 0.97848 0.97867
30 0.99817 0.98502 73 0.97893 0.97887
31 0.99752 0.98478 74 0.97943 0.97913
32 0.99642 0.98417 75 0.98003 0.97947
33 0.99493 0.98318 76 0.98074 0.97988
34 0.99312 0.98185 77 0.98155 0.98035
35 0.99107 0.98028 78 0.98243 0.98085
36 0.98887 0.97858 79 0.98334 0.98135
37 0.98661 0.97689 80 0.98425 0.98181
38 0.98432 0.97530 81 0.98510 0.98227
39 0.98205 0.97389 82 0.98591 0.98274
40 0.97981 0.97270 83 0.98665 0.98327
41 0.97765 0.97174 84 0.98734 0.98391
42 0.97563 0.97102 85 0.98799 0.98467
43 0.97380 0.97051 86 0.98860 0.98555
44 0.97219 0.97021 87 0.98916 0.98652
45 0.97081 0.97009 88 0.98965 0.98750
46 0.96967 0.97016 89 0.99004 0.98844
47 0.96880 0.97043 90 0.99028 0.98927
48 0.96820 0.97087 91 0.99035 0.98996
49 0.96784 0.97143 92 0.99026 0.99050
50 0.96770 0.97203 93 0.99006 0.99090
51 0.96771 0.97264 94 0.98980 0.99120
52 0.96786 0.97328 95 0.98956 0.99144
53 0.96812 0.97394 96 0.98941 0.99167
54 0.96846 0.97459 97 0.98936 0.99191
55 0.96887 0.97520 98 0.98946 0.99221




No standard tables exist for lapsation rates (in Australia). The “expected” lapse
rates used in this thesis, and presented in this section, were determined based on
the Single Insurer Lapse Data (described in Section 5.3.2). For each product type,
the expected lapse rate at duration d is set equal to the average lapse rate at that
duration for all of the years for which data was available.
Table A.4: Expected Lapse Rates by Curtate Duration (Years) and Policy Type.
























Australian Solvency and Capital Adequacy Requirements
B.1 Introduction
This section provides summaries of the methodologies used to calculate the solvency
and capital adequacy requirements under the Australian Life Insurance standards,
LPS2.04 and LPS3.04 respectively.
B.2 The Solvency Requirement
Under LPS2.04, the solvency requirement for a statutory fund1 is calculated using
the following methodology:
1. Calculate the solvency liability : this is done using the methodology described
in AS1.04 for determining the best estimate liability, but “allowing for current
and future bonuses subject to the appropriate application of discretions and
adopting prescribed solvency assumptions”.
2. Calculate the minimum termination value: this is determined as the greater
of “the lowest termination value2 that the company is (contractually) obliged
1Under the Life Insurance Act 1995, a statutory fund is defined as “a fund that is established
in the records of a life company and relates solely to the Life Insurance business of the company or
a particular part of that business. . . A life company must at all times have at least one statutory
fund in respect of its Life Insurance business but may have more statutory funds if it chooses to do
so”. However, it is required that an insurer maintain a separate statutory fund exclusively for its
investment-linked business, and another separate statutory fund exclusively for any Life Insurance
business carried outside Australia (if either of these is applicable).
2A termination value is the amount that an insurer must pay on the voluntary termination of
an insurance contract.
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to pay and the amount calculated in accordance with the Surrender Value
Standard (LPS4.02)”.
3. Determine the greater of the amounts in Items 1 and 2.
4. Add the expense reserve: the expense reserve is calculated as:
M × Fixed Acquisition Expenses −Offset Statutory Capital; (B.1)
where M = (1− tax rate), the fixed acquisition expenses are defined as “the
total actual acquisition expenses for the statutory fund for the 12 months prior
to the valuation date less the variable expenses included in that amount”, and
offset statutory capital is defined as “the amount of statutory capital which
is appropriately utilised in meeting the expense reserve requirements of the
statutory fund”.
5. Determine the greater of the amount calculated in Item 4 and the current
termination value for all policies in the statutory fund.
6. Add other liabilities.
7. Add the reserve for inadmissible assets: the inadmissible assets reserve is a
“reserve against the risks associated with assets, the value of which is depen-
dent on the ongoing conduct of business; holdings in associated or subsidiary
financial services entities; and concentrated asset exposures. A more detailed
list of inadmissible assets and the reserve prescribed in respect of each of these
assets is given in Section 10 of LPS2.04.
8. Add the resilience reserve: the resilience reserve, denoted RR, is calculated
using the formula:
RR = L′ ×A/A′ − L; (B.2)
where L is the solvency liability (including other liabilities) prior to the pre-
scribed change, L′ is the solvency liability after the prescribed change; A is the
value of admissible assets of the statutory fund prior to the prescribed change,
and A′ is the value of the admissible assets at the adjusted yield and further
reduced by the adverse exchange movement and credit risk default factors.
Section 11 of LPS2.04 gives details of how to calculate the prescribed yield
change, L′ and A′.
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B.3 The Capital Adequacy Requirement
Under LPS3.04, the capital adequacy requirement for a statutory fund is calculated
using the following methodology:
1. Calculate the capital adequacy liability : this is done using the the methodology
described in LPS1.04 for determining the best estimate liability, but “allow-
ing for current and future bonuses subject to the appropriate application of
discretions and adopting (prescribed) capital adequacy assumptions”.
2. Calculate the current termination value: the current termination value is the
termination value on the reporting date.
3. Determine the greater of the amounts in Items 1 and 2.
4. Add other liabilities.
5. Add the reserve for inadmissible assets: the calculation of this reserve is similar
to the calculation of the inadmissible assets reserve required under LPS2.04,
except that assets used in the conduct of business are no longer classed as
inadmissible, with the exception of defined benefit superannuation fund sur-
pluses.
6. Add the resilience reserve: the resilience reserve is calculated using Equation
(B.2), but using different prescribed yield changes from those required in the
calculation of the resilience reserve under LPS2.04.
7. Determine the greater of the amount calculated in Item 6 and the solvency
requirement calculated under LPS2.04.
8. Add the new business reserve: the new business reserve is calculated as “the
amount required to ensure that the solvency requirement of the statutory
fund will continue to be met over the next three years, allowing for capital
and profits emerging over that period from the existing business of the fund,
less the new business capital, less the offset statutory capital”.
APPENDIX C
Proofs of Mathematical Results
C.1 Change in Capital ∆C (1)
As defined in the Swiss Solvency Test (Equations (2.14) and (2.15)), the change in
capital over a one year time horizon, denoted ∆C (1), can be calculated as:
∆C (1) = C (1)− C (0)
=
A (1)− L (1)
1 +R (0, 1)
− C (0) , (C.1)
where A (t) is the value of the insurer’s assets at time t, L (t) is the value of the
insurer’s liabilities at time t, C (t) is the amount of capital held by the insurer at
time t and R (0, t) denotes the risk discount rate over the period from time 0 to
time t. By definition, A (1) is equal to the accumulated value of the insurer’s assets
at time 0, plus the accumulated value of any net cash inflows that occurred during
the period from time 0 to time 1. Assuming that all cashflows occur at either the
beginning or the end of the policy year, we have
A (1) = [A (0) + CFboy (0, 1)] (1 +R (0, 1)) + CFeoy (0, 1) ; (C.2)
where CFboy (t− 1, t) denotes the total (net) cashflows occurring at the beginning of
the period from time t− 1 to t and CFeoy (t− 1, t) denotes the total (net) cashflows
occurring at the end of the period from time t− 1 to t. Also, by definition,
A (0) = L (0) + C (0) . (C.3)
235
236 Proofs of Mathematical Results
Combining Equations (C.1), (C.2) and (C.3) gives:
∆C (1) =
A (1)− L (1)
1 +R (0, 1)
− C (0)
=
[A (0) + CFboy (0, 1)] (1 +R (0, 1)) + CFeoy (0, 1)− L (1)
1 +R (0, 1)
− C (0)
= A (0) + CFboy (0, 1) +
CFeoy (0, 1)− L (1)
1 +R (0, 1)
− C (0)
= L (0) + C (0) + CFboy (0, 1) +
CFeoy (0, 1)− L (1)
1 +R (0, 1)
− C (0)
= L (0) + CFboy (0, 1) +
CFeoy (0, 1)− L (1)
1 +R (0, 1)
. (C.4)
If the insurer’s non-policy liabilities are equal to zero, as is assumed throughout this
thesis, then
∆C (1) = PL (0) + CFboy (0, 1) +
CFeoy (0, 1)− PL (1)
1 +R (0, 1)
; (C.5)
where PL (t) denotes the insurer’s policy liabilities at time t.
C.2 VaR of the −∆C (1) Distribution
If assets exceed liabilities at time t = 1 with probability 99.5%, then
Pr (C (1) > 0) > 0.995. (C.6)
This can be rewritten as
Pr (C (1)− C (0) > −C (0)) > 0.995 (C.7)
Pr (∆C (1) > −C (0)) > 0.995. (C.8)
∆C (1) is the profit over the period from time 0 to time 1. Therefore, the loss over
the period from time 0 to time 1 is −∆C (1). Rearranging Equation (C.8) gives
Pr (−∆C (1) < C (0)) > 0.995
Pr (−∆C (1) > C (0)) ≤ 0.005. (C.9)
By the definition given in Section 2.6, the maximum value of C (0) such that Equa-
tion (C.9) is true is the 99.5% VaR of the distribution of −∆C (1).
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C.3 Change in Capital ∆C (t)
As defined in Equations (8.2):
∆C (0, t) = C (t)− C (0)
=
A (t)− L (t)
1 +R (0, t)
− C (0) . (C.10)
Also, by analogy to Equation (C.2),
A (t) = [A (t− 1) + CFboy (t− 1, t)] (1 +R (t− 1, t)) + CFeoy (t− 1, t) . (C.11)
By repeated substitution into Equation (C.11):




(CFeoy (i− 2, i− 1) + CFboy (i− 1, i)) (1 +R (i− 1, t))
+ CFeoy (t− 1, t) , t ≥ 2; (C.12)
where
1 +R (0, t) =
t∏
i=1
(1 +R (0, i)) . (C.13)
Combining Equations (C.3), (C.10) and (C.12) gives:




CFeoy (i− 2, i− 1) + CFboy (i− 1, i)
1 +R (0, i− 1)
+
CFeoy (t− 1, t)− L (t)
1 +R (0, t)
− C (0)




CFeoy (i− 2, i− 1) + CFboy (i− 1, i)
1 +R (0, i− 1)
+
CFeoy (t− 1, t)− L (t)
1 +R (0, t)
. (C.14)
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If the insurer’s non-policy liabilities are equal to zero, then




CFeoy (i− 2, i− 1) + CFboy (i− 1, i)
1 +R (0, i− 1)
+
CFeoy (t− 1, t)− PL (t)
1 +R (0, t)
. (C.15)
C.4 VaR of the −∆Cmin (0, 3) Distribution
If assets exceed liabilities at times t = 1, 2 and 3 with probability 95%, then
Pr (C (1) > 0, C (2) > 0, C (3) > 0) > 0.95. (C.16)
This can be rewritten as
Pr (∆C (1) > −C (0) ,∆C (0, 2) > −C (0) ,∆C (0, 3) > −C (0)) > 0.95; (C.17)
hence
Pr (min (∆C (1) ,∆C (0, 2) ,∆C (0, 3)) > −C (0)) > 0.95; (C.18)
and so
Pr (∆Cmin (0, 3) > −C (0)) > 0.95; (C.19)
where ∆Cmin (0, 3) = min (∆C (1) ,∆C (0, 2) ,∆C (0, 3)).
∆C (0, t) is the profit over the period from time 0 to time t. Therefore, the loss
over the period from time 0 to time t is −∆C (0, t), and −∆Cmin (0, 3) is clearly a
loss random variable. Rearranging Equation (C.19) gives
Pr (−∆Cmin (0, 3) < C (0)) > 0.95
Pr (−∆Cmin (0, 3) > C (0)) ≤ 0.95. (C.20)
By the definition given in Section 2.6, the maximum value of C (0) such that Equa-
tion (C.9) is true is the 95% VaR of the distribution of −∆Cmin (0, 3).
APPENDIX D
Detailed Sensitivity Analysis Outputs


























































































































Liability Asset Economic −∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
Portfolio Portfolio Model 99.5% VaR 99.5% TVaR 95% VaR 95% TVaR
1 3 Kemp 18,377.83 18,754.08 17,420.72 17,939.84
1 3 Wilkie 18,256.89 18,639.33 17,170.05 17,705.58
1 3 CAS/SOA 17,835.29 18,248.00 16,607.74 17,153.91
1 3 Mod. C/S 17,841.06 18,291.29 17,105.72 17,817.05
2 1 Kemp 64,183.25 64,282.00 63,929.56 64,055.12
2 1 Wilkie 63,086.07 63,103.17 62,644.49 62,842.95
2 1 CAS/SOA 63,270.03 63,517.52 62,497.37 62,842.66
2 1 Mod. C/S 62,939.51 63,064.39 62,457.85 62,670.54
2 2 Kemp 44,805.37 44,893.55 44,495.61 44,648.31
2 2 Wilkie 43,995.09 44,215.28 43,526.42 43,753.95
2 2 CAS/SOA 43,754.19 43,764.51 43,212.71 43,454.75
2 2 Mod. C/S 43,972.19 43,998.12 43,390.50 43,650.43
2 3 Kemp 33,904.83 34,117.75 33,251.39 33,587.49
2 3 Wilkie 33,245.68 33,473.72 32,566.98 32,872.16
2 3 CAS/SOA 32,921.47 33,165.81 32,186.38 32,515.14
2 3 Mod. C/S 33,327.10 33,626.25 32,509.20 32,876.88
2 4 Kemp 28,607.83 28,894.70 27,867.65 28,207.00
2 4 Wilkie 28,074.52 28,340.39 27,323.30 27,665.76
2 4 CAS/SOA 27,760.84 28,063.36 26,935.59 27,328.89
2 4 Mod. C/S 28,235.72 28,560.08 27,312.62 27,737.12
3 1 Kemp 1,637.10 1,645.77 2,277.12 2,293.44
3 1 Wilkie 1,733.68 1,779.22 2,208.26 2,274.97
3 1 CAS/SOA 2,023.89 2,097.81 2,394.93 2,498.80
3 1 Mod. C/S 1,466.04 1,507.17 1,918.65 1,976.98
4 1 Kemp -343.93 -334.27 548.10 554.31
4 1 Wilkie -400.43 -387.07 557.93 571.38
4 1 CAS/SOA -388.60 -372.45 585.75 605.07

















Table D.2: Ratios of the LPS2.04 Solvency Requirements to the Stochastic Minimum Asset Requirements for the Economic Sub-Model
Sensitivity Analysis Scenarios
Liability Asset Economic −∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
Portfolio Portfolio Model 99.5% VaR 99.5% TVaR 95% VaR 95% TVaR
1 3 Kemp 131% 128% 138% 134%
1 3 Wilkie 128% 125% 136% 132%
1 3 CAS/SOA 130% 127% 139% 135%
1 3 Mod. C/S 126% 123% 131% 126%
2 1 Kemp 110% 110% 110% 110%
2 1 Wilkie 112% 112% 113% 112%
2 1 CAS/SOA 112% 111% 113% 112%
2 1 Mod. C/S 112% 112% 113% 113%
2 2 Kemp 118% 118% 119% 119%
2 2 Wilkie 121% 120% 122% 121%
2 2 CAS/SOA 121% 121% 123% 122%
2 2 Mod. C/S 121% 121% 122% 122%
2 3 Kemp 124% 124% 127% 126%
2 3 Wilkie 127% 126% 129% 128%
2 3 CAS/SOA 128% 127% 131% 130%
2 3 Mod. C/S 126% 125% 130% 128%
2 4 Kemp 128% 127% 132% 130%
2 4 Wilkie 131% 130% 134% 133%
2 4 CAS/SOA 132% 131% 136% 134%
2 4 Mod. C/S 130% 129% 134% 132%
3 1 Kemp 81% 81% 59% 58%
3 1 Wilkie 58% 57% 46% 44%
3 1 CAS/SOA 51% 49% 43% 41%
3 1 Mod. C/S 54% 53% 41% 40%
4 1 Kemp -8% -8% 5% 5%
4 1 Wilkie -8% -9% 6% 6%
4 1 CAS/SOA -9% -10% 6% 6%


























Table D.3: Ratios of the LPS3.04 Capital Adequacy Requirements to the Stochastic Minimum Asset Requirements for the Economic
Sub-Model Sensitivity Analysis Scenarios
Liability Asset Economic −∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
Portfolio Portfolio Model 99.5% VaR 99.5% TVaR 95% VaR 95% TVaR
1 3 Kemp 131% 128% 138% 134%
1 3 Wilkie 128% 125% 136% 132%
1 3 CAS/SOA 130% 127% 139% 135%
1 3 Mod. C/S 126% 123% 131% 126%
2 1 Kemp 110% 110% 110% 110%
2 1 Wilkie 112% 112% 113% 112%
2 1 CAS/SOA 112% 111% 113% 112%
2 1 Mod. C/S 112% 112% 113% 113%
2 2 Kemp 118% 118% 119% 119%
2 2 Wilkie 121% 120% 122% 121%
2 2 CAS/SOA 121% 121% 123% 122%
2 2 Mod. C/S 121% 121% 122% 122%
2 3 Kemp 124% 124% 127% 126%
2 3 Wilkie 127% 126% 129% 128%
2 3 CAS/SOA 128% 127% 131% 130%
2 3 Mod. C/S 126% 125% 130% 128%
2 4 Kemp 128% 127% 132% 130%
2 4 Wilkie 131% 130% 134% 133%
2 4 CAS/SOA 132% 131% 136% 134%
2 4 Mod. C/S 130% 129% 134% 132%
3 1 Kemp 118% 117% 85% 84%
3 1 Wilkie 83% 81% 65% 63%
3 1 CAS/SOA 73% 71% 62% 59%
3 1 Mod. C/S 79% 76% 60% 58%
4 1 Kemp -8% -8% 5% 5%
4 1 Wilkie -8% -9% 6% 6%
4 1 CAS/SOA -9% -10% 6% 6%































































































Liability Asset Economic −∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
Portfolio Portfolio Model
Iterations
Mean Std. Dev. Skew. Mean Std. Dev. Skew.
1 3 Kemp 2400 -683.74 938.24 -0.0030 -574.39 946.14 -0.0044
1 3 Wilkie 2100 -733.56 915.15 -0.0255 -496.83 797.60 0.0905
1 3 CAS/SOA 3100 -995.78 939.15 0.0339 -969.59 937.12 0.0324





































































































































Liability Asset Economic −∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
Portfolio Portfolio Model
Iterations
Mean Std. Dev. Skew. Mean Std. Dev. Skew.
1 3 Kemp 1800 -688.79 965.83 0.1051 -579.98 973.87 0.1078
1 3 Wilkie 2100 -718.47 909.61 0.0858 -481.27 798.88 0.1700
1 3 CAS/SOA 1600 -995.36 931.72 0.1052 -970.57 925.50 0.0998
1 3 Mod. C/S 2000 -855.29 997.51 0.1685 -626.07 1121.00 0.3159
2 1 Kemp 600 -1042.42 107.29 0.5078 -1042.42 107.29 0.5078
2 1 Wilkie 200 -1066.57 411.65 -0.0387 -1066.57 411.65 -0.0387
2 1 CAS/SOA 1700 -1064.81 627.71 -0.0487 -1064.81 627.71 -0.0487
2 1 Mod. C/S 1000 -1057.06 376.47 0.0278 -1057.06 376.47 0.0278
2 2 Kemp 800 -1016.74 356.61 -0.1948 -1016.74 356.61 -0.1948
2 2 Wilkie 400 -1026.05 411.32 -0.1104 -1026.05 411.32 -0.1104
2 2 CAS/SOA 700 -1136.17 502.46 -0.0814 -1136.17 502.46 -0.0814
2 2 Mod. C/S 1000 -1096.93 434.57 0.0691 -1096.93 434.57 0.0691
2 3 Kemp 1700 -939.57 568.87 0.0622 -939.57 568.87 0.0622
2 3 Wilkie 1600 -938.60 546.40 0.0283 -938.60 546.40 0.0283
2 3 CAS/SOA 900 -1090.55 549.16 0.0288 -1090.55 549.16 0.0288
2 3 Mod. C/S 1200 -1036.32 606.02 -0.0406 -1036.32 606.02 -0.0406
2 4 Kemp 1200 -863.17 599.97 0.1858 -863.17 599.97 0.1858
2 4 Wilkie 1800 -869.31 610.16 0.1472 -869.31 610.16 0.1472
2 4 CAS/SOA 900 -1027.21 621.79 0.1789 -1027.21 621.79 0.1789
2 4 Mod. C/S 1100 -961.11 663.73 0.3313 -961.11 663.73 0.3313
3 1 Kemp 4700 -6.48 42.46 -1.4673 460.69 55.85 -1.5421
3 1 Wilkie 4800 -18.97 174.99 -0.4607 409.56 199.41 -0.5752
3 1 CAS/SOA 9700 -10.81 246.42 -0.1698 423.95 261.33 -0.2470
3 1 Mod. C/S 6700 -8.64 121.95 -0.0792 414.26 138.56 -0.1575
4 1 Kemp 8800 0.33 8.38 0.1974 709.57 7.34 -0.2340
4 1 Wilkie 9000 0.48 28.62 -0.0162 752.58 22.51 -0.0275
4 1 CAS/SOA 10,000 0.03 45.45 -0.0939 751.33 39.05 -0.1329
4 1 Mod. C/S 10,000 0.22 28.15 -0.0101 752.48 22.67 -0.0402
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Table D.6: Levels of Sufficiency (on a VaR Basis) of the LPS2.04 and LPS3.04
Capital Amounts for the Lapsation Sub-Model Sensitivity Analysis Scenarios
Liability Asset Economic Solvency Cap. Ad.
Portfolio Portfolio Model Capital Req. Capital Req.
−∆C (1)
2 1 Kemp > 99.99% > 99.99%
4 1 Kemp > 99.99% > 99.99%
−∆Cmin (0, 3)
2 1 Kemp > 99.99% > 99.99%
3 1 Kemp 0.00% 7.17%
4 1 Kemp 0.00% 0.00%
4 1 Wilkie 0.00% 0.00%
Table D.7: Stochastic Minimum Asset Requirements for the Lapsation Sub-Model
Sensitivity Analysis Scenarios ($)
Liability Asset Economic −∆C (1)
Portfolio Portfolio Model 99.5% VaR 99.5% TVaR
2 1 Kemp 64,002.13 64,037.00
4 1 Kemp -353.75 -350.62
Liability Asset Economic −∆Cmin (0, 3)
Portfolio Portfolio Model 95% VaR 95% TVaR
2 1 Kemp 63,762.25 63,851.03
3 1 Kemp 2242.61 2253.74
4 1 Kemp 561.26 564.90
4 1 Wilkie 537.91 549.92
Table D.8: p-values for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Anderson-Darling Tests for
the Lapsation Sub-Model Sensitivity Analysis Scenarios
Liability Asset Economic −∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
Portfolio Portfolio Model KS AD KS AD
2 1 Kemp 0.117 0.000* 0.117 0.000*
3 1 Kemp - - 0.000* 0.000*
4 1 Kemp 0.005* 0.000* 0.032* 0.000*
4 1 Wilkie - - 0.853 0.427






















































































































































Liability Asset Economic −∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
Portfolio Portfolio Model
Iterations
Mean Std. Dev. Skew. Mean Std. Dev. Skew.
1 3 Kemp 2300 -667.05 928.83 0.0381 -557.87 935.78 0.0387
1 3 Wilkie 3900 -735.77 930.99 0.0744 -503.31 813.38 0.1752
1 3 CAS/SOA 3400 -994.15 921.79 0.0598 -971.51 919.70 0.0607


























































































Liability Asset Economic −∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
Portfolio Portfolio Model
Iterations
Mean Std. Dev. Skew. Mean Std. Dev. Skew.
1 3 Kemp 1100 -675.34 947.98 0.1151 -564.77 955.09 0.1132
1 3 Wilkie 11,200 -724.23 933.68 0.0100 -483.09 815.59 0.0743
1 3 CAS/SOA 15,700 -992.22 939.99 0.0715 -968.35 937.53 0.0653
1 3 Mod. C/S 12,800 -861.48 982.30 0.1495 -633.85 1101.07 0.2820
2 1 Kemp 200 -1055.19 103.37 0.0726 -1055.19 103.37 0.0726
2 1 Wilkie 1300 -1053.14 488.69 -0.0763 -1053.14 488.69 -0.0763
2 1 CAS/SOA 1800 -1059.70 619.54 -0.0237 -1059.70 619.54 -0.0237
2 1 Mod. C/S 65,000 -1049.28 506.99 0.0038 -1049.28 506.99 0.0038
2 2 Kemp 1300 -1025.20 362.31 -0.1361 -1025.20 362.31 -0.1361
2 2 Wilkie 700 -1035.54 468.50 -0.1580 -1035.54 468.50 -0.1580
2 2 CAS/SOA 1100 -1132.46 498.65 -0.0641 -1132.46 498.65 -0.0641
2 2 Mod. C/S 800 -1092.43 463.50 0.0774 -1092.43 463.50 0.0774
2 3 Kemp 800 -926.38 560.11 0.1822 -926.38 560.11 0.1822
2 3 Wilkie 1300 -940.29 561.84 0.0801 -940.29 561.84 0.0801
2 3 CAS/SOA 1200 -1089.73 581.71 0.0198 -1089.73 581.71 0.0198
2 3 Mod. C/S 900 -1028.68 598.67 0.0667 -1028.68 598.67 0.0667
2 4 Kemp 1600 -861.98 617.39 0.1302 -861.98 617.39 0.1302
2 4 Wilkie 1300 -864.93 607.51 0.0182 -864.93 607.51 0.0182
2 4 CAS/SOA 900 -1023.16 589.84 -0.0239 -1023.16 589.84 -0.0239
2 4 Mod. C/S 1000 -971.45 677.99 0.1381 -971.45 677.99 0.1381
3 1 Kemp 5200 2.07 25.79 0.0177 472.07 26.66 0.0064
3 1 Wilkie 7300 -3.44 147.13 -0.1261 437.08 157.57 -0.1946
3 1 CAS/SOA 9400 -11.16 249.09 -0.1733 427.05 268.34 -0.2839
3 1 Mod. C/S 10,000 -0.70 107.88 -0.0108 429.68 119.68 -0.0603
4 1 Kemp 10,000 -0.17 8.57 -0.0292 710.00 5.74 -0.0430
4 1 Wilkie 10,000 0.14 40.11 -0.1284 743.36 32.03 -0.1838
4 1 CAS/SOA 10,000 0.26 47.90 -0.0259 748.63 40.31 -0.0718
4 1 Mod. C/S 10,000 -0.03 37.21 -0.0465 743.23 30.26 -0.0865
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Table D.11: Best Estimate Liabilities, and Solvency and Capital Adequacy Capital
Requirements Per Policy for the Dependencies Sensitivity Analysis Scenarios ($)
Liability Asset Economic Best Est. Solvency Cap. Ad.
Portfolio Portfolio Model Liability Capital Req. Capital Req.
1 3 Kemp 15,995.38 8,047.70 8,047.70
1 3 Wilkie 15,995.65 7,342.64 7,342.64
1 3 CAS/SOA 15,822.12 7,316.60 7,316.60
1 3 Mod. C/S 15,478.73 6,935.23 6,935.23
2 1 Kemp 64,904.92 5,671.54 5,671.54
2 1 Wilkie 63,149.02 7,427.44 7,427.44
2 1 CAS/SOA 62,604.34 7,972.12 7,972.12
2 1 Mod. C/S 62,992.44 7,584.02 7,584.02
2 2 Kemp 45,064.95 7,983.92 7,983.92
2 2 Wilkie 44,008.51 9,040.36 9,040.36
2 2 CAS/SOA 43,677.18 9,371.69 9,371.69
2 2 Mod. C/S 43,909.86 9,139.01 9,139.01
2 3 Kemp 33,275.38 8,877.66 8,877.66
2 3 Wilkie 32,607.06 9,545.98 9,545.98
2 3 CAS/SOA 32,374.01 9,779.03 9,779.03
2 3 Mod. C/S 32,534.05 9,618.99 9,618.99
2 4 Kemp 27,637.66 9,088.21 9,088.21
2 4 Wilkie 27,143.88 9,581.99 9,581.99
2 4 CAS/SOA 26,948.45 9,777.42 9,777.42
2 4 Mod. C/S 27,080.55 9,645.32 9,645.32
3 1 Kemp 1,550.87 -217.21 374.09
3 1 Wilkie 1,278.54 -266.84 158.30
3 1 CAS/SOA 1,290.26 -261.53 192.47
3 1 Mod. C/S 1,084.66 -291.05 67.91
4 1 Kemp -385.28 413.67 413.67
4 1 Wilkie -498.19 531.91 531.91
4 1 CAS/SOA -534.05 569.99 569.99
4 1 Mod. C/S -505.85 540.01 540.01
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Table D.12: Levels of Sufficiency (on a VaR Basis) of the LPS2.04 and LPS3.04
Capital Amounts for the Dependencies Sensitivity Analysis Scenarios
Liability Asset Economic Solvency Cap. Ad.
Portfolio Portfolio Model Capital Req. Capital Req.
−∆C (1)
1 3 Wilkie > 99.99% > 99.99%
1 3 CAS/SOA > 99.99% > 99.99%
1 3 Mod. C/S > 99.99% > 99.99%
2 1 Mod. C/S > 99.99% > 99.99%
3 1 Kemp 0.00% > 99.99%
3 1 Wilkie 4.22% 86.33%
3 1 Mod. C/S 0.28% 73.44%
4 1 Kemp > 99.99% > 99.99%
4 1 Wilkie > 99.99% > 99.99%
4 1 CAS/SOA > 99.99% > 99.99%
4 1 Mod. C/S > 99.99% > 99.99%
−∆Cmin (0, 3)
2 1 Mod. C/S > 99.99% > 99.99%
3 1 Kemp 0.00% 0.01%
3 1 Wilkie 0.00% 4.57%
3 1 Mod. C/S 0.00% 0.10%
4 1 Kemp 0.00% 0.00%
4 1 Wilkie 0.00% 0.00%
4 1 CAS/SOA 0.00% 0.00%
4 1 Mod. C/S 0.00% 0.00%
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Table D.13: Stochastic Minimum Asset Requirements for the Dependencies Sensi-
tivity Analysis Scenarios ($)
Liability Asset Economic −∆C (1)
Portfolio Portfolio Model 99.5% VaR 99.5% TVaR
1 3 Wilkie 18,264.57 18,706.55
1 3 CAS/SOA 17,829.62 18,289.66
1 3 Mod. C/S 17,846.88 18,364.40
2 1 Mod. C/S 62,967.45 63,178.27
3 1 Kemp 1,642.62 1,653.45
3 1 Wilkie 1,749.92 1,798.26
3 1 Mod. C/S 1,441.82 1,492.69
4 1 Kemp -357.73 -354.89
4 1 Wilkie -394.15 -381.46
4 1 CAS/SOA -381.25 -365.57
4 1 Mod. C/S -405.65 -390.68
Liability Asset Economic −∆Cmin (0, 3)
Portfolio Portfolio Model 95% VaR 95% TVaR
2 1 Mod. C/S 62,334.78 62,625.55
3 1 Kemp 2,243.98 2,260.49
3 1 Wilkie 2,184.45 2,257.10
3 1 Mod. C/S 1,892.33 1,954.18
4 1 Kemp 534.45 537.42
4 1 Wilkie 581.36 597.52
4 1 CAS/SOA 598.22 619.84

















Table D.14: Ratios of the LPS2.04 and LPS3.04 Requirements to the Stochastic Minimum Asset Requirements for the Dependencies
Sensitivity Analysis Scenarios
Liability Asset Economic −∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
Portfolio Portfolio Model 99.5% VaR 99.5% TVaR 95% VaR 95% TVaR
Solvency Requirement (LPS2.04) Ratios
1 3 Wilkie 128% 125% - -
1 3 CAS/SOA 130% 126% - -
1 3 Mod. C/S 126% 122% - -
2 1 Mod. C/S 112% 112% 113% 113%
3 1 Kemp 81% 81% 59% 59%
3 1 Wilkie 57% 56% 46% 44%
3 1 Mod. C/S 55% 53% 42% 41%
4 1 Kemp -8% -8% 5% 5%
4 1 Wilkie -9% -10% 6% 6%
4 1 CAS/SOA -10% -10% 6% 6%
4 1 Mod. C/S -9% -9% 6% 6%
Capital Adequacy Requirement (LPS2.04) Ratios
1 3 Wilkie 128% 125% - -
1 3 CAS/SOA 130% 126% - -
1 3 Mod. C/S 126% 122% - -
2 1 Mod. C/S 112% 112% 113% 113%
3 1 Kemp 117% 116% 86% 85%
3 1 Wilkie 83% 81% 67% 65%
3 1 Mod. C/S 83% 80% 63% 61%
4 1 Kemp -8% -8% 5% 5%
4 1 Wilkie -9% -10% 6% 6%
4 1 CAS/SOA -10% -10% 6% 6%
4 1 Mod. C/S -9% -9% 6% 6%
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Table D.15: p-values for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Anderson-Darling Tests for
the Dependencies Sensitivity Analysis Scenarios
Liability Asset Economic −∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
Portfolio Portfolio Model KS AD KS AD
1 3 Wilkie 0.282 0.282 - -
1 3 CAS/SOA 0.931 0.880 - -
1 3 Mod. C/S 0.044* 0.002* - -
2 1 Mod. C/S 0.930 0.752 0.930 0.752
3 1 Kemp 0.930 0.910 0.599 0.478
3 1 Wilkie 0.139 0.000* 0.025* 0.000*
3 1 CAS/SOA 0.020* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
3 1 Mod. C/S 0.362 0.041* 0.102 0.001*
4 1 Kemp 0.854 0.532 0.495 0.344
4 1 Wilkie 0.163 0.000* 0.037* 0.000*
4 1 CAS/SOA 0.656 0.141 0.253 0.006*
4 1 Mod. C/S 0.673 0.063* 0.491 0.003*



























































































Liability Asset Economic −∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
Portfolio Portfolio Model
Iterations
Mean Std. Dev. Skew. Mean Std. Dev. Skew.
1 3 Kemp 2600 -668.24 931.85 0.0384 -536.47 940.50 0.0356
1 3 Wilkie 6600 -708.62 925.88 0.0919 -444.28 802.04 0.1636
1 3 CAS/SOA 2100 -966.52 905.32 0.1336 -933.33 920.45 0.1532
1 3 Mod. C/S 2300 -841.65 980.23 0.1463 -586.06 1114.14 0.3142
2 1 Kemp 900 -1038.20 54.62 0.0600 -1038.20 54.62 0.0600
2 1 Wilkie 900 -1076.41 88.87 0.0293 -1076.41 88.87 0.0293
2 1 CAS/SOA 200 -1087.24 55.58 0.2419 -1087.24 55.58 0.2419
2 1 Mod. C/S 500 -1071.81 52.42 -0.0800 -1071.81 52.42 -0.0800
2 2 Kemp 700 -1009.02 355.59 -0.1393 -1009.02 355.59 -0.1393
2 2 Wilkie 1000 -1053.08 333.01 -0.1827 -1053.08 333.01 -0.1827
2 2 CAS/SOA 700 -1155.36 346.30 -0.1746 -1155.36 346.30 -0.1746
2 2 Mod. C/S 800 -1118.07 384.03 -0.0787 -1118.07 384.03 -0.0787
2 3 Kemp 1300 -925.64 554.38 0.1184 -925.64 554.38 0.1184
2 3 Wilkie 1700 -956.12 537.12 -0.0643 -956.12 537.12 -0.0643
2 3 CAS/SOA 1000 -1101.29 534.05 0.0092 -1101.29 534.05 0.0092
2 3 Mod. C/S 1500 -1043.20 592.78 0.1758 -1043.20 592.78 0.1758
2 4 Kemp 1800 -855.02 621.20 0.1170 -855.02 621.20 0.1170
2 4 Wilkie 1000 -885.42 591.44 0.1635 -885.42 591.44 0.1635
2 4 CAS/SOA 600 -1050.29 613.31 0.2053 -1050.29 613.31 0.2053
2 4 Mod. C/S 1500 -960.86 656.40 0.2153 -960.86 656.40 0.2153
3 1 Kemp 4800 1.69 8.28 0.0936 459.09 7.44 0.0472
3 1 Wilkie 5800 -1.35 25.06 0.0618 449.78 28.06 0.0364
3 1 CAS/SOA 6000 -1.85 18.39 0.0592 447.73 18.01 0.0416
3 1 Mod. C/S 10,000 -0.47 18.37 0.0226 456.26 17.19 0.0073
4 1 Kemp 5900 -0.44 6.19 0.0163 729.30 3.94 -0.0102
4 1 Wilkie 10,000 0.49 9.02 -0.0655 729.22 4.23 -0.0138
4 1 CAS/SOA 8200 0.59 7.44 0.0405 728.45 3.94 0.0283
4 1 Mod. C/S 5500 0.19 7.81 0.0044 727.97 4.06 0.0179
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Table D.17: Best Estimate Liabilities, and Solvency and Capital Adequacy Capital
Requirements Per Policy for the Distributional Mean Sub-Model Sensitivity Analysis
Scenarios ($)
Liability Asset Economic Best Est. Solvency Cap. Ad.
Portfolio Portfolio Model Liability Capital Req. Capital Req.
1 3 Kemp 15,676.76 4,804.05 6,413.49
1 3 Wilkie 15,644.01 4,780.01 6,405.66
1 3 CAS/SOA 15,287.20 4,710.54 6,410.19
1 3 Mod. C/S 15,287.20 4,713.53 6,411.25
2 1 Kemp 64,016.44 6,560.02 6,560.02
2 1 Wilkie 64,017.25 6,559.21 6,559.21
2 1 CAS/SOA 64,019.35 6,557.11 6,557.11
2 1 Mod. C/S 64,017.72 6,558.74 6,558.74
2 2 Kemp 44,515.63 8,533.24 8,533.24
2 2 Wilkie 44,515.06 8,533.81 8,533.81
2 2 CAS/SOA 44,511.26 8,537.61 8,537.61
2 2 Mod. C/S 44,513.60 8,535.27 8,535.27
2 3 Kemp 32,915.46 9,237.58 9,237.58
2 3 Wilkie 32,917.30 9,235.74 9,235.74
2 3 CAS/SOA 32,898.38 9,254.66 9,254.66
2 3 Mod. C/S 32,909.84 9,243.20 9,243.20
2 4 Kemp 27,363.63 9,362.24 9,362.24
2 4 Wilkie 27,367.43 9,358.44 9,358.44
2 4 CAS/SOA 27,337.23 9,388.64 9,388.64
2 4 Mod. C/S 27,355.64 9,370.23 9,370.23
3 1 Kemp 1,251.84 -201.06 219.46
3 1 Wilkie 1,249.88 -201.58 219.44
3 1 CAS/SOA 1,225.96 -201.21 222.06
3 1 Mod. C/S 1,225.96 -201.21 222.06
4 1 Kemp -611.01 642.93 642.93
4 1 Wilkie -610.53 642.33 642.33
4 1 CAS/SOA -604.36 635.87 635.87

















Table D.18: Stochastic Minimum Asset Requirements for the Distributional Mean Sensitivity Analysis Scenarios ($)
Liability Asset Economic −∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
Portfolio Portfolio Model 99.5% VaR 99.5% TVaR 95% VaR 95% TVaR
1 3 Wilkie - - 16,861.17 17,406.13
2 1 Kemp 62,829.74 62,849.27 62,754.91 62,792.94
2 1 Wilkie 62,887.79 62,923.06 62,781.45 62,831.34
2 1 CAS/SOA 62,771.32 62,806.94 62,697.06 62,733.71
2 1 Mod.C/S 62,767.67 62,781.18 62,706.96 62,736.25
2 2 Wilkie 44,166.96 44,331.66 43,834.64 44,001.37
2 2 CAS/SOA 44,089.43 44,181.06 43,704.70 43,902.61
3 1 Kemp 1,283.56 1,287.70 1,870.33 1,874.50
3 1 Wilkie 1,332.82 1,341.09 1,901.44 1,917.28
3 1 CAS/SOA 1,284.56 1,292.66 1,850.26 1,860.25
3 1 Mod.C/S 1,288.48 1,295.70 1,859.04 1,868.78
4 1 Kemp -591.31 -588.80 354.80 356.86
4 1 Wilkie -580.56 -576.94 355.59 357.73
4 1 CAS/SOA -578.34 -575.36 357.03 359.16


























Table D.19: Ratios of the LPS2.04 Solvency Requirements to the Stochastic Minimum Asset Requirements for the Distributional Mean
Sensitivity Analysis Scenarios
Liability Asset Economic −∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
Portfolio Portfolio Model 99.5% VaR 99.5% TVaR 95% VaR 95% TVaR
1 3 Wilkie - - 121% 117%
2 1 Wilkie 112% 112% 112% 112%
2 1 CAS/SOA 112% 112% 113% 113%
2 1 Mod. C/S 112% 112% 113% 112%
2 2 Wilkie 120% 120% 121% 121%
2 2 CAS/SOA 120% 120% 121% 121%
3 1 Kemp 82% 82% 56% 56%
3 1 Wilkie 79% 78% 55% 55%
3 1 CAS/SOA 80% 79% 55% 55%
3 1 Mod. C/S 80% 79% 55% 55%
4 1 Kemp -5% -5% 9% 9%
4 1 Wilkie -5% -6% 9% 9%
4 1 CAS/SOA -5% -5% 9% 9%

















Table D.20: Ratios of the LPS3.04 Capital Adequacy Requirements to the Stochastic Minimum Asset Requirements for the Distributional
Mean Sensitivity Analysis Scenarios
Liability Asset Economic −∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
Portfolio Portfolio Model 99.5% VaR 99.5% TVaR 95% VaR 95% TVaR
1 3 Wilkie - - 131% 127%
2 1 Kemp 112% 112% 112% 112%
2 1 Wilkie 112% 112% 112% 112%
2 1 CAS/SOA 112% 112% 113% 113%
2 1 Mod. C/S 112% 112% 113% 112%
2 2 Wilkie 120% 120% 121% 121%
2 2 CAS/SOA 120% 120% 121% 121%
3 1 Kemp 115% 114% 79% 78%
3 1 Wilkie 110% 110% 77% 77%
3 1 CAS/SOA 113% 112% 78% 78%
3 1 Mod. C/S 112% 112% 78% 77%
4 1 Kemp -5% -5% 9% 9%
4 1 Wilkie -5% -6% 9% 9%
4 1 CAS/SOA -5% -5% 9% 9%
4 1 Mod. C/S -5% -5% 9% 9%
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Table D.21: p-values for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Anderson-Darling Tests for
the Distributional Mean Sensitivity Analysis Scenarios
Liability Asset Economic −∆C (1) −∆Cmin (0, 3)
Portfolio Portfolio Model KS AD KS AD
1 3 Wilkie - - 0.431 0.036*
2 1 Kemp 0.997 0.866 0.997 0.866
2 1 Wilkie 0.976 0.871 0.976 0.871
2 1 CAS/SOA 0.548 0.228 0.548 0.228
2 1 Mod. C/S 0.619 0.547 0.619 0.547
2 2 Wilkie 0.795 0.157 0.795 0.157
2 2 CAS/SOA 0.379 0.128 0.379 0.128
3 1 Kemp 0.827 0.099 0.703 0.461
3 1 Wilkie 0.509 0.028* 0.689 0.222
3 1 CAS/SOA 0.335 0.046* 0.974 0.462
3 1 Mod. C/S 0.947 0.514 0.981 0.871
4 1 Kemp 0.831 0.344 0.973 0.893
4 1 Wilkie 0.682 0.092 0.733 0.392
4 1 CAS/SOA 0.257 0.010* 0.569 0.082
4 1 Mod. C/S 0.707 0.266 0.557 0.021*
Note: * indicates significance at the 5% significance level.
Glossary of Acronyms and Abbreviations
ABS Australian Bureau of Statistics.
AD Anderson-Darling.
AIC Akaike Information Criterion (or Criteria).
APRA Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority.
AR Autoregressive.
ARCH Autoregressive Conditionally Heteroskedastic.
ARMA Autoregressive Moving Average
AS Actuarial Standard.
Best Est. Best Estimate.
BIS Bank for International Settlements.
BOY Beginning of Year.
Cap. Ad. Capital Adequacy.
CAPM Capital Asset Pricing Model.
CAS Casualty Actuarial Society.
CEA Comite´ Europe´en des Assurances.
CoC Cost of Capital.
CPI Consumer Price Index.
EOY End of Year.
EPV Expected Present Value.
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EU European Union.
FOPI Swiss Federal Office of Private Insurance.
FUM Funds Under Management.
GARCH Generalised Autoregressive Conditionally Heteroskedastic.
GDP Gross Domestic Product.
GLM Generalised Linear Model.
IAA International Actuarial Association.
IAAust Institute of Actuaries of Australia.
JB Jarque-Bera.
KS Kolmogorov-Smirnov.
LPS Life Insurance Prudential Standard.
LRT Likelihood Ratio Test.
MA Moving Average.
NB Negative Binomial.
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
PV Present Value.
RBA Reserve Bank of Australia.
SCR Solvency Capital Requirement.
SOA Society of Actuaries.
SPI Share Price Index.
TVaR Tail Value at Risk.
VaR Value at Risk.
VAR (Cointegrated) Vector Autoregressive.
ZIP Zero-Inflated Poisson.
Glossary of Insurance Terms
Bonus Bonuses are the means by which profits are distributed to holders of par-
ticipating policies.
Capital Guaranteed Insurance This insurance policy is similar in operation to
an investment-linked insurance policy, except that the value of the investment
units are guaranteed not to decrease in value over the term of the policy.
Central Exposed to Risk The number of person-years lived during the observa-
tion period by those lives under consideration.
Central Mortality Rate The number of deaths per person-year lived in the ob-
servation period by those under consideration.
Deterministic Non-random.
Deterministic Policy Value A policy value calculated using deterministic valu-
ation assumptions.
Deterministic Valuation Assumption A valuation model parameter that is as-
sumed to equal a known, non-random quantity.
Duration The length of time since policy inception.
Endowment Insurance An insurance policy that pays a benefit on (or shortly
after) the death of the insured life, if that death occurs within the specified
term of the policy, or on survival to the end of the policy term.
General Insurance Any insurance that is not classed as Life Insurance or as Pri-
vate Health Insurance. It is also referred to as Non-Life Insurance and as
Property and Casualty Insurance.
In Force An insurance contract is said to be in force if it has been written, that
is, the policy term has commenced, and has not yet expired through reaching
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the end of its term or following a claim, nor has it been terminated by either
the insurer or the policyholder.
Initial Exposed to Risk The number of lives alive and exposed to risk at the
beginning of the observation period.
Initial Mortality Rate The probability of a life, that is alive at the beginning of
the observation period, dying during the observation period.
Insurance Liability The obligation on the part of an insurance company to pay
the benefits specified under the terms of its in force insurance contracts, plus
any expenses (including tax and commission) or profit distributions (required
by the company’s investors) associated with those contracts.
Insured Life Data Data that only includes information on lives that hold Life
Insurance policies.
Investment-Linked Insurance An insurance policy where premiums are used to
purchase “units” in an investment fund and the death benefit is set equal to
the value of those units, after investment growth, tax, and expenses, on the
death of the policyholder.
Lapsation The voluntary termination of an insurance contract by the policyholder.
Also termed withdrawal.
Level Term Insurance A term insurance policy where the premium charged is
guaranteed to remain constant for the entire term of the policy.
Life Insurance Insurance that provides for the payment of money, either as an
annuity or as a lump sum, contingent upon the termination or continuance of
a human life, or on whether a human life is found to be disabled, due to an
accident or illness, or to have a stated medical condition or disease.
Life Office A Life Insurance company.
Morbidity Illness.
Net Premium A premium calculated with no allowance for expenses or profits.
Non-Participating Policy A standard insurance contract under which the poli-
cyholder has no right to share in the profits of the insurer.
Participating Policy Under a participating or with-profits policy, the policyholder
is entitled to receive a share of the profits earned by the insurer (usually as a
result of paying higher premiums than if the policy was a non-profit contract).
These profits are distributed to the policyholder as bonuses.
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Policy Liability The expected present value of future insurance policy outgoings
(including expenses and benefit payments) less the expected present value of
insurance policy income (including premiums). Also termed policy value.
Policy Reserve “The amount of assets that the Life Office needs to hold at a
particular point in time (the valuation date) such that, allowing for future
premium income and for the anticipated returns from investment, the (insur-
ance) liabilities of the Life Office will be met as they fall due” (Booth et al.
(2005, p.223)). This amount may include a risk margin, added to better en-
sure that the insurer will be able to meet all claim payments even if the actual
claims experience turns out to be worse that expected.
Policy Value See policy liability.
Private Health Insurance Insurance that partially or fully reimburses the poli-
cyholder for the costs associated with specified private medical treatments.
Pure Endowment An insurance policy that pays a benefit on the survival of the
insured life to the end of the policy term.
Rider Policy Optional insurance coverage that can be added to an in force insur-
ance policy to modify the benefits under that policy.
Run Off A block of insurance business is said to be in run off if the insurer is no
longer selling new policies of this type but is allowing existing policyholders to
continue with their policies until either the policy term expires or the policy-
holder chooses to terminate the policy. An insurance portfolio is said to have
run off when all of the policies in the portfolio have either expired or been
terminated, either due to a claim being made, to lapsation, or to the actions
of the insurer; and no new policies are being issued by the insurer.
Solvency Capital Requirement The minimum amount of capital that an insurer
must hold at all times, as specified under the legislation of the country in which
the insurer operates.
Statutory Fund Defined under the Life Insurance Act 1995 as “a fund that is
established in the records of a life company and relates solely to the Life
Insurance business of the company or a particular part of that business.”
Stochastic Random.
Stochastic Policy Value A policy value calculated using stochastic valuation as-
sumptions (or using a combination of stochastic and deterministic valuation
assumptions).
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Stochastic Solvency Testing The assessment of an insurer’s solvency position
using probability-based criteria.
Stochastic Valuation Assumption A valuation model quantity that is assumed
to be a random variable which can be described by a probability distribution.
Sum Insured The sum insured of an insurance policy is the amount that the in-
surer will pay in the event of the policyholder’s death, or, in some cases, the
policyholder’s survival to a particular point in time.
Surrender Value The amount that the insurer will pay in the event of the poli-
cyholder voluntarily terminating their insurance policy. This amount may be
0.
Temporary Insurance See term insurance.
Term Insurance An insurance policy that pays a benefit on (or shortly after) the
death of the insured life, if that death occurs within the specified term of the
policy. If the insured life survives to the end of the policy term, then no benefit
is payable. Also referred to as temporary insurance.
Unbundled Insurance An insurance policy where the investment, expense and
mortality insurance elements of the contract can be separated for pricing and
analysis purposes.
Whole of Life Insurance An insurance policy that pays a benefit on (or shortly
after) the death of the insured life, whenever that may occur.
Withdrawal See lapsation.
With-Profits Policy See participating policy.
Yearly Renewable Term Insurance A term insurance policy where the premium
charged may be reviewed on an annual basis.
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